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Preface 
I try to show in this thesis that Johnson not only 
had an interest in the law but how the law affected the 
style of his general reasoning. The best evidence for 
this lies in the legal texture of his periodical essays,. 
his consultations with Boswell on specific legal cases, 
and is collaboration with Chambers in the writing of the 
law lectures. Moreover, the sermons, political pamphlets, 
Rasselas, the Life of Savage, and the petitions written 
on behalf of Dodd, add to an understanding of Johnson's 
legal 'habit of mind'. I have chosen to concentrate on 
. these works because they reflect those juridical concerns 
that characterize Enlightenment thinking and define John- 
son's approach to legal matters. 
No attempt is made here to evaluate his journalism, 
the Parliamentary reports, the Lives of the Poets, the 
play Irene, his poems, and assorted other writings. 
They may be considered for their illustration of tend- 
encies in Johnson's legal and political thinking but a 
detailed analysis of these works is outside the scope of 
this thesis. As I have said, my concern is with the 
periodical essays, the Boswell cases and the law lectures. 
I want to discuss the way Johnson functions in these 
relationships and how this contributes to an understanding 
of the pattern of his jurisprudence. 
The pioneering works of McNair and McAdam are seminal 
to an understanding of this thesis. However, while they 
identify many specific legal elements in Johnson's writ- 
- ii- 
ing, they do little to analyze these elements in terms 
of Johnson's. jurisprudential thinking. Moreover, McNair 
falls short in explaining these patterns and does not 
place Johnson's writing in the context of contemporary 
thought. McAdam sets out Johnson's contributions to the 
Chambers lectures, but he neither places these contribu- 
tions in the context of contemporary intellectual thought, 
nor does he fully appreciate the range of Johnson's legal 
reasoning. McAdam does little to prove his premise that 
Johnson affected the law. 
-111- 
Note Concerning Footnotes: 
For the sake of simplification, none of Johnson's 
works are preceded by his name. Normally the Yale text 
when available is followed. All citations to Boswell's 
Life are taken from. L. F. Powell edition which includes 
the Life of Johnson, Tour to the Hebrides and the Journey 
into Nort Wales. 
All citations to Black'stone's Commentaries '(B1. '. Comm. ) 
are taken from the Fourth E ition, 1770. 
_iv_ 
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Throughout his --ac1 ülh life 'Samuel 'Johnson displayed 
an intense interest in the law. This is evident not only 
in his collaborations with Boswell and Chambers, but also 
v-Jh-e_t, k& ýýa`t hý; iv piiýS 'hdt -ýccdue5 
are determined by the workings of the law. In this pro- 
cess moral and legal authority are perceived by him as 
operating in tandem. 
The legal quality of Johnson's mind is apparent in 
his adoption of the advocate's mask, his intellectual 
inconsistency, his interests in property values, his 
advocacy of criminal law reform, and his understanding 
of the impact the law exerts upon social forces. 
Although a coherent system of Johnson's jurisprudence 
does not emerge from his writings, nonetheless his legal 
thinking entitles him to consideration as an important 





In his periodical essays Johnson reveals an embry- 
onic legal philosophy. Conmenting on moral principles 
and contemporary mores, Johnson in the Rambler, 'Idler, 
and Adventurer Essays reflects a concern for justice and 
an understanding of the complexity of legal administra- 
tion. Despite the remark that he has an 'aversion to 
satire', Johnson', at times, makes sharp satiric observa- 
tions on lawyers and on the'law itself. In addition, 
Johnson draws his satiric portraits by exercising the 
techniques of argumentation used in the structure and 
1 
presentation of a legal brief. This manipulation of 
literary form permits Johnson to comment perceptively 
not only on practitioners of the law but also on current, 
substantive legal issues. In these essays Johnson ef- 
fectively employs_ patterns of jurisprudential thinking 
within a literary texture to design the fabric and 
structure of his"moral"argument. 
2 
Indeed, the especial 
1. cf: Sidney R. Parker, jr., ' The- Fundamentals* of Legal 
Writing, (Charlottesville: The Mic ie Co., 1967), for 
a discussion of effective legal writing and the best 
way to organize the legal principles to be discussed 
in a brief. 
cf: George Rossman, ed. Advocacy and the' Kings English, 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 1960), for 
a discussion of the language required for effective 
advocacy. 
2. Fussell, * Samuel, Johnson, and the, Life of Writing, pp. 
45-46, "All this legal consciousness could not help 
stimulate skill in the management of images and ideas 
less for their own delightful sake than as elements in 
a process of advocacy. From this proximity of the law 
to literature stems the very eighteenth-century idea 
that the act of literature is necessarily an act of 
argument, that the writer, even when he assumes the 
role of poet, is=st comparable to a barrister argu- 
ing a case. " 
2 
attention and effort. which Johnson gave to the legal com- 
ments in the Rambler essays requires them to be reviewed 
for the contribution these essays make to the assessment 
of his juridical thinking. Moreover, the legal comments 
that pervade these' periodical essays reflect the moral and 
social truths which are most expressive of Johnson's own 
thoughts. in Rambler 208 Johnson wrote: 
The'essays professedly serious, if I 
have been able to execute my own in- 
tentions, will be found exactly con- 
formable to the precepts of-Christianity, 
without any accommodation to the licen- 
tiousness and levity of the present age. 
I therefore look back on this part of 
my work with pleasure, which no blame or 
praise of man shall diminish or augment. 
I shall never envy the honours which wit 
and learning obtain in any other cause, if 
I can be numbered among the writers who 
have given ardour to virtue, and confid- 
erice to truth. 
3 
With his mind focused on the universal verities in man and 
his relationship to his society, Johnson's juridical com- 
ments in these periodical essays suggest the tenor of his 
4 
own thoughts more clearly than any of his other writings. 
The structure of these juridical essays indicates an 
ofn. e- 
understanding of the rules of evidence,,, complexity of pro- 
of tº+e. ...... .... shows 
cedure,,, concepts of mens' rea, and, most prominently,, an 
impressive grasp of legal writing and argument. General- 
ly, these essays present a precept, elaborate :, its ram- 
3. ' Rambler 208, p. 320 
4. ' Life -T, p. 210 n. 1, "Dr. Johnson'- said to an acquaint- 
ance ofmine, "My other works are wine and-water; but 
ny Rambler is pure 'wine. "'I Rogers's Table'-Talk, 10. 
3 
ifications, introduce relevant or supporting examples, 
and produce a summation that unravels the potentialities 
of the theme. Organizing the legal essays in this way 
enables Johnson to make 'substantial legal comments within 
a literary perspective. An important aspect of this 
0,6 
style of writing is its function1advancing Johnson's 
primary-interests in legal philosophy and attendant moral 
precepts despite the genre limitations of the essay. The 
importance of Johnson's legal reasoning lies in the saga- 
city of his moral expression which reveals a conservative 
eighteenth-century humanist who, nevertheless, has an 
affinity with the most radical speculation of the Enlight- 
5 
enment. Johnson's conservative proclivities, acting as 
a counterpoint to these flashes of enlightened thought, 
illustrate the inconsistency that characterizes Johnson's 
6 
habit of thought. However, the impetus behind this con- 
tinual intellectual movement is the desire to discern the 
moral truths which' invigorate the spirit of the law. It 
5. Leon'Radzinowicz ,. A -Histor of___ English Criminal' Law 
and its Administration from 1750: The Movement for 
e orm 1750-1833, New Yor : The MacMillan Co., 19 48), 
pp. 336-339. 
6., Life I, p. 471, . 343; ' Life II, 21; ' Life IV, 338; Leopold baamrosch, jr., The'Uses of Johnson's Criticism, (Char- 
lottesville: University of Virginia, 1976), p. 17: "A 
more serious objection to systematizing Johnson's 
thought is that the more precise the system becomes, 
the more it distorts or leaves out matters of great 
importance to him. " What Damrosch writes about the 
limitation's of Johnson's critical theory applies also 
to the habit of mind he exhibits in his jurisprudential 
thinking. 
Rassel'as, p. 20, "'Inconsistencies, answered Imlac, 
cannot both be right, but, imputed to man, they may 
both be true . "' 
4 
is'this quality. äf the 'moral philosopher that impels 
Johnson to search out his sense of. justice as he compre- 
hends the more strictly constructed letter of the law. 
Not only do these juridical essays manipulate legal 
diction for literary concerns, but they reflect an intri- 
cate knowledge'of classical juristic opinion and rhetori- 
cal style. Throughout these essays Johnson utilizes 
legal judgments to develop the moral precepts he desires 
to inculcate or employs legal diction and imagery in 
their structure to flavour examples and initiate discus- 
sion. The legal quality this practice weaves into the 
texture of these essays reflects not only. Johnson's pre- 
occupation with the law but his awareness of the law as 
a regulator of society. This is clearly illustrated by 
7 
Johnson's use'of 'form-words', such as prepositions, 
conjunctions, and articles to shape, accent and emphasize. 
in addition, he uses sentences that are elliptical in 
that the specific legal context is understood though 
7. Margaret M. Bryant, ' English' in the Law Courts: 'The 
" Part' that' Articles, Prepositions and conjunctions Play 
'in Legal Discussions, New York: Co is Univ. Press, 
p. "Briefly, 'form-words' are not definite 
content words which present a specific idea to the 
-mind, but are words which show relationship. " In her 
treatise Bryant discusses how 'form-words' affect legal 
submissions and determine judicial response. 
cf. 'Rambler 86, p. 89, for a discussion of the precise 
use ofcr tical and technical terms, and how the ar- 
rangement of words affect harmony in the language. 
Wiensatt, Philosophic 'Words, pp. 65-66: "it is charact- 
eristic o£ a the types of philosophical image in the 
Rambler that they occur not only in explicit and firm- 
yydrawn similes and analogies but more dispersedly 
and pervasively, in attenuated and shorter metaphors 
or in phrases which have only a coloring of philosophy. " 
5 
omitted. There. is no systematic use of legal idioms and 
maxims in Johnson's periodical essays; however, distinct 
and frequent usage of these'terms and the concerns they 
reflect do. occur. Any discrete review of ' these' essays 
indicates the importance of the- law to Johnson not only 
in a synoptic sense but in the realization that the inti- 
mations in his language reflect the relationship between 
the'law and the society which it governs. 
8 
Several Rambler essays contribute prominently to an 
understanding of Johnson's jurisprudential thinking or 
reflect a legal flavour in their structure and language. 
9 
These essays complemented by numbers from the'Idler and 
10 
Adventurer help to formulate Johnson's general legal 
thinking and establish his view of-the legal relations 
existing between rights and duties. The content of these 
essays ranges from the citation of legal maxims, to com- 
ments on debt and the excessive reliance on the death 
penalty. Johnson examines legal education and the type 
of persons drawn to the law. He characterizes the law- 
yer's position in society and the perceptions of him held 
by the average person as well as his peers in the profes- 
sion. Although *Johrison often tries to hide behind the 
mask of a satirist, he shows himself to be aman who loves 
8. Rambler essays: 23,60,81,114,142,148,149,19,95, 
197,8,9,13,18,57,20,60,14,113, ' and 125. 
9. 'Idler essays: S. 10,11°, 22,38,65,71,85,89, and 
10. Adventurer essays: 50,62, and 102. 
6 
the law and is disconcerted by the realization that not 
all share his view of propriety and professional ethics. 
In these essays the foundations of Johnson's legal views 
are laid and the points discussed illuminate the problems 
inherent in a society that is governed by the appearance 
of justice and the rule of law. 
-- ---i---- 
Throughout these essays, Johnson employs the tech- 
niques of the rhetorician to set up a framework within 
which his moral and legal discussions are advanced. John- 
son uses language to create examples that present incisive 
legal arguments. With discernment and insight Johnson 
advised how to design-a successful argument: 
it is observed by the Younger Pliny, 
that an orator ought not so much to 
select the strongest arguments which 
his cause'admits, as to employ all 
which his imagination can afford; 
for, in pleading, those'; äre of most 
value, which will most affect the 
judges; and the judges, says he, will 
be always most touched with that which 
they had before conceived. 
11 
This technical advice may appear obvious; however, to 
Johnson the importance of an effective oral presentation 
12 
could not be over-estimated. The value of pleading and 
11. ' Rambler 23, p. 128. 
12. Alessandro Giuliani, 'The Influence of Rhetoric on. 
the Law of Evidence and Pleading', 7 N. S. Juridical 
Review (1962), pp. 216-251. 
John Ä. Inglis, 'Eighteenth Century Pleading', 19 
Juridical Review (1907-1908), pp. 42-57. 
7 
its rhetorical presentation gave'life and shape to the 
legal questions involved. And this rather general advice 
cannot be dismissed as valueless since Johnson understood 
that the verbal argument added colour and understanding 
13 
to notions of proof and evidence. 
Although the focus of Rambler 23'is not specifically 
a legal one, the observations made on judicial proceedings 
indicate that some reference is being-made to an unfortu- 
nate occurrence in the courtroom. Conveyed through an 
essay on'literary criticism, Johnson's advice to an orator 
suggests a serious failing in the judicial process. Advo- 
cates who exploit their talents can obscure facts and sug- 
gest to a judge Interpretations at the expense of justice. 
Superficially, legal principle and procedure provide the 
connection with the'rule'of law; however, the prejudices 
and thought processes of a judge assuredly parallel those 
of the literary critic in reaching a judgment. Thus, a 
judge's understanding of the elements in a case is similar 
to that of a critic evaluating a literary text. Both are 
subject to preconceived opinions, bound by tradition in 
the roles they assume, and influenced by reputation; yet 
in spite of that they present a _ftLcade of 
independence 
13. Life V, pp. 26-27; On the practice of law Johnson com- 
ments: "lawyers are a class of the community, who, by 
study and experience, have acquired the art and power 
of arranging evidence, and of applying to the points 
at issue what the law has settled. ... If, by a super- iority of attention, of knowledge, of skill, and a 
better method of communication, he has the advantage 
of his adversary, it is an advantage to which he 'is 
entitled. There must always be some advantage, on one 
side or other; and it is better that advantage should 
be had by talents, than by chance. " 
8 
and vigorously. deny they have any prejudice. An aware- 
ness of what is convincing to both types of judge, in 
essence, provides a guide to an effective legal presenta- 
tion. 
This analogy is not extraordinary since the attention 
with which jurist and critic observe'life is the same. 
Both function in much the same way as they scrutinize 
14 
principles and their-application. In their review of 
either a case or a text, they try to detect disparities 
between form and content as well as expose illusion. Each 
in their way complement the other and each'is a-metaphor 
for the other. And in Johnson himself there is a percept- 
ible, though subtle, integration of the two. With this 
relationship in mind, it becomes clear that much of John- 
son's counsel to an orator or literary critic has its 
corresponding function also 'in the law and its administra- 
tion. The various and extensive dimensions of their rela- 
tionship becomes apparent in these essays when their spe- 
cific legal texture is examined., This is not to suggest 
that everything here must be regarded as of a legal nature 
but to realize the 'peculiar habit of Johnson's mind where 
the possibility is always present. 
Evidence of this 'relationship between' critic and 
judge is present in'Rambler 95. In this essay Johnson 
articulates the dangers in sophistry and the susceptibil- 
ity to intellectual hubris that afflict lawyers and 
14. The word 'critic' comes from the Greek It? \w which. 
has the gloss of 'to judge'. 
9 
judges. He discusses the skills needed for an advocate 
and points out the way these skills can be abused in an 
adversary relationship. Describing how he survived liv- 
15 
ing in a disputatious household, Pertinax - actually re- 
lates the manner in which a judge is perceived to act: 
It was necessarily my care to preserve 
the kindness of both the*controvertists, 
and therefore I had very early formed the 
habit of suspending -my judgti4%j*, of 
hearing arguments with indifference, 
inclining as occasion required to either 
side, and of holding myself undetermined 
between them till I knew of-what opinion 
I might conveniently declare. 
16. 
This recitation suggests the joys present in a sense of 
power, and despite protestations to the 'contrary, the 
frequent exercise of an arbitrary judgment. Pertinax's 
remarks capture the'common view of the judge in society 
especially with the appearance of impartiality disguising 
the preconceived opinion. By describing Pertinax's 
, l- 
methöd of decision-making, Johnson implies. 
the 
lack of 
essential fairness required for the proper administration 
of justice is common to judges. 
Pertinax relates how his early training led him to 
the study of the law: 
Thus, Sir, I acquired very early the 
skill of disputation, and, as we natur- 
15. cf. Edward A. Bloom, 'Symbolic Names in Johnson's 
Periodical Essays', ' Modern' Lan aae___ Quarterly, vol. 
13'(1952), pp. 333-372; for the classic paper on 
the value. and importance of Johnson's use of names 
in these 'essays. 
16. 'Rambler 95, p. 144. 
10 
ally love the arts in which we believe 
ourselves to excel I did not let lay 
abilities lie useless, nor suffer my dexterity 
to be lost for want of practice. I engaged 
in perpetual wrangles with my schoolfellows, 
and was never to be convinced or repressed 
by any other arguments than blows, by which 
my antagonists commonly determined the 
controversy, as I was,. like the Roman 
orator, much more eminent for eloquence than 
courage, .................................... My father, who had no other wish than to 
see his son richer than himself, easily con- 
cluded that I should distinguish myself 
among the professors of the law; and there- 
for, when I had taken my first degree, dis- 
patched me to the Temple with a paternal 
admonition', that I should never suffer my- 
self to feel shame, for nothing but modesty 
could retard my fortune. . 17 
Quickness of tongue and desire for riches seem to be the 
motivating forces behind Pertinax's quest for a legal 
career. These character traits are set out in this essay 
as common to those'attracted to the legal profession. 
Naturally, to Johnson this situation would wreak havoc 
not only so far as Pertinax was concerned, but also in 
its effect on the quality and status of the profession. 
The Horaticgn urbanity with which. the portrait of Pertinax 
is drawn is an attempt to hide the dismay Johnson feels 
when he has to undertake such castigation of character 
and motive. * 
it is instructive'to consider the way in which John- 
son has Pertinax tell of his stay at the Temple: 
I was nor/in the place where every one 
catches the contagion of vanity, and soon 
began to distinguish myself by sophisms 
17. 'Rambler 95, pp. 144-145. 
11 
and paradoxes. ' I declared war against 
all received opinions and established rules, 
and levelled my batteries particularly 
against those universal principles which. 
had stood unshaken in all the vicissitudes 
of literature, and are considered as the . inviolable temples of truth, or the 
impregnable bulwarks of science. 
........................................... 
I knew the defects of every scheme of govern- 
merit, and the inconveniencies of every law. 
18 
This indictment of the legal profession and legal educa- 
19 
tion reflects Johnson's disapproval of the type and 
quality of person drawn to the law. And this educational 
process seen through the use of a figure such as Pertinax 
has significant consequences: 
The habit of considering every proposition 
as alike uncertain, left me so test by 
which any tenet could be tried; every 
opinion presented both sides with equal 
evidence, * and my fallacies began to 
operate upon my own mind in more important 
enquiries. It was at last the sport of my 
vanity to weaken the obligations of moral 
duty, and efface the distinctions of good 
and evil, till I had deadened the sense of 
conviction, and abandoned my heart to the 
fluctuations of uncertainty, without anchor 
and without compass, without satisfaction 
of curiosity or peace of conscience; with- 
out principles of reason, or motives of 
action. Such is the hazard of repressing 
the first perceptions of-truth, of spread- 
ing for diversion the snares of sophistry, 
and engaging reason against its own deter- 
minations. 
" 20 
18. Rambler 95, pp. 145-146. 
19. cf. Holdsworth, A History of Engli'sh, Law, vol. 6, pp. 
489-499; 620-624-, -for a discussion o egal education 
and the comments of Roger North in the late 17th Cen- 
tury; vol. 12, pp. 77-91, for his remarks on the mel- 
ancholy topic of legal education-in the eighteenth 
century. 
20. °Rambler 95, p. 147. 
12 
This suggestion of moral relativism now recognized by ? er- 
tinax is an affliction that often affects members of the 
legal community. Pertinax's comprehension of this weak- 
ness presented in the way one approaches the issues in a 
law case sugge2ts moral problems. present in any adversary 
system of law. Questions of moral and intellectual 
honesty-affect the professional advocate not only with 
the temptation for mental gymnastics but in the appeal to 
vanity. Johnson intimates th. at a solid foundation in 
moral values and an understanding of intellectual prin- 
ciples are more necessary to the advocate than the facil- 
ity for specious argumentation. 
Although Pertinax is portrayed as a conscientious 
though ' certainly confused law student, the logic and 
discipline mandatory for a legal mind is absent. Perti- 
nax does not have the temperament that Johnson feels is 
required for one to be a credit to the law and its admin- 
istration. The suggestion in Rambler 95 is that the 
problems in the administration of the law and the deliv- 
ery of justice 'are"intimate'1 with the quality of the prac- 
titioner. And before there can be any solution to these 
problems, reform must begin with legal education and the 
quality of those persons drawn to its study. 
This theme of legal education and the personality 
traits of those attracted to the law was of constant con- 
21. cf., Life II, pp. 47,430-431; * Life V, pp. 26-27, for 
a discussion of legal ethics in the adversary system. 
13 
cern to Johnson22 and appears often in these essays. 
Johnson raises questions of both the quality and sincer- 
ity of students and practitioners to determine the effec- 
tive and just administration of the law. To this end. 
Johnson creates his satiric portraits of unscrupulous 
lawyers and incompetent students as a way to query method 
and th. e delivery of justice in the legal system. The way 
in which. Johnson varies the design of these portraits 
highlights the particular problem he'wishes to be exam- 
ined. The legal system depends on those who operate it, 
and Johnson recognizes that stability in society and the 
advance of civilization'is'measured by how the law is per- 
22. cf. Bl:. Comm T, 5-14, for Blackstone's complaints 
about the quality, status, and nature of legal educa- 
tion. Johnson's interest in legal education is most 
-clearly demonstrated in the aid he gave in composing 
Chambers' law lectures. In these lectures one of 
Johnson's most interesting, legal education, is where he advises on the use of books and the art of learning: "Precedents thus necessarily established are necessary 
to be learned, but they must be learned only from books, for there could be no use of rewriting in a lecture a long form which by its exactness is inevitably too 
long for the memory and too minute for the attention 
of the hearer, and which the lecturer having no power 
to alter or contract, can only transcribe from a book 
in which any of his auditors can read it for himself. 
The course and order of this legal process or the 
reciprocal transactions of a suit might be generally 
deduced and described, but of such accounts the use 
would probably not equal the expectation of the hear- 
er because it is useless to be told of that which may every day be seen, and a judicial process like 
everything else is learned with less danger of error 
or forgetfulness, by practice and observation than by 
precept and description. To know forms it is neces- 
sary to read precedents, and to learn practice it is 
requisite to frequent the courts, not neglecting to 
excite observation and to confirm experience by the 
use of such books as the great masters of legal pro- 
ceedings have given us for our direction. (Kings 96, 
pp. 89-90). 
14 
ceived to function by the- 'common people. 
23 
It has often 
been observed by Johnson that the law provides the con- 
24 . 
nection between the citizen and his society, and that 
lawyers as officers of the court represent the law in. 
fact and deed to these people. While he does not over- 
25 
look the minor judiciary, Johnson's focus in these 
essays is on those who represent themselves as having 
been influenced by systematic legal study. 
Johnson's most striking portrait of a vicious lawyer 
is developed in Rambler 197., Captator's father is a coun- 
try attorney whose mission in life seems to be the accumu- 
lation of wealthby either legitimate'or fraudulent means. 
Dexterity of conscience and sharp practice' provided the 
justifications and devices of this attorney. Captator 
describes how this attitude manifests itself in his 
father's attention to selected relatives. 
These hoarders of money were visited and 
courted by all who had any pretence to 
23, sermon 24, pp. 250-251: "... that no publick prosper- 
ity or private quiet, can be hoped for, but from the 
justice and wisdom of those, to whom the administra- 
tion of affairs, and the execution of the laws, is 
committed. " 
24. ' Life II, p. 249: "it is the society for which the 
magistrate is agent. " 
25. 'Adventurer 102, p. 439: Writing of a country Justice 
ot -Peace,, Johnson portrays him as saying: "I have 
no skill in controversial learning, nor can conceive 
why so many volumes should have been written upon 
questions, which i have lived so long and so happily 
without understanding. I once resolved to go through 
the volumes relating to the office of justice of the 
peace, ' but found them so crabbed. and intricate, that 
in less than a month i desisted in despair, and re- 
solved to supply-my deficiencies by paying a compet- 
ent salary to a skillful clerk. " 
15 
approach them, and received presents 
and compliments from cousins who could 
scarcely tell the degrees of their 
relation. But we had peculiar advant- 
ages, which encouraged us to hope, that we 
should by degrees supplant our competi- 
tors. My father, by his profession, made 
himself necessary in their affairs; for the 
sailor and cYýambermaid, he enyý; fed oaf-ý, ý. ýkja9es and secýý. '{ýtsý and 
w. ofe 6--ids---Ps-J"4Tä d had endeared himself to the 
old woman, who once rashly lent an hundred 
pounds without consulting him, by informing 
her, that her debtor, was on the point of 
bankruptcy, and posting so expeditiously 
with'an execution, that all the other 
creditors were defrauded. 
26 
Johnson suggests that such misconduct and exploitation is 
too common in the practice of the law. This type of 
27 
solicitation and abuse of process, which violates the 
standard of legal ethics set out in even the most general 
canons of the law, is one of the oldest and most legiti- 
mate objects of satire. 
28 
In choosing satire as the vehicle to denounce this 
conduct, Johnson appreciates the levels on which his crit- 
icism operates. And in following Pope's dictum: no writ- 
ing is good that does not tend to better mankind some way 
or other', Johnson is aware that his readers will recog- 
26. Rambler, 197, pp. 263-264. 
27., Life II, pp'. 430-431, Johnson discusses a different 
type of legal solicitation. 
28., Dictionary: "Proper Satire is distinguished, by the 
generality of the reflections from a lampoon which is 
aimed at a particular person. " Johnson is acting as a 
sort of guardian of legal ideals, and the use of 
satire reflects his recognition of what actually is 
and what should be. 
cf. ''Idler 45 where Johnson attacks a particular type 
of site (lampooner of mankind) but here he hopes 
his satire will effect change. 
16 
nize the existence of this type of attorney and become 
vigilant in dealing with him. The requisite that good 
satire requires easy identific cction indicates that Cap- 
tator's father is not an unusual character. The inclusion 
of this portrait of misconduct and exploitation in the 
essays discloses how seriously Johnson takes the myth of 
the unprincipled attorney. 
Captator relates how this betrayal of trust by his 
father was accomplished: 
To the squire he was a kind of steward, 
and had distinguished himself in his 
office by his address in raising the 
rents, his inflexibility in distressing 
the tardy tenants, and his acuteness in 
setting the parish free from burthensome 
inhabitants, by shifting them off to 
some other settlement. 
Business made frequent attendance' 
necessary; trust soon produced intimacy; 
and success gave a claim to kindness; so 
that we had opportunity to practise all 
the arts of flattery and endearment. 
29 
By-making Captator's father attractive to his clients and 
effective on their behalf, Johnson points out just how 
seductive evil can be. People who have problems or want 
things done for them allow their own scruples to be com- 
promised. When moral or business standards are abrogated 
in an effort to seek quick'advantage, control over actions 
in this pursuit can be illusory. Johnson suggests the 
dangers of yielding to temptation for power or riches, 
and why one must be'especially vigilant in fiduciary re- 
29. ' Rambler 197, p. 264. 
17 
lationships. 
Derived from this -situation -is the question of what 
determines proper 'standards of behavior and what elements 
constitute the norms required to be'accepted in any func- 
tioning legal system. "Every guide to behaviour is also 
a standard for evaluation- individual acts can be evalu- 
ated according to whether or not they are prescribed be- 
30' 
häviour. " Johnson's suggestion is that because of the 
presence of quirks in man and 'society one may easily reap 
a crop that one 'does not sow. Reasoning that individuals 
affect the way in which'the'law functions, Johnson avers 
that the 'misuse of the system affects those who subvert 
intention and angle'for unfair advantage. ' in setting out 
this situation, Johnson spreads the responsibility for the 
maintenance 'of the legal system between all those who are 
touched by it. It is not stipulated that this obligation 
applies only to the lawyer, his clients, or victims, but 
that it assuredly involves the reader of the essays. The 
liability rests with everyone to, ensure the equitable ad- 
ministration of justice, and it is this idea which gives 
the portrait its avenging spirit. 
The remarks contained in these satiric portraits are 
not mere jibes but reveal Johnson's considered opinion on 
the morals of lawyers and students. in Rambler 19 the 
vignette presents a facile and multifariously talented 
30. Joseph 'Raz,. The' Concept' of ä Legal' 'System: ' An' Intro- 
duction to the Theory System, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, , p. 124. 
18 
student named Polyphilus who surveys various careers to 
find the one for which he is most fitted. When Polyphil- 
us investigates the demands 'and requirements of the legal 
profession, he perceives many curious discrepancies be- 
tween appearance and reality. This is how Johnson des- 
cribes Polyphilüs' experience: 
He immediately took chambers in the Tem- 
ple, bought a commonplace--book, and con- 
fined himself for some months to the 
perusal of the statutes, year-books, 
pleadings, and reports; he was a constant 
hearer of the courts, and began to put 
cases with reasonable accuracy. But he 
soon discovered, by considering the fortune 
of lawyers, that preferment was not to be 
got by acuteness, learning, and eloquence. 
He was perplexed by the absurdities of 
attorneys, and misrepresentations made by 
his clients of their own causes; by the 
useless anxiety of one, and the incessant 
importunity of another; he began to 
repent of having devoted himself to a study, 
which was so narrow in its comprehension 
that it could never carry his name to any 
other country, and thought it unworthy of 
a man of parts to sell his life only for 
money. 
31 
To his dismay Polyphilus discovers that neither diligence 
nor virtue finds sure reward in the law. A narrow and 
constricted learning combined with an ease of conscience 
seem to be the prescription for a successful legal career. 
Unfortunately, this observation does not reflect an anom- 
alous situation, but instead makes a succinct statement 
on the popular perceptions of lawyers and law students. 
31. ' Rambler 19, p. 106; cf. footnote 22, for Johnson's re- 
marks on law books and legal education' (Chambers' lec- 
ture K. 95, pp. 89-90). 
19 
Polyphilus' acute disappointment and unfulfilled ex- 
" pectations are described in this account to dramatize the 
evident absence of ethical conduct by both lawyers and 
their clients. Encouraged by their clients, lawyers man- 
ipulate'fact and subvert principle in the mutual desire 
for success. This alliance 'contributes to a breakdown of 
confidence in the "legal system and contempt for all those 
involved in the legal process. Johnson avers that a higher 
standard of behaviour is demanded from those who act as 
guardians of the regulating - processes. of society. Thus, 
Johnson draws from Polyphilus' experience to underscore 
the'relevance'of this thesis as well as sharpen his satir- 
ic thrust. The'terision created between Polyphilus' revela- 
tion and the viewpoint of the reader sets the stage on 
which Johnson plays out his tale of disenchantment. This 
appeal for'the e. eäder to be the judge of where and how 
such conduct is harmful to 'society is entirely managed by 
Johnson'. By utilizing this particular image of Polyphilus, 
Johnson denies the "reader the 'luxury of a complacent atti- 
tude. 
In Rambler 19 Johnson develops the sentiment that ad- 
vanceinerit in the law is proportionate'to one's talents for 
ob, fuscatjon, and that the speed with ' which' this advancement 
is achieved is determined by the degree of avarice. This 
32 
vignette is replete with suggestions of a conspiracy to 
32. Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal 
Law in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in 
( ew ým : duLu fro e, Eighteent - gJl , IIIU 
p. o private manipulation of the law 
by the wealthy and powerful was in truth'a ruling- 
class conspiracy, in the most exact meaning of the 
word. The King, judges, magistrates and gentry used 
private, extra-egal dealings among themselves to 
bend the statute and common law to their own purposes. " 
20 
subvert virtue and distort justice. Johnson-avers that 
their clients' complicity abets lawyers in a deceitful 
approach to legal practice and ethical conduct. The 
structure of Polyphilus' tale allows wide scope for the 
promulgation of Johnson's didacticism. Certainly, John- 
son's intention is to expose weaknesses in the legal sys- 
tem and imperfections in the moral character of those 
involved. He does not admonish merely to reaffirm con- 
temporary opinion of lawyers and the management of their 
33' 
practice, but to Offer the remedy of vigilance. In 
essence, this portrait argues for a better system of legal 
education, and one which does not neglect the teaching of 
ethical and moral standards. 
33. cf. Rambler 13, p. 69, for Johnson's remarks on secre- 
cy and How lawyers are known to use private informa- 
tion for their own purposes. 
Robert Robson, The Attorney inEighteenth-Century Eng- 
land, (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1959), p. 136: "The lawyer, on the other hand, was made necessary only by 
. the 
depravity of men- or of other men- and by the in- 
creased complexity and artificiality of society. A 
defeated client would abuse his own attorney for his 
ineptitude, and his opponent's for his chicanery. His 
successful antagonist would resent having to pay for 
what he believed to be his rights, and would harbour 
a grudge against his adversary's attorney for having 
subjected him to unnecessary expense and delay. 
Further, lawyers were agents and nothing more. They 
were, in the opinion of many besides Swift, 'A Society 
of men bred up from their youth in the art of proving, by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is 
black, and black is white, according as they are paid. ' 
'(cf. Junius' Letter of 22 June 1769) It was assumed 
that they were not over-fastidious in accepting cases 
and clients, or very seriously concerned that justice 
should prevail. " 
Henry Fielding, The Author's Farce, ' ed. Henley: "The 
lawyer, with a face demure, / Hangs him who steals 
your pelf; / Because the good man can endure/ No rob- 
ber but himself. vol. viii, p. 245. 
21 
To Johnson. religion provided the ethical -framework 
34 
for a moral life, and in large measure this attitude 
helped to shape his legal and-social thinking. For John- 
son advanced a strong relationship between church and 
35 -. 36 
state where there was toleration' but not equality as 
to religion. This position forms a central tenet in his 
understanding of the moral content in legal education. 
In Rambler 9 the - vignette' illustrates a law student's 
resistance to this viewwpoint. Here, Johnson does not 
underestimate the hostility the self-assured law student 
betrays: 
The truth'is, very few of them have 
thought about religion, but they have 
all seen a parson, seen him in a habit 
different from their own, and there- 
fore declared war against him. A 
young student from the inns of court, 
who has often attacked the curate of 
his father's parish with such argu- 
ments as his acquaintances could fur- 
nish, and returned i"o; tawn , withou* sýcCesS is now gone down with a resolution to 
destroy him; for he has learned at 
last how to managea prig, and if he 
pretends to hold him again to syllogism, 
he has a catch in reserve, which neither 
logic nor metaphysics can resist. 
37 
This law student has an enmity to religion that is a mere 
34. Quinlan, Samuel- Johnson*: * A' Layman's' Religion, p. 155. 
35. 'Li'fe II, pp. 249-253, Johnson places limits on tolera- 
t on. 
36. Chapin, ' The' Religious' Thought' of Samuel, Johnson, pp. 
118-140. c. sermon 24, were Johnson suggests that 
moral and legal-alority are predicated on Christian 
principles. 
37. ' Rambler 9, p. 48. 
22 
reflex and uninformed. In addition, this law student's 
actions contribute to Johnson's'assertions"as to the 
faulty moral structure' inherent in legal education. in 
Johnson's view the ethical framework derived from relig- 
ious teaching sustains fidelity to the working out of 
legal principles. Johnson's premise is that laws are in 
large measure developed by moral teachings, and that the 
quality of those persons involved in the law zaust be 
shaped-by them. it is the responsibility of law lectur- 
ers to point out these connections to their students and 
have them avoid ill-considered argument. Unfortunately, 
Johnson sees a penchant for superficial and facile rea- 
38 
soning in the type of training law students undergo. 
Johnson informs the reader that the product of this 
training reflects the wisdom of the maxim:, leges sine 
moribus Vanae. While this student may have learned the 
techniques of argument, he fails to realize how essential 
moral standards are to the law and legal argument. John- 
son uses this portrait to underscore his idea that morals 
are indispensable for any successful legal system. 
38. 'Bi'Comm. I, p. 31: Blackstone clearly evidences sym- 
patFy for the student trapped by contemporary pedago- 
gical practice: "A raw and unexperienced youth, in the 
most dangerous season of life, is transplanted on a 
sudden into the midst of allurements to pleasure, 
without any restraint or check but what his own pru- 
dence can suggest; with no public direction in what 
course to pursue his enquiries; no private assistance 
to remove the distresses and difficulties which will 
always embarrass a beginner. In this situation he is 
expected to sequester himself from the world, and by 
a tedious lonely process to extract the theory of law 
from a mass of undigested learning; or else by an 
assiduous attendance on the courts to pick up theory 
and practice together, sufficient to qualify him for 
the ordinary run of business. 
23 
Adrift and lonely, ' it is only a short journey for a 
student to degenerate' into a consuming cynicism and exped- 
ience. Moreover, from ill-digested learning and the un- 
instructed attention to loft)'- principle 'comes delusion. 
Certainly, it is the law student to whom: 
it is natural to mean well, when only 
abstracted ideas of virtue are proposed 
to the mind, and no particular passion 
turns us aside from rectitude; and so 
willing is every man to flatter himself, that 
the difference between approving laws, and 
obeying them, is frequently forgotten; he 
that acknowledges the obligations of moral- 
ity, and pleases his vanity with enforcing 
them to öthers, concludes himself zealous 
in the cause of virtue, though he has no 
longer any regard to her precepts, than 
they conform to his own desires; and counts 
himself among her warmest lovers, because 
he praises her beauty, though every rival 
steals away his,, heart. 
39 
On the'one hand, Johnson shows his understanding of the 
dispiriting nature of legal education, and on the other, 
he recognizes the eventual damage'this does to the law 
itself. Thesenportraits articulate 'Johnson's indictment 
of the way legal study corrupts and the impact this cor- 
ruption has on society. Those involved in all aspects of 
the law share with the reader the responsibility for per- 
mitting this to happen. 
These uncomplimentary portraits of law students and 
lawyers indicate the precariousness that human agency in- 
jects into the exercise of moral and legal principles. 
In these observations on the legal conmunity, Johnson ex- 
35. ' Rambler 76, p. 34. 
24 
presses the ethical imperatives that he passionately 
wants the law to. reflect. - However, it is-not in the 
power of Johnson's portraits to correct all these defects, 
, 
but in pointing them out Johnson hopes to inspire refor- 
oration. Johnson's grasp of legal education and his own 
moral principles provide the impetus behind the correc- 
Lions he'feels are needed. These unseemly portraits are 
drawn to focus attention 
of legal administration. All this helps to lay the foun- 
dation for Johnson's collaboration with'Chambers and his 




This theme of the lawyer in pursuit o'expediencg 
40 
has its corollary in the malevolent intention of clients. 
Johnson sees this as leading to an exploitation of power 
-and privilege that can corrupt a man and harm his sub- 41 
ordinates. it is not surprising that there is a series 
42 
of essays dealing with-money and abuse in the law. For 
40. cf. My remarks on'Rambler 197, pp. 14-17. 
41. Sermon 23, p. 239: "Every man may, without a crime, 
study his own happiness, if he be careful not to im- 
pede, by design, the happiness of others. In the 
race of life, some must gain the prize, and others 
must lose it; but the prize is honestly gained by him who outruns his competitor, without endeavouring 
to overthrow him. "; p. 246: "The great benefit of 
society is that the weak are protected against the 
strong. " 
Voi, tle_, ' Samuel Johnson' the Moralist, pp. 57-58. 
42. 'Adventurer 34,41,53, and 62; "Idler 22 and 38. 
25 
this relation between law and money holds great potential 
43 
for a moralist who himself has suffered from poverty. 
While these essays elicit a compassionate and humane re- 
44 
sponse, ' Johnson's own sense of property conflicts with 
the 'effect strict laws on property have. ' On the one hand, 
in his jurisprudential thinking Johnson stresses the sanc- 
tity of property, and on the other, he is willing to adapt 
elements of his theory to particular cases. This duality 
illuminates Johnson's understanding of the importance hu- 
man agency has in the 'administration' of the law. 
Johnson's reaction to the types of injustice that 
occur.. when money intervenes is characteristic of his un- 
derstanding of the place moral values have in seemingly 
mundane legal issues. In'Rambler 142 Johnson attacks the 
privileged classes' manipulation of the legal system to 
the disadvantage of the poor and untutored. 
43. Clifford, Young Sam Johnson, pp. 210-212; Bate, 'The 
Achievement of Samuel Jo nson, pp. 74-78; In The 
'Vanity of Human Wises, Jo nson writing from Both the 
dept of his own experience with poverty and his moral 
outlook sets out in a legal context the corruption of 
wealth: ' "But scarce observ'd, the knowing and the bold/ 
Fall in the gen'ral massacre of gold; / Wide-wasting 
pest! that rages unconfin'd, / And clouds with crimes 
the records of mankind; /Fý. -s-o/d{, s sword the hireling 
ruffian draws, / For Gold the hireling judge distorts 
the laws; / Wealth'heap'd on wealth, nor truth nor 
safety buys, / The dangers gather as the treasures 
rise. (lines 21-28). 
44. Greene, 'The Politics'of Samuel-Johnson, p. 196: "... 
there must be laws protecting private property. But 
at the back of all his political thinking there is the 
feeling that it is wrong for any one individual to be 
allowed unlimited opportunity to increase his own. 
happiness at the expense of that of others, and that 
it is a prime function of the state to set limits to 
such opportunity. " cf. My chapter on Johnson's varied 
views of property discussed in the Chambers' lectures. 
26 




His. (Squire Bluster's) next acts of 
offence 'were committed in a contentious 
and spiteful vindication of the privil- 
eges of his manors, and a rigorous and 
relentless prosecution of every man 
that presumed to violate his game. As he 
happens to have no estate adjoining equal 
to his own; his oppressions are often borne 
without resistance, for fear of a long 
suit, of which he delights to count the 
expenses without the least solicitude 
about the event; for he knows, that where 
nothing but an honorary right is con- 
tested, the poorer antagonist must always 
suffer, whatever shall be the last decision 
of the law. 
45 
Limitation of actions in law and discriminatory vestiges 
of a feudal system combine to subvert civilized values. 
It is odious that the poor may be manipulated at the dis- 
cretion of a caviling squire, and the instrument that per- 
mits this to happen is provided by lawyers. And it is 
the recurring pattern of such activity that imbues this 
46 
portrait with its moral intensity. ' The insensitivity 
of a squire Bluster supplies an example for Johnson's 
criticism and illustrates the burdens which the law must 
45. " Rambler 14, p. 392. 
46. cf. Johnson's translation' of Horace. ' Epode' the 2d 
where a different kind of country squire is described: 
"Blest as th' immortal Gods is he/ Who lives from 
toilsome bus'ness free, / Like the first race in Sat- 
urns reign/ When floods of Nectar stain'd the-main, / 
Manuring with laborious hand/ His own hereditary Land, / 
Whöme' no contracted debts molest/ No griping Creditörs 
infes$1' 
.J No trumpets sound, o Soldiers cries, / Lrý v2. ßfä erhöh 
Üd1/"ýh 
Diýap. býi ? a, ý, pes 
.tiinI o1`GV 
%rrvr+ lsV V' 
d. r&, w ji. nos ily 
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bear. 
Although Squire Bluster's action's are. insolent and 
mischievous, what is more reprehensible is the violation 
of security which. the law is supposed to nurture. To 
Johnson this is especially distressing since he always 
47 
feared the violent disintegration of 'society. Although 
Rambler 142 is not a precise exposition of how the poor 
are treated by local squires, it does point out how the 
legal system is exploited. Johnson sees this type of 
legal perversion as providing the background from which 
fundamental changes in the law must come. ' When the letter 
of the law is applied exclusively, the spirit of the law 
can be neglected, and Johnson apprehends thecdamage this 
does to the fabric of'society. The cynical-and unethical 
employment of legal theory to advance an untenable moral 
position militates against the relevance and majesty of 
the law. Johnson's belief in the rule of law has a strong 
ideological basis, but this includes an adherence to moral 
48 
precepts that are not confused in the web of legal theQr'. 
Certainly, Johnson's object in this portrait of Squire 
Bluster is to show how the cunning use of social power 
47. Cf. The False Alarm (1770), Johnson's political pam- 
phlet written on the expulsion of Wilkes from Parlia- 
ment, contains many illustrations of Johnson's abhor- 
rence of mob rule and the dangers this holds for so- 
ciety. 
48. cf. * Diarie's, ' Prayers, and Annals, p. 96; Johnson's 
prayer "Before the Study of Law"; Sermon 18, p. 193: 
"To subdue passion, and regulate des , is the great 
task of man, as a moral agent; a task, for which 
natural reason, however assisted and enforced by hu- 
man laws, has been found insufficient, and which can- 
not be performed but by the help of religion. " 
28 
distorts belief in justice and shadows the appearance of 
law. 
Such behaviour makes Johnson anxious. As a practi- 
cal moralist Johnson'believes that the pursuit of general 
happiness is not limited to intention but includes the 
49 
effect of activity. Both his moral and legal reasoning 
50 
tells him that the fundamental utility which enables 
the law to operate'is impeded by the actions of a Squire 
Bluster. Johnson's concept'of the law includes the moral- 
ity that makes it possible and acceptable. ' The internal 
morality of the law conflicts with Bluster's subversion 
of its external function, and it is this problem that 
Johnson wants to demonstrate. While it is desirable to 
have laws governing the landlord-tenant relation, their 
application requires balance and discrimination. Bluster's 
abuse of process not only subtends moral principle but 
the social fabric of society on which the law depends. 
Integrity in the'law is the substantive aim of'Johnson's 
moral outlook and the recognition of this attitude illumi- 
49. Voitle, p. 150; "He (Johnson) does not regard moral- 
ity as mainly consisting in being goodhearted or in 
being anything, because above all morality to him 
means doing. The chief goals of the activity so 
fundamental to his moral thinking are the happiness 
of the agent, which involves self-realization, and 
the happiness of others. 
50. Cf. Kings 80, pp. 20-21; Writing on 'politick law', 
Johnson sets out more clearly his ideas on utility and happiness in determining laws for society. In my dis- 
cussion I point out Johnson's compatibility with 
Bentham's idea of utility in the law; moreover, in 
this attitude Johnson reflects his interests int. las - 
sical thinking of Aristotle and Horace, as well as 
how he absorbs, nuances from Blackstone and Grotius. 
29 
nates his character studies. Certainly, Johnson's inter- 
est -in the 'subjective aspects of legal administration 
affects his reaction to the law as a powerful institution, 
and his probe of the activity of Bluster indicates his 
commitment to a sense'of, dignity which the law must have. 
- --- iii ---- 
Moreover, it is precisely his conunitiuent to the mean- 
ingful and just expression of human and moral values in 
the law that requires Johnson to investigate the treatment 
of debtors. To Johnson the power of the law is nowhere 
more misguided than in its, application to those persons 
51 
imprisoned for debt. In two groups'of essays; Advent- 
urer 34,41,53;, Idler. 22 and 38, Johnson deals with the 
unfortunate condition of debtors and the laws that op- 
press them. In Idler 22 Johnson decries the laws from 
which the harsh*sanctions imposed on debtors derive their 
authority: 
The wisdom and justice of the English 
laws, are by Englishmen at least, loudly 
celebrated; but scarcely the most zeal- 
ous admirers of our institutions can 
think that law wise, which when men are 
capable of work, obliges them to beg; 
or just, which'exposes the liberty of 
one to the passions of another. 
52 
51. Bate, Samuel Johnson, p. 321;. Johnson was arrested 
for debt (+, 5 l8s. ) and relief was provided by Richard- 
son'. Johnson therefore personally experienced the 
fear and authority of the debt laws. 
52.: Idler 22, p. 69. 
30 
Economic hardship is. not'a crime'although the law at this 
53 
. time in effect considered it so. ' " in large measure the 
severe penalty for debt led to more crime"and further 
54 . degradation, and Johnson's understanding of this is. 
behind his advocacy of better prison' conditions and more 
sensible administration of the law. In these essays John- 
son's compassion and enlightened approach place, him at 
55 
the forefront of the movement for reform, and dispose, 
of any notion of him as a regressive conservative. His 
horror at the quality of life forced on those condemned 
C 
53. Flinn, An Economic and Social History of Britain: 
1066-1939, p. 97. 
cf. Holdsworth, ' A History of English Law, v. 1, pp. 
257-258, for a quic review o the re evant stat- 
utes. 
Sermon 5, p. 58: "Poverty indeed is not always the 
effect of wickedness, it may often be the consequen- 
ce; of virtue; " 
54. ' Sermon 4, p. 47: "Let any man reflect upon'the snares 
to w ich poverty exposes virtue, and remember, how 
certainly one crime makes way for another, till at last all distinction of good and evil is obliterated; 
and he will easily discover the necessity of charity, 
to preserve a great part of mankind from the most 
atrocious wickedness. " 
cf. Babington, The ' Engl'ish' Basti'le, pp. 81-91; George, 
London Life in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 309-311, 
for descriptions of prison con itions. 
55. Voitle, p. 84; Radzinowicz, pp. 336-339; cf. Field- ing, -Enquiry into the Cause of the'Increase of Rob- 
'bers-, for a different analysis of t He pro ems of 
crime and debtors. 
31 
to a debtor's prison56 impels Johnson to write these 
pleas for intervention. 
In a curious way, the 'tale of the ingenuous Misargy- 
rus related in Adventurer essays 34,41,53, and 62 argues 
against the retributive nature of debt laws. Misargyrus 
recites a catalogue of middle-class temptations and 
crimes; -folly, fraud, pretense, delusion, gratification, 
bribery (flattery), usury, and loan-sharking, where the 
criminal often becomes himself the victim. in suggesting 
this view, Misargyrus maintains that these victims suffer 
disproportionately to the gravity of their crimes. This 
is not to dismiss the effect these offences have'on indi- 
viduals. or to minimize the damage done to the moral fabric 
56. Heath, Eighteenth Century Penal Theory, pp. 201-204, 
for a discussion of Howar s contributions to penal 
reform. 
'Idler 38, p. 120: "The misery of ggals is not half 
tim it evil; they are filled with every corruption 
which poverty and wickedness can generate between them; 
with'all the shameless and profligate enormities that 
can be produced by the impudence of ignominy, the 
rage of want, and the malignity of despair. in a 
prison, -1hß awe of the public eye is lost, and the 
power of the law is spent; there are few fears, there 
are no blushes. The lewd inflame the lewd, the auda- 
cious harden the audacious. Every one fortifies him- 
self as he can against his own sensibility, endeavours 
to practise on others the arts which are practised on 
himself; and gains the kindness of his associates by 
similitude of manners. Thus some sink amidst their 
misery, and others survive only to propagaftvillainy. " 
Stephen, 'History of the Criminal Law, v. 1, p. 418: 
"A whole series of prosecutions ote officers of the 
Fleet prison for the murder of prisoners by barbarous 
ill-usage throws light upon another dark side of the 
administration of justice in the eighteenth century. " 
cf. Trials of Higgins, Bainbridge, and Aston, 17 
State Trials 298-626. 
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of society, but to question whether there is any place 
for rehabilitation in the present legal system. While 
Misargyrus disarmingly accepts the 'wisdom in punishing 
those beyond redemption: 
I know not, Sir, whether among this 
fraternity of sorrow you will think any 
much to be pitied; nor indeed do many 
of them appear to solicit compassion, for 
they generally applaud their own con- 
duct, and despise those whom want of 
taste or spirit suffers to grow rich. 
It were happy if the prisons of. the king- 
dom were filled only with characters like. 
these, men whom prosperity could not 
make useful, and whom ruin, cannot make 
wise, -' but there are among us many who 
raise different sensations, many that 
owe their present misery to the seductions 
of treachery, the strokes of casualty, or 
the tenderness of pity; many whose suf- 
ferings disgrace society, and whose vir- 
tues would adorn it; 
57 
but he maintains that the system fails in demanding the 
incarceration of those 
whose virtue has made them unhappy, or 
whose misfortunes are at least without 
a crime, 
58 
In pointing out the unfairness in uniform sanctions, Mis- 
argyrus advances the modern sociological premise that the 
kind and degree of punishment should be determined by the 
circumstance and that the law should have a degree of 
57. Adventurer 53, p. 370. 
58. ' Adventurer 62, p. 378. 
33 
flexibility to meet this situation. 
59 
When he writes that: 
the-laws of a just government ought 
either to prevent or repair: nothing 
is more inequitable than that one 
man should suffer for the crimes of 
another, for crimes which he neither 
prompted nor permitted, which he could 
neither foresee nor prevent. 
60 
Misargyrus is not only arguing for the adjustment of 
61 
punishment to guilt but appealing to the compassion 
of a just society. And he'suggests that there is no pre- 
vention-where events cannot be'controlled. Moreover, 
there is the suggestion that this could happen to anybody. 
In this way Misargyrus appeals to self-interest which is 
often the most persuasive argument. By writing the My- 
sargyrus letters, Johnson builds a careful structure to 
portray men who are ensnared in the tangles of the debt 
59. Kames, 'Historical Law Tracts, p. 52: "that to pre- 
serve a strict proportion betwixt a crime and its 
punishment, is not the only or chief view of a wise 
legislature. "; p. 53: ' "Hence, in regulating the 
punishment of crimes, two circumstances ought to 
weigh, viz., the immorality of the action, and its 
sad treachery. " 
60. *Adventurer 62, p. 381. - 
61. cf. Beccaria, ' Dei Dlelitti e* Pelle pene, trans Farrer, 
p. 251, for "... a general theorem may be deduced, of 
great utility, though little conformable to custom, 
that common lawgiver of nations. The theorem is this: 
'In order that every punishment may not be an act of 
violence, committed by one man or by many againWa 
single individual, it ought to be above all things 
public, speedy, necessary, the least possible in the 
given circumstances, proportioned to its crime, dic- 
tated by the laws. " 
34 
laws, 62 and at the same time, uses their stories to illus- 
trate the pernicious nature of retributive justice. 
Idler 22 and its companion Idler 38 both criticize 
the hdrsh'treatment that debtors must endure. Johnson 
63 
-frames his analysis with common. sense economics in his 
suggestion that such imprisonment actually exacerbates the 
problem it pretends to alleviate: 
The prosperity of a people is pro- 
portionate to the number of hands and 
minds usefully employed. To the com- 
munity sedition is a fever, corruption is 
a gangrene, and idleness an atrophy. 
Whatever body, and whatever society, 
wastes more than it acquires, must grad- 
ually decay; and every being that continues 
to be fed, and ceases to labour, takes 
away something from the public stock. 
The confinement, therefore., of any man 
in the sloth a>>ol da. rhness cF .a pýýs, oný 
ýs Jod to the 
nation, and no gain to the creditor. For 
of the multitudes who are pining in those 
cells of misery, a very small part is sus- 
pected of any fraudulent act by which they 
retain what belongs to others. The rest 
are imprisoned by the wantonness of pride, 
the malignity of revenge, or the acrimony 
62. * Adventurer 62, p. 381; Johnson points out how the 
legal concept of consideration in a contract can 
trap one in legal entanglements and highlight moral 
failures: "It is, I think, worthy of consideration, 
whether, since no wager is binding without a possibil- 
ity of loss on each-side, it, is not equally reasonable 
that no contract should be valid without reciprocal 
stipulations: but in this case, and others of the 
same kind, what is stipulated on his side to whom the bond is given? he takes advantage of the security, 
neglects his affairs, omits his duty, suffers tim- 
orous wickedness to-grow daring by degrees, permits 
appetite to call new gra*ifications, and, perhaps, 
secretly longs for the time, in which he shall have 
power to seize forfeiture:... " 
63. Johnson's style of economic thinking is similar to 
Smith's general assessment in Wealth*of' Nations, chap. Vlll, p. 78-79, where he writes that the higE--earnings 
of labour are an advantage 'to '.: society. 
35 
of disappointed expectation. 
64 
Johnson argues that it makes little *economic sense to re- 
tain a debtor. who under supervision could contribute to 
the well-being of society. This is a fundamental weakness 
in the law since there is no pretense of prevention or 
reformation, only revenge. Despite the imperfections, 
vanity', or folly'that can drive one into debt, Johnson 
considers the honest debtor to have the ability to con- 
tribute to society, and therefore worth saving. 
The arbitrary imposition and inequitable distribution 
65 
of sanctions represented by the power of personal writs 
is particularly distasteful to 'Johnson. Johnson finds 
these writs which allow an individual-to distrain prop- 
erty or send a person to prison only on the basis of a 
motion or summary judgement unfair: 
Since poverty is punished among us as 
a crime, it ought at least to be treated 
with the same lenity as other crimes; the 
offender ought not to languish, at the 
will of him whom he has offended, but to 
be allowed some appeal to the justice of 
his country. 
66 
Johnson avers that the debtor is not afforded due process 
of law but subjected to a rule administered at the suffer- 
64. Idler 22, p. 69; cf. Adventurer 41, p. 356, for a sim- 
1i r argument. 
65. cf. Maitland, Forms of Action-at' Common Law, p. 5: 
These personal writs or te fictions contrived to 
get modern results out of medieval premises. "; Bl 
Co=n.. III, C 9, p. 159. 
66. "Idler 22, p. 70. 
36 
ance of an individual. This distresses Johnson's under- 
standing of the moral and ethical components the law must 
have 'for it to be just: 
The end of all civil regulations is to 
secure private happiness from public mal- 
ignity; to keep individuals from the power 
of one another; but this end is apparently 
neglected, when a man, irritated with loss, 
is allowed to be the judge of his own cause, 
and to assign the punishment of his own 
pain; when the distinction between guilt 
and unhappiness, between casualty and de- 
sign, is intrusted to eyes blind with 
interest, to understandings depraved by 
resentment. 
67 
... ... ... .... .... 
The maxim: riemo debet esse' judex' iii' propria causa (12 
Coke, 114a) succinctly states Johnson's objection to law 
administered by those who have a vested interest in its 
outcome. Johnson's remarks constitute a vigorous indict- 
ment of the legal system and its professed sense of bal- 
68 
ance. ' Moreover, it is just this lack'of balance that 
Johnson sees as the critical failure 'in debt laws. To 
als c, Johnson not only do these laws but,, their administration 
violate the rule of reason and natural justice. 
67. Idler 22, p. 70. 
68. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science, of the Law, pp. 97- 
98; "This metaphysical use of the idea of balance was 
not easily distinguished from the idea of moderation, 
and the Commentaries used the two interchangeably. By 
setting up suitable alternatives, Blackstone was able 
to define any rule as a moderate one: "The laws of 
England, more wisely, have steered in the middle be- 
tween both extremes: providing at once against the 
inhumanity of the creditor, who is not suffered to 
confine an honest bankrupt after his effects are 
delivered up; and at the same'time taking care that 
all his just debts sha'll. be. paid, so far as the 
effects will extend. " B1'., Comm. II, 473. 
37 
Johnson realizes the-economic imperatives69 that 
encourage the growth and development of a credit economy. 
But he demands that the responsibility for personal and 
commercial failure must be shared by the creditor: 
The motive to credit, is the hope'of 
advantage. Commerce an never be at 
a stop, while one man wants what an- 
other can supply; credit will never 
be denied, while it is likely to be 
repaid with profit. He that trusts one 
whom he designs to sue, is criminal by 
the act of trust, -the cessation of such insidious traffick is to be desired, 
and no reason can be given why a change 
of the law should impair any other. 
We see nation trade with nation, where 
no payment can be compelled. Mutual con- 
venience! produces mutual confidence, 
and the merchants continue to satisfy the 
demands of each other, though they have 
nothing to dread but the loss of trade. 
70 
in this way Johnson apportions the legal and moral guilt 
in the collapse of monetary prudence. By creating in 
Idler 38 a vivid picture of the finality of debtor's 
prison, Johnson attempts to use this guilt and prick 
conscience: 
Surely, he whose debtor has perished 
in prison, though he may-acquit him- 
self of deliberate murder, must at 
least have his mind clouded with dis- 
content, when he considers how much 
another has suffered from him; when 
he thinks on-'the wife bewailing her 
69. cf. Middendorf, .' Johnson.. on Wealth and Commerce', 
Johnson, "Boswell and their Circle, pp. 4". -64; Carswell, 
The South Sea Bu e, for a is-cussion of the most 
significant collapse of credit to date and the effect 
this-had on the psyche of Britain. 
70, Idler 22, p. 71. 
38' 
husband, or the children begging the 
bread which their father would have 
earned. If there are any. made so ob- 
durate by avarice or cruelty, as to 
revolve these consequences without 
dread or pity, I oust leave them to be 
awakened by. some other power, for I 
write only for human beings. 
71 
Johnson wants to make the creditor see the results of his 
actions.. This appeal carefully defines responsibility 
and demonstrates the implications of prosecution for debt. 
Johnson maintains that the harsh sanctions governing 
debtors argue for penal reform. Certainly, his catalogue 
of the sufferings debtors endure and the conditions so- 
ciety imposed on them confronts current standards and 
anticipates how the law must change if it is to be 
72 
responsive to the society it regulates. 
To promote his thesis that society must demand change 
in the circumstances of debtors, Johnson uses a mathemati- 
cal argument to show how the lives of many are complicated 
by such whol. esale imprisonment: 
we live in an age of commerce and com- 
putation; let. us therefore coolly enquire 
71. Idler 38, pp. 120-121. 
72. 'Life II, p. 416, "Laws are formed by the manners and 
exigencies of particular times, and it is but acci- 
dental that they last longer than their causes, " 
Johnson argues that the changing conditions and under- 
standing of society mandate that laws adapt to the 
new perceptions or concerns that arise. This is es- 
pecially important because in Idler ll, p. 37, Johnson 
points out: "Forms of government are seldom the re- 
sult of much deliberation, they are framed by chance 
in popular assemblies, or in conquered countries by 
despotick authority. Laws are often occasional, 
often capricious, made always by a few, and sometimes 
by a single voice. " 
39 
what is the sum of evil which the 
imprisonment of debtors-brings upon 
cic. -r'country ....................... The misfortunes of an individual do 
not extend their influence to many; 
yet, if we consider the effects of 
consanguinity and friendship, and the 
general reciprocation of wants and 
benefits, which make one man dear or 
necessary to another, it may reason- 
ably be supposed, that every man lan- 
guishing in prison gives trouble of 
some kind to two others who love or 
need him. By this multiplication of 
misery-we see distress extended to the 
hundredth part of the whole. society. 
If we estimate 'at a shilling a day 
what is lost by the inaction and con- 
sumed in the support of each man thus 
chained down to involuntary idleness, 
the public loss will rise in one year 
to three 'hundred thousand pounds; in 
ten years to more than a sixth part 
of our circulating coin. 
73 
This argument touches the interest-and common sense of 
74 
the multitude and not directly their conscience. For it 
points out how everyone suffers because the economic im- 
pact is direct and damaging. 
Johnson sums up his argument for change with the 
exhortation: 
It may be hoped that our lawgivers 
will at length take away from us this 
power of starving and depraving one 
another; buts if there be any reason 
why this inveterate evil should not 
be removed from our age, which true 
policy has enlightened beyond any 
73, Idler 38, p. 118: Johnson is again advanced in his 
thinking when he considers the psychological damage 
misery causes and how this affects productivity. 
74. *Rambler 148, p. 26; "the great law of social beings, 
yw is every individual is commanded to consult the 
happiness of others. " 
former time, let those, ' whose writings 
form opinions and the practices of their 
contemporaries, endeavour to transfer the 
reproach'of such imprisonment from the 
debtor to the creditor, till universal 
infamy shall pursue the wretch, 
whose wantonness of power, or revenge of 
disappointment, condemns another to tor- 
ture and to ruin; till he shall be hunted 
through the world as an enemy to man, and 
find in riches no shelter from contempt. 
75 
This demagogic appeal to the public at large indicates the 
intensity of feeling aroused in him by the debt laws. For 
he is advocating not only change in the law but a campaign 
76 
to bring this change about. Johnson's evangelical sum- 
oration reflects a belief in the wisdom of the people and 
their acceptance of the responsibility they have in insur- 
77 
ing that laws work for the betterment of society. 
----iv ---- 
Johnson's finest jurisprudential thinking is contain- 
ed in Rambler 114. This essay is a cogent, well reasoned 
75. Idler 38, p. 120. 
76. Greene, The Politics, of Samuel' Johnson, pp. 51-54. 
77. cf. B1 Comm, I, 244-245, for the right to petition 
'such  oppressions as tend to dissolve the 
constitution and subvert the fundamental of govern- 
ment' and when the 'positive laws are silent'; Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government, @243, p. 447, the summa- 
tion which maintains that when authority is abused, it 
is forfeited and the people have a right to act. This 
is the logical conclusion of the campaign Johnson is 
advocating, and shows that he absorbed Lockes' ideas 
in encouraging the people to guard the terms of the 
social contract,.. and the debt laws lead Johnson to 




appeal for radical change in the present system of punish- 
ment. Johnson calls into question the entrenched atti-. 
tudes that impede innovations-in the nature and kind of 
sanction that he feels society demands. Criticizing orth- 
odox positions that favour sternness and retribution, John- 
son remarks that the law-must function not by terror but b 
respect: 
Even those that have most reverence 
for the laws of right, are pleased 
with shewing that not fear, but 
choice, regulates their behaviour; 
and would be thought to comply, 
rather than obey 
78 
79 
Essentially, Johnson sets up a utilitarian argument to 
show that stringent laws and revengeful punishments were 
80 
ineffective and counterproductive. in this essay which 81 
reflects the most progressive of his social notions, 
Johnson maintains that the failure of apportioning crimes 
82 
to punishment actually hinders the distribution of jus- 
78. Rambler 114, pp. 241-242. 
79. Voitle, pp. 86-88; Radzinowicz, p. 336. 
80. cf. Montesquieu, De* 1, '6sp1-'"A. des' lois, Book VI, chap. 
13; Becte? xiu, Dei Delitti eee Pene, chap. 20, for 
their arguments that agree with Jo nson's position. 
81. Voitle, p. 86. 
82. Grotius, De Jure'Bell'i et-Pacis, Bk. II, Chap. XX @28, 
p. 291; Montesquieu, De _spr .! ̂ 'des 
loin, Bk VI, 
chap. xvi, p. 77j "C'est un gran mal, parmi nous de 
faire subir la meme peine a celui qui vole sur un 
grand chemin, et ä celui qui vole et assassine. Ii 
est visible que, pour la sürete publique, ii fauelrait 
mettre quelque difference dans la peine. " 
42 
tice. It is his focus on the overuse of capital punish- 
ment that makes Johnson realize his most humanitarian im- 
83 
pulse. ' 
Certain observations are made deploring the public 
wisdom in allowing this legislation of legal 'massacre'. 
Johnson writes: 
A slight perusal of the laws by which 
the measures of vindictive and coercive 
justice are established, will discover 
so many disproportions between crimes 
and. punishments, such capricious dis- 
tinctions of guilt, and such confusion of 
remissness and severity, as can scarcely 
be believed to have produced by public 
wisdom, sincerely and calmly of publick 
happiness. 
84 
The themes of retribution, proportion, determination, and 
barbarity develop the patterns of Johnson's argument 
85 
against capital punishment. Moreover, Johnson suggests 
that 'political arrogance' and legislative incompetence 
encouraged by the abdication of public responsibility per- 
mits such cruel punishment. Paradoxically, these laws do 
83. cf. Sir Thomas More, Utopia, tr. Paul Turner, (Har- 
mondsworth: Penguin Boo ks, 1965), Bk I, pp. 44-45; 
Johnson's Christian humanism is influenced by More to 
whom he credits for this number '(Rambler 114, p. 247). 
In the Utopia More responds to an English lawyer's 
advocacy of stern measures against thieves, and this 
lawyer's consfiernation that despite hanging England is 
still plagued with robbers: "This method of dealing 
with thieves is both unjust and socially undesirable. 
As a punishment it's too severe, and as a deterrent 
it's quite ineffective. Petty larceny isn't bad 
enough to deserve the death penalty. " 
84. Rambler 114, p. 242. 
85. ' Life 1,147, n. i;.; ' Life 'IV, 328 n 1; 329 n. 2; 359 n. 2. 
43 
not protect society but endanger it, and in writing this 
essay Johnson tries to mould public opinion to realize 
their self-interest in changing the nature and frequency 
of capital punishment. 
Johnson attacks capital punishment because it is not 
a remedy but a vengeful reflex: 
It has been always the practice, when 
any. particular species of robbery 
becomes prevalent and common, to 
endeavour its suppression by capital 
denunciations. 
86 
This approach offers no solution to ending criminal activ- 
ity, and actually argues that more and'. ingenious criminal 
acts take place. Of this escalation, Johnson writes: 
Thus, one generation of malefactors 
is commonly cut off, and their successors 
are'frightened into new expedients; the 
act of thievery is augmented with greater var, efy of 
fraud, and subtilized to higher degrees 
of dexterity, and more occult methods of 
conveyance. 
87 
A cycle develops whereby the death penalty, out of frus- 
tration, is applied indiscriminately and disproportionate- 
ly. Johnson continues: 
The law then renews the pursuit in the 
heat of anger, and overtakes the offender 
again with death. By this practice, cap- 
ital inflictions are multiplied, and 
crimes very different in their degrees 
of enormity are equally subjected to the 
severest punishment that man has the power 
86. Rambler 114, p. 243. 
87. Ibid. 
44 
of exercising' upon man. 
88 
If there is any legitimate basis for capital punishment, 
89 
it is its ability to act as a deterrent. However, as 
Johnson points out the result here is the proliferation 
90 
of new classes of crime mandating the death penalty. It 
is obvious to Johnson that the only way to break this 
cycle is either to abolish' capital punishment or to les- 
sen its use. 
Johnson presents a conservative political position 
that vests wide authority and discretion in those who 
determine the law: 
The lawgiver is undoubtedly allowed to 
estimate the malignity of an offence, 
not merely by the loss or pain which 
single acts may produce, but by the 
general alarm and anxiety arising from 
the fear of mischief, and insecurity 
of possession: he therefore exercises 
the right which societies are supposed 
to have over the lives of those that com- 
pose them, not simply to punish a trans- 
gression, but to maintain order, and 
preserve quiet; he enforces those laws 
88. Ibid. 
89. Rambler 114, p. 245. 
90. Bi. Comm. IVIS-19: "no less than a hundred and sixty 
have been declared by an act of Parliament to be 
felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, 
to be worthy of instant death. So dreadful a list, 
instead of diminishing, increases the numbers of of- 
fenders. " Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal 
Law", in Albion's Fatal Tree, p. 56: "The post- 
revblution Parliaments passed more and more capital 
statutes in order to make'every kind of theft, mali- 
cious damage or rebellion an act punishable by death. 
Although most executions took place under Tudor stat- 
utes rather than these fresh-minted ones, the new 
legislation gave the 'power to make terrible examples 
when necessary. " 
45 
with , teverity that are most in danger 
of violation,. as the commander of a 
garrison doubles the guard on that side 
which*is threatened by the enemy. 
91 
But the presence'of a siege mentality undermines the leg- 
islator in providing for the public welfare. For this 
mentality obscures a rational approach to combating rising 
crime, and offers ideas that are uninspired and moribund. 
Johnson maintains: 
This method has been long tried, but 
tried with so little success, that 
rapine and violence are hourly en- 
creasing; yet few seem willing to des- 
pair of its efficacy, and of those who 
employ their speculations upon the 
present corruption of the people, 
some propose the introduction of more 
horrid, lingering and terrifick pun- 
ishments; some are inclined to accel- 
erate the executions; some to discourage 
pardons; and all seem to think that 
lenity has given confidence to wicked- 
ness, and that we can only be rescued 
from the talons of robbery by inflexible 
rigour, and sanguinary justice. 
92 
All this provides no reasonable answers, and Johnson 
realizes the failure to resolve this pressing problem 
will eventually undermine the government. 
This is not to say that capital punishment should be 
abolished, or the government has no right to select it; 
but that its imposition must be chosen with care and 
91. Rambler 114, p. 243. 
92., Rambler 114, pp. 243=244. 
46 
deliberation. 93 . Johnson has ä stringent criterion for its 
acceptance: 
Death is, as one of. the ancients observes, 
-r Tw v pýj fy* wp ßc L -r-c% Tv  
'of dreadful things the most dreadful'; an 
evil, beyond which , nothing. can 
be threat- 
ened by sublunary power, or feared from 
human enmity or vengeance. This terror 
should, therefore, be reserved as the last 
resort of authority, as the strongest and 
most operative of prohibitory sanctions, 
and placed before the treasure of life, to 
guard from invasion which cannot be re- 
stored. 
94 
This standard for the use of capital punishment is abused 
continual/ and leads to confusion in the classification 
of crimes. Johnson reasons as follows: 
93. Bi Comm. IV, 9-10: "The practice of inflicting capital 
punis ments, for offences of human institution, is 
thus justified by that great and good man, Sir Matthew 
Hale: 'when offences grow enormous, frequent, and 
dangerous to a kingdom or state, destructive or highly 
pernicious to civil societies, and to the great in- 
security and danger of the kingdom or its inhabitants, 
severe punishment and even death itself is necessary 
to be annexed to laws in many cases by the prudence of 
lawgivers. ' It is therefore the enormity, or danger- 
ous tendency, of the crime, that alone can warrant any 
earthly legislature in putting him to death that com- 
mits it. It is not its frequency only, or the dif- 
ficulty of otherwise preventing it, that will excuse 
our attempting to prevent it by a wanton effusion of 
human blood. For, though the end of punishment is to 
deter men from offending, it never can follow from 
thence, that it is lawful to deter them at any rate 
and by any means; since there may be unlawful methods 
of enforcing obedience even to the justest laws. Every 
humane. legislator will be therefore extremely cautious 
of establishing laws that inflict the penalty of 
death, especially for slight offences, or such as are 
merely positive. He will expect a better reason for 
his so doing, than that loose one which generally is 
given; that it is found by former experience that no 
light penalty will be effectual. " 
94. Rambler 114, p. 244. 
47 
To equate robbery with murder is to 
reduce murder to robbery, to confound in 
conmon minds the gradations of iniquity, 
and incite the commission of a greater 
crime to prevent the detection of a less. 
If only murder were punished with death, 
very few robbers would stain their hands 
in blood; but when, by the last acts of 
cruelty no new danger is incurred, and 
greater security may be obtained, upon 
what principle shall we bid them forbear? 
95 
Not only does the excessive use of the death penalty con- 
fuse the nature and severity of criminal acts, but it 
inculcates any, attitude of abandon. As Johnson observes 
f, -* his experiences, this attitude is not only counter- 
productive but contributes to the commission of more vio- 
lent. acts as well as the 'disintegration of the legal pro- 
cess. 
. 
Despite the structure of the law, its administration 
will be frustrated by the common sense and humanity of 
96 
those who perceive the difference in degree. The admin- 
istration of justice is retarded by this overeznployment 
of capital punishment: 
95. *'Ibid.; cf. Sermon 18, p. 196, for robbery and theft so 
destructive of social fabric.; More, Utopia, pp. 50- 
51: "From a practical point of view, surely it's ob- 
vious that to punish thieves and murders in precisely 
the same way is not only absurd but also highly dan- 
gerous to the public. if a thief knows that a con- 
viction for murder will get him no more trouble than 
a conviction for theft, he's naturally impelled to 
kill the person that he'd otherwise merely have rob- 
bed. It's no worse for him if-he's caught, and it 
gives him a better chance of not being caught, and of 
concealing the crime altogether by eliminating the 
only witness. So in our efforts to terrorize thieves 
we're actually encouraging them to murder innocent 
people. "' 
96. cf. Hall, Theft-, Law and Society, pp. 91-97, for a dis- 
cussion on larceny an how both judges and jurors mod- ified the use of capital punishment mandated by stat- 
ute. 
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The frequency of capital punishments, 
therefore, rarely hinders the commission of 
a crime, ' but naturally and commonly pre- 
vents its detection,. and is, if we pro- 
ceed only upon'prudential principles, 
chiefly for that reason to be avoided. 
Whatever may be urged by casuists or poli- 
ticians, the 'greater part of mankind, 
as they can never think that to pick the 
pocket and to pierce the heart is equally 
criminal, will scarcely believe that two 
malefactors so different in guilt can be 
justly doomed to the same punishment: nor 
is the necessity of submitting the con- 
science to human laws so plainly evinced, 
so clearly stated, or so generally allowed, 
but that the pious, the tender, and the 
just will always scruple to concur with the 
community in an act which their private 
judgement cannot approve.. 
He who knows not how often rigorous laws 
produce total impunity, and how many crimes 
are concealed and forgotten for fear of 
hurrying the offender to that state in 
which there is no repentance, has con- 
versed very little with mankind. And 
whatever epithets of reproach or contempt 
this compassion may incur from those who 
. confound cruelty with firmness, I know not 
whether any wise man would wish it less 
powerful, or less extensive. 
98 97 
This enlightened . and. articulate. plea is characteristic 
97. ' Rambler l r 114, p. 245. 
98. cf. 'Bi. 'Comm. IV, 16-17: "Lastly, as a conclusion to 
the wig o le, we may observe that punishments of unrea- 
sonable severity, especially when indiscriminately in- 
flicted, have less effect in preventing crimes, and 
amending the manners of a people, than such as are 
more merciful in general, yet properly intermixed with 
due distinctions of severity. It is the sentiment of 
an ingenious writer, who seems to have well studied 
the springs of human action, (Beccaria, c 7), that 
crimes are more effectively prevented by the certainty, 
than by the severity, of punishment. For the excessive 
severity of laws (says Montesquieu, Sp. L. b6. c. 13) hin- 
ders their execution: when the punishment surpasses all 
measure, the public will frequently out of humanity 
prefer impunity to it. " 
Much-of Johnson's argument and his phrasing come almost 
directly-from Montesquieu, "who absorbed. More; cf. Flet- 
cher, -Montesquieu and English Politics: 1750-1800, pp. 
21-33, or early Brit is _opinion on 
Espy-, *t es Lois. 
49 
of Johnson's mixture. of morals and utility. On the one 
hand, Johnson points out how police, detection so necessary 
to frustrate future crime is limited, and on the other, he 
approves the intervention of moral action. Thus, Johnson 
unites self-interest with conscience in this argument in 
an effort to broaden its appeal. Certainly, Johnson wants 
laws that are effective, but they must also be just. This 
ultimate sanction that does not respect the variety and 
complexity of issues, that is imposed uniformly, that is 
vindictive and repressive, and that hinders an equitable 
distribution of justice, is itself destructive and noxious. 
Johnson's summation is a severe indictment and one 
that offers insights into the'pattern of his jurisprudent- 
ial thinking: 
All laws against wickedness are inef- 
fec1 al, unless some will inform, and 
some will prosecute; but till we mitigate 
the penalties for mere violations of 
property, information will always be 
hated, and prosecution dreaded. The 
heart of a good man cannot but recoil at 
the thought of punishing a slight in- 
jury with death; especially when he re- 
members, that the thief might have pro- 
cured safety by another crime, from which 
he was restrained only by his remaining 
virtue. 
The obligations to assist the exercise 
of publick justice are indeed strong; but 
they will certainly be overpowered by ten- 
derness for life. What is punished with 
severity contrary to our ideas of adequate 
retribution, will be seldom discovered; 
and multitudes will be suffered to ad- 
vance from crime to crime, till they 
deserve death, because they had been 
sooner prosecuted, they would have suf- 
fered death before they deserved it. 
99 
99. Rambler 114, p. 246: This in part conflicts with'John- 
son'John- s of the sanctity of property. 
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Written with the assurance that forecloses opposition, 
this statement defines the nature'and aim of criminal laws. 
Public order and security as the objects of criminal laws 
are compromised by a criminal's perception that his pun- 
ishment will be disproportionate to his crime. The crimi- 
nal law should control revenge and develop sanctions that 
are civilized and appropriate to the gravity of the of- 
fence. These 'sanctions should indeed be punitive but not 
avenging. For the criminal law to be effective, good men 
must consider it to be just. Only when the criminal law 
meets these criteria will it have public confidence and 
enjoy just administration. To'Johnson these elements are 
absent in a system that relies on the strict adherence Of 
the death penalty. 
However, it is Johnson's desire to reform the law 
and to lessen the use of the death penalty. In this 
" 100 
essay Johnson realizes that his ideas are advanced: 
This scheme of invigorating the laws by 
relaxation, and extirpating wickedness 
by lenity, is so remote from common 
practice, that I might reasonably fear 
to expose it to the publick. 
. 101 
By his advocacy in this essay, Johnson reveals himself to 
be a thinker in tune with'the most enlightened thought of 
his time, and one who is willing to oppose current 'prej- 
100. Voitle, p. 84; Radzinowicz; pp. 336-337. 




Moreover, Johnson shows himself not to be 
trapped by the iron chains of legal precedent. He has 
the ability to transcend conventional wisdom and fashion 
from prevailing trends those truths which'only need to be 
uncovered. It is the. 'quality of Johnson's mind that en- 
ables him to take these 'discoveries and organize them 
into a reasoned, humane argument that gets at the sub- 




In his opposition to the death penalty as a universal 
102. cf. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, for how this En ig tenment writer's use of prej- 
udice' is consciously defiant; Boulton, The Language 
of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke (Lond on: 
Rout e ge an KegaA Paul, 1963), pp. 97--1-33; Among 
the entries in the Dictionary about prejudice the 
main point is that preju ice. are unexamined opinions: 
Prejudice: 
1. Prepossession; judgment formed beforehand without 
examination. 
2. Mischief; detriment; hurt; injury. 
To prejudice: 
1. To prepossess with unexamined opinions; to fill 
with prejudices. 
2. To obstruct or injure by prejudices previously 
raised. 
3. To injure; to hurt; to diminish; to impair. 
Prejudicial: 
1. Obstructive by means of opposite prepossessions. 
2. Contrary; opposite. 









cacy on-behalf of Dr. William Dodd, who was convicted 
of forgery, shows Johnson sustaining the principal argu- 
ments he made-in Rambler 114. His adherence to the sub- 
stance of Rambler 114 is especially-significant since 
106 
Johnson did not care for Dodd, abhorred the nature of 
107 
his fraud, and was frightened by the vociferousness 
103: Life IV, pp. 188-189; Despite Johnson's seeming ap- 
proval of public executions, he continued to oppose 
capital punishment. if mandated for crimes which did 
not involve murder. 
104. Dictionary of National 'Bio ra h, Vol. V, pp. 1060- 
1062: Fitzgerald, A Famous Forgery, being the Story 
of 'I The Unfortunate'. *-Doctor Dodd. 
105. Radzinowicz, pp. 458-459, n. 29. 
106. Hawkins, The Life of Samuel Johnson, ed. Bertram H. 
Davis, pp. 191. 
107. ' Sermon 18, pp. 198-199; "The crime of fraud has this 
aggravation, that it is generally an a uuse of confi- 
dence. Robberies of violence are committed commonly 
upon those, to whom the robber is unknown. The lurk- 
ing thief takes indiscriminately what comes by chance 
within his reach. But deceit cannot be practised, 
unless by some previous entreaty, and gradual advance, 
by which distrust is dýsslpated, and an opinion of 
candour and integrity excited. Fraud, therefore, 
necessarily disguises life with solicitude and sus- 
picion. He that has been deceived, knows not after- 
wards whom he can trust, but grows timorous, reserved, 
afraid alike of enemies and friends; and loses, at 
least, part of that benevolence which is necessary to 
an amiable and virtuous character. Fraud is the more 
to be suppressed by universaldeftstatioT n, as its ef- 
fects can scarcely be limited. A thief seldom takes 
away what can much impoverish the loser; but by fraud, 
the opulent may at once be reduced to indigence, and 
the prosperous distressed; the effects of a long -: 
course of industry may be suddenly annihilated, the 
provision made for age may be withdrawn, and inherit- 
ance of posterity intercepted. " 
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of the public agitation demanding commütation108 All this 
is summed up. by Radzinowicz: 
In view of Johnson's poor opinion of 
Dodd, the readiness with which he con- 
sented to help him may seem somewhat 
surprising. it may be explained 
partly by his great kindness and sympathy 
with human beings in distress, and 
partly by the fact that Dodd's case con- 
firmed Johnson in his conviction that 
the criminal law was excessively and 
unnecessarily severe as well as irrationally 
uniform. He was fully aware that as the 
law then stood, Dodd had to be hanged; 
and. he objected to a system providing no 
alternative to the death penalty which 
was - he firmly believed - too severe a 
punishment for Dodd's offence. 
109 
While Radzinowicz's remarks provide a fine suimnation, it 
110 
is instructive'to review Johnson's specific writings on 
behalf of Dodd to see the jurisprudential patterns that 
develop. 
Johnson's petition on Dodd's behalf to the King for 
clemency is one of the finest pieces of this type of sup- 
plicatory writing. it accepts the truth and wisdom of 
the conviction, the legitimacy of the authority that im- 
poses the sentence, offers extreme repentance, but ques- 
108. Life II, p. 90: ', This petitioning is a new mode of 
distressing government, and a mighty easy one. ' cf. 
The False Alarm where Johnson attacks the ease with 
which petitions are circulated. However, Johnson 
aroused by his sympathy for Dodd abandoned his usual 
opposition to petitions: "Surely the voice of the 
publick, when it calls so loudly, and calls only 
for mercy, ought to be heard. " Life II, p. 120. 
109. Radzinowicz, p. 458. 
110.: Life.. 'III, - pp. - 120-122; ' Papers' Written by Dr. ' Johnson 
an2lDr. Dodd, ed. R. W. C apman; Sermon 28, pp. _. 
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tions the severity of the sentence and *suggests mitigating 
circumstances of life and past actions. Johnson writes: 
That debased as he is by ignominy, and 
distressed as he is by poverty, scorned 
by the world and detested by himself, de- 
prived of all external comforts, and 
afflicted by consciousness of guilt, he 
can. derive no hope from longer life, but 
that of repairing the injury done to Man- 
kind, by exhibiting an example of shame 
and submission, and of expiating his sins 
by prayer and penitence. 
111 
Johnson expresses his Christian humanism in writing this 
compelling plea based on mercy and potential service. In 
his effort Johnson balances the interests of an individual 
112 
against the demands of society. He explores the prop- 
osition that mercy forms an integral part of this rela- 
tionship, and emphasizes the humanity from which it must 
spring. To do this, Johnson exploits the 'emotional and 
113 
ethical dimensions of language, but does not give a 
111. Chapman, #4 p. 2-3. 
112. cf. Rambler 60, p. 323, for'Johnson's usual approach 
to t ifi balance in a legal context. Here Johnson 
quotes Sir Matthew Hale: 'Let me remember when I find 
myself inclined to pity a criminal, that there is 
likewise a pity due to the country. ' This quotation 
introduces a theme that is more characteristic of 
Johnson's legal philosophy. Johnson realizes that 
in any legal determination it is necessary to balance 
the trust invested in judicial decision against so- 
ciety's interest. This understanding is an intricate 
factor investigating how justice is ultimately dis- 
pensed, and reflects the legal and moral tensions 
present in the issuance of a decree. However, in the 
Dodd case Johnson shows his habitual inconsistency 
and an ability to moderate some of his basic propo- 
sitions. 
113. Marie Hochmuth Nichol's,, Rhetoric- and Criticism, 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana Sate University ress, 1963), 
p. 13. 
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juris consultus. He. exercises his considerable talent for 
114 
advocacy rather-than his legal acumen. 
Johnson does raise 'two legal points: the question of 
'intent' and the issue of proportionate punishment, to 
115 
enhance his argument in favour of a royal pardon.. John- 
son reasons unsuccessfully that Dodd's restitution implies 
116 
that he-did not intend 'finally to defraud' and thus, 
114. cf. My chapter on the'Boswell cases for Johnson's 
talents as an advocate;. Rambler 27, p. 150, for a 
different view of an advocay es artful defences: "My 
next patron was Eutyches the statesman, who was wholly 
engaged in publick affairs, and seemed to have no 
ambition but to be powerful and rich. I found his 
favour more permanent than that of the others, for 
there was a certain price at which'it might be 
bought; he allowed nothing to humour, or to affectaý,, - 
tion, but was always ready to pay liberally for the 
service that he required. His demands were, indeed, 
very often such as virtue could not easily consent 
to gratify; but virtue is not to be consulted when 
men are to raise their fortunes by the favour of the 
great. His measures were censured; I wrote in his 
defence, and was recompensed with a place, of which 
the profits were never received by me without the 
pangs of remembering that they were the rewards, of 
wickedness, a reward which nothing but that neces- 
sity, which the consumption of my little estate in 
these wild persuits had brought upon me, hindered me 
from throwing back in the face of my corruptor. " 
Ironically, much of this misfortune bffected Dodd in 
the same way. 
115. cf. Radzinowicz, pp. 126-131. for a discussion on the 
differing views of Beccaria and Blackstone on the 
royal prerogative of mercy. In his efforts on behalf 
of Dodd, Johnson follows a middle course that veers 
toward Blackstone's opinion which is more practical 
and takes into greater consideration present circum- 
stances more than fidelity to theory. Johnson real- 
izes that while such harsh penalties should not be 
universally mandated, this does not question the 
validity or need for the royal pardon. Instead, he 
asserts its usefulness both as a correction to leg- 
islative impetuosity and as a way to support the 
institution of monarchy. 
116. 'Select'State Trials at, Justice-Hall, vol I, p. 28; 
. Rex v. Do Leac 155. 
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did not fall within theterms of the statute. 
117 
Moreover, 
Johnson avers that the' circumstances of DoddIs case do not 
merit the imposition of the death penalty. To this effect, 
Johnson tries to make an argument based on the gap between 
social needs and substantive' law. He'considers Dodd's 
case to be one which 'points up the inherent unfairness in 
the administration of a law that leaves little room for 
. 118 judicial discretion. in addition Johnson appreciates 
the ramifications Dodd's case has for society and especial- 
ly, the effect it may have on the future' authority of the 
state. ' 
119 
This issue of criminal intent (mens rea) is criti- 
cal to Johnson's legal argument, and he tries to make a 
great deal out of the ambiguity between wens rea and in- 
117.2 George 2 c. 25 (1729)' @ 1; Archbold, 'Pleading and 
Evidence, 3rd ed., (London: Pheney; Sweet and u in: 
Millian, 1928), p. 234: this statute "made it felony, 
death, ' to forge any deed, will, bond, bill of ex- 
change, or promissory note, or acquittance or receipt 
for money or goods, 'to utter or publish as true' any 
forged deed, ... ".; Radzinowicz, p. 100, n. 68, for his treatment of this statute as a capital crime for 
forgery; Hall, Theft, Law and Society, 110-152; for 
an historical discussion o the statutes governing 
forgery and the problems in administration. 
118. Select Trials, p. 29: Mr. Sergeant Glynn writes: 
"Your application for mercy must*be made elsewhere; 
it would be cruel in the court to flatter you; there 
is a power of dispensing mercy where you may apply. " 
By the terms of this statute, this felony denies the 
benefit of clergy and carries a death penalty which 
on determination of guilt must be imposed by the 
court. 
119. actus non' facit- reum nisi' mens sit, tea. 
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tention. 
120 However, Johnson realizes that not only did 
Dodd act and have the'intention'to act, but that he under- 
stood his action to be'criminal. Dodd was well aware 
that his forgery was proscribed by law and morals, and 
since he carried out the design of his plan, the criminal 
intent was proven. Moreover, the decisive legal inter- 
121 
pretation and the one supported by most legal authorities 
does not concur with*the thrust of Johnson's submission. 
Indeed, the tenor of Johnson's remarks reveals that even 
120. cf. Hall, General, Principles of Criminal- Law, pp. 70- 
145, for an illuminating discussion of mens rea and 
intention. Hall's comments are historical and ana- 
lytical although this. is primarily a modern treat- 
ment. Rambler 28, pp. 153-157; Rambler 76, pp. 33- 
37, for JJo nson's comments on intention and the way 
one misconstrues one's own motives. Much of Johnson's 
remarks seem to anticipate the case of Dr. Dodd. 
121. cf. B1. Comm, IV, pp. 20-33; Hobbes, Leviathian, 
Chapter Russell on Crimes Vol II, Chap. 12, S. 3 
p. 353. Idler 65 , p. , -Johnson's familiarity with Hale's Pleas of the Crown; Hale, 'Pleas of the Crown 
I, p. 14 , .. where there is no will-to commit 
an offense, there can be no .. just reason to incur the penalty.. ". Stephen, vol III, ch. 29, p. 
187: "The meaning of the phrase would be more exactly 
though less neatly expressed if it was 'with intent 
to deceive in such a manner as to expose any person 
to loss or the risk of loss'. The object of a for- 
ger is nearly always his nwen advantage, and he 
thinks that in many cases he will be able to gain 
his own object without ultimate loss to any person, 
and it is not at'once obvious that such an intention 
is fraudulent. " 
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he knew how thin his submission was. 
122"But in bringing 
up this issue o mens rea, Johnson questions its foxmu- 
Tation as an 'element of the crime as defined by the 
statute. This question of mens-rea in the penal law is 
what actually determines a criminal state of mind, and in 
his submission Johnson tries to confuse Dodd's action 
with mental states, i. e. those intellectual, emotional 
or psychic patterns that characterize the mind and which 
in a legal sense help to define 'intent' as an element of 
a crime, in order to lessen the degree of guilt. By 
raising this issue, Johnson hopes to mitigate the crimi- 
nal effects of Dodd's forgery and streng eiitthe plea for 
mercy. 
By advocating transportation instead of death, John- 
son makes an enlightened argument on the need for propor- 
122. -Rambler 31, p. 171-172: cf. for Johnson not wearing 
ie"advocate's mask and where he points out moral implications in the intent to do wrong: "But such 
pride, * once indulged, too frequently operates upon 
more important objects, and inclines men not only to 
vindicate their errors, but their vices; to persist 
in practices which their own hearts condemn, only 
lest they should seem to feel reproaches, or be made 
wiser by the advice of others; or to search for 
sophisms-, tending to the confusion of all princi- 
ples, and the evacuation of all duties, that they 
may not appear to act what they are not able to 
defend. Let every man, who finds vanity so far pre- 
dominant, as to betray him to the danger of this 
last degree of corruption, pause a moment to con- 
sider what will be the consequences of the plea 
which he is about to offer for a practice to which 
he knows himself not led at first by reason, but im- 
"pelled by the violence of desire, surprized by the 
suddenness of passion, or seduced by the soft ap- 
proaches of temptation, and by imperceptible gradua- 
tions of guilt. Let him consider what he is going 
to commit by forcing his understanding to patronise 
those appetites, which'it is its chief business to 
hinder and reform. 
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tionate punishment.. A case'such'as Dodd's calls for 
reason not vindictiveness. Moreover, Johnson's use of 
external considerations in making this argument is like 
the modern pre-sentence investigation that takes personal 
and social circumstances into account. This becomes 
clear in the letter he'writes for Dodd to the Lord Chan- 
cellor Bathh nr ,h 
My Life has not been wholly useless, I 
have labovº±. d in my calling diligently and 
successfully but success infl, m J- . my 
vanity, and my heart betrayed me. --- 
violent passions exposed me to violent 
temptations, but I am not the first whom 
temptation has overthrown. I have in all 
my deviations, kept right always in view, 
and have invariably resolved to return to 
it. Whether in a prosperous state I should 
have kept my resolution publick justice 
had not suffered me to know. 
My Crime has been indeed atrocious, but 
my punishment has not been light. From a 
height of reputation which perhaps raised 
envy in others, and certainly produced 
pride in myself, I have fallen to the 
lowest and grossest infamy; 
123 
In this appeal to the Lord Chancellor, Johnson points out 
what he hopes are mitigating personal circumstances. It 
is interesting to note that Johnson does not argue for 
commutation on the basis of legal issues. Instead he 
suggests social utility and societal values as reasons for 
mercy. While the legal aspects of Johnson's plea are not 
strong, the impact of hanging so prominent a man as Dodd 
is. And. it is this idea that runs through the letter to 
Bathhurst. 
123. Chapman, Papers , Written' by Dr. Johnson and Dr. Dodd 
1777, #8, p. 6. 
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in the letter Johnson writes for Dodd to Lord Mans- 
field there are no salient legal points developed. What 
is written is a continuation of the plea to Bathhurst: 
I have offended; I am penitent; I en- 
treat but for Life, ' for a Life which 
must pass certainly in Dishonour, and 
probably in Want. Do not refuse, my 
Lord, to compassionate a man who blasted 
in Fame, and ruined in Fortune, yet 
shrinks with Terrour from the Precipice 
of Eternity. Let me live, however mis- 
erable, and let my Miseries-warn all those 
to whom they shall be known, against Self 
indulgence, Vanity, and Profusion. 
Once more my Lord, let me beg for Life, 
and when you see me going from the Gloom 
of a Prison, to the Penury of Banishment, 
do not consider publick justice as wholly 
unsatisfied....... 
124 
The importance of these pleas lies-in their questioning of 
what is the proper function of punishment. Certainly, 
125 
Johnson understands the nature of eternal punishment 
126 
but the nature of civil punishment is a different thing. 
Johnson sees correction and example*as keys to the function 
124. Chapman, pp. 8-9. #9. 
125. Life III, p. 200; Life IV, p. 299, Johnson has a 
strong, firm belief in the Christian theory of 
eternal punishment and salvation.. 
126. Rambler 31, p. 173: "As justice requires that all 
injuries should be repaired, it is the duty of him 
who has seduced others by bad practices, or false 
notions, to endeavour that such as have adopted his 
errors should know his retraction, and that those 
who have learned vice by his example, should by his 
example be taught amendment. " Johnson maintains 
the need for punishment in secular matters to com- 
plement his theological views. 
0 
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of-civil punishment, not vengeance or retribution. 
127 
Johnson's idea of correction is the more modern one of 
reformation. In the Dodd case Johnson argues for the 
example of a reformed life and not the 'example of death. 
Certainly, Dodd's dedth'is the final deterrent for him, 
but Johnson offers the broader view that Dodd's life pro- 
vides an example 'for' others tempted by forgery to witness 
a living example-of degrqdation. 
In his advocacy for life and transportation, Johnson 
128 
concurs with Becccria in thinking that crimes of a 
pecuniary nature do not merit the death penalty. Despite 
his deep concern for property, Johnson also agrees with 
127. Rambler 114, p. 245: "From this conviction of the 
inequa ity of the punishment to the offence proceeds 
the frequent solicitation of pardons. They who 
would rejoice at the correction of a thief, are 
yet shocked at the thought of destroying him. His 
crime shrinks to nothing, compared with his misery; 
and severity defeats itself by exciting pity. The 
gibbet, indeed, certainly disables those who die 
upon it from infesting the community; but their 
death seems not to contribute more to the reformation 
of their associates than any other method of separa- 
tion. " 
128. Beccg. ria, XXX, p. 74: "Thefts not involving violence 
should be punished by a fine. Whoever seeks to en- 
rich himself at the expense of others should be de- 
prived of his own. But, since this is ordinarily the 
crime only of poverty and desperation, ............ e the most suitable punishment will be that kind of 
servitude which alone can be called just- the tempo- 
rary subjection of the labors and person of the 
criminal to the community, as repayment, through 
total personal dependence, for the unjust despotism 
usurped against the social contract. " 
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Blackstone129 in the view that these types of crimes are 
not against nature but civil-authority. Because of this 
attitude, Johnson appreciates that the death penalty must 
be imposed with discretion and deliberation. The. Dodd 
case provides Johnson with reasons to refine his arguments 
against the death penalty and the way it is applied uni- 
formly and excessively. The philosophical basis for 
Johnson's advocacy on behalf of Dodd lies with his opposi- 
tion to the death penalty and his support of proportionate 
punishment. While Johnson had reservations about Dodd 
himself, he saw in the Dodd case not only a way to advance 
the status of the state but to reform the criminal law. 
Johnson does not question the right of the state to impose 
the death penalty but argues that in this instance it is 
an abuse of authority. The Dodd case allows Johnson to 
129. B: l*. Gömm. IV, p. 9: Writing of crimes that are mala 
pro i ita not mala-in. se Blackstone says: "With 
regard to offences ma la in se, capital punishments 
are in some instances inflicted by the immediate com- 
mand of God himself to all mankind; as, in the case 
o murder, by the precept delivered to Noah, their 
common ancestor and representative, 'whoso sheddeth 
man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. ' In 
other instances they are inflicted by the example of 
the creator, in his positive code of laws for the 
regulation of the Jewish republic; as in the crime 
against nature. But they are sometimes inflicted 
without such express warrant or example, at the will 
and discretion of the human legislature; as for for- 
gery, for robbery, and sometimes for offences of a 
l4: ghter kind. Of these we are principally to speak: 
as--. these crimes are, none of them, offences against 
natural, but only against social, rights; not even 
robbery itself, unless it be a robbery from one's 
person; all others being an infringement of that 
right of property, which, as we have formerly seen, 
owes it's origin not to the law of nature, but merely 
to civil society. 
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use the issue of criminal- reform in such a way as to 
strengthen the power of the state. His reasoning follows 
contemporary thinking on proportionate punishment and, at 
the same time, ' enables Johnson to reinforce a generally 
conservative political outlook. This is not inconsistent, 
because Johnson is seeking to. justify a perception of the 
state as a wise, ' humane 'and necessary institution. How- 
ever, while his efforts for Dodd failed, Johnson was not 
-130 
disconcerted, but thenceforth-lent his support to the 
. 131 
movement for criminal law reform. 
vi 
In Rambler 81 Johnson explores the religious maxim: 
'whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so 
do unto them' (Matthew vii 12) within its legal context. 
Johnson deals with principles of mercy and compassion and 
their relation to community and individual. He disting- 
uishes a concept of justice and analyzes community respon- 
sibility. In this effort Johnson examines the critical 
juncture of benevolence and justice in terms of civil 
rights and moral duties. He*probes the moral implications 
in a judge's sentence and considers the social utility in 
granting mercy. Writing on the difference between 'debts 
of charity' and 'debts of justice', Johnson pursues his 
130. Radzinowicz, pp. 336-339. 
131. cf. ' Observations on- the, Propriety of Pardoning Dr. 
Dodd, ea., Chapman, pp. 24-26; for a statement of 
the Dodd case which Johnson had sent to the newspap- 
ers. 
64 
enquiry into the nature of punishment and its effect on 
society. 
The issue of judicial sentencing illustrates Johnson's 
ability to sustain apparent inconsistency. In the Dodd 
case Johnson. takes a benevolent- view of judicial mercy 
where,, ' as opposed to a "crime'against nature", e. g. murder, 
the death penalty may be 'imposed for a civil crime. How- 
ever, in this essay, Johnson frames a more general argu- 
ment on the need and effect of sentencing: 
" One of the most celebrated cases which 
have been produced as requiring some skill 
in the direction to conscience to adapt 
them to this great rule, is that of a 
criminal asking mercy of hisjudge, who 
cannot but know that if he was in the state 
of the supplicant, he should desire that par- 
don which he now denies. - The difficulty of 
this sophism will vanish, if we remember that 
the parties are, in reality, on one side the 
criminal, and on the other the community of 
which the magistrate is only the minister, dnd 
by which he is intrusted with the publick 
safety. 
132 
Johnson sees the paramount concern as that of public safe- 
ty and, in essence, "the'security of the state: 
The magistrate therefore, ' in pardoning a 
man unworthy of pardon, betrays the trust 
with which he is invested, gives away what 
is not his own, and, apparently, does to 
others what he would not that others should 
do to him. Even the community, whose right 
is still greater to arbitrary grants of 
mercy, is bound by those laws which regard 
the great republick of mankind, and cannot 
justify such forbearance as may produce 
wickedness, and lessen the general confi- 
dence and security in which all have an 
equal interest, and which all are therefore 
132. ' Rambler 81, p. 62. 
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bound to maintain. For this. reason the 
state has not a right to erect a general 
sanctuary for fugitives, or give protec- 
tion to such as have forfeited their 
lives by crimes against the laws of com- 
mon morality equally acknowledged by all 
nations, because no people can, without 
infraction of the universal league of 
social beings, incite, by prospects of 
impunity and safety, those practices in 
another dominion, which they would them- 
selves punish in their own. 
133 
This stern and seemingly uncompromising approach is Zunda- 
mental to Johnson's view of crimes against nature. There 
is a distinction in the pattern of Johnson's thinking on 
punishment when the crime is capital by natural law and 
134 
not just by civil legislation. 
This distinction is made clear in the way Johnson 
explores the application of positivist law to the exercise 
of individual morals. Johnson accepts the need for those 
personal deliberations that are made in quest of a proper 
judgment. To him such'a pursuit defines the major con- 
stituents in his theory of virtue. This is not based on 
a situation ethic but a rigorous moral core that implies 
direction and guides action. it is here that Johnson 
takes exception to a rule of distributive justice: 
The discharge of the 'debts of charity', 
or duties which we owe to others not 
merely as required by justice, but as 
133. Rambler 81, p. 62-63. 
134. cf. chapter 3, pp. 210,218,231-3?; however, this implies a different, non-utilitarian view of natural law from 
the position he takes in the Chambers' lectures. 
Nevertheless, this shift shows how Johnson's think- 
ing matures, and his ability to advance seemingly, 
conflicting positions on even fundamental points. 
66' 
dictated by benevolence, ' admits in , its own nature greater complication of 
circumstances and greater latitude of 
choice. Justice is indispensably and 
universally necessary, and what is 
necessary must always be limited, 
uniform, and distinct. 
135 
Johnson argues for a moral rule that 'is not equally 
determinate and absolute with respect to offices of 
kindness, and acts of. liberality', but the question re- 
mains as to how this affects the state. 
Johnson's perception of personal 'debts of charity' 
allows him to say that: 
we can only know what others suffer 
or want, by considering how we should 
be affected in the same state; nor 
can we proportion our assistance by 
any other rule than that of doing 
what we should expect from others, 
136 
However, the demands of the state do not permit this rule 
to be 'followed when allocating punishment. This-isj 6, Vie, 
scope'of criminal punishment includes annulling a breach 
of duty or setting out the parameters of rights. In this 
essay Johnson suggests that appropriate punishments pro- 
vide a suitable answer for some aspects of a crime; but 
135. Ibid. p. 63. 
136. Rambler 81, p. 61. 
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maintains that the interest of society is paramount. 
137 
The legal and philosophical basis in a judicial decision 
involves a combination of legal, moral and community re- 
sponsibility which governs Johnson's thinking on the 
138 0 
nature of punishment. . 
----vii ---- 
.. 139 An Account' of the Life' of Mr. *Richard Savage shows 
how Johnson shapes facts and manipulates perceptions in 
order to make an effective legal presentation. Savage, a 
140 
minor poet who shared many late-o; 94' adventures with 
137. cf. Adventurer 50, p. 366, where Johnson feels severe 
corporal punishment is legitimate for personal cor- 
rection and state security: "There is, I think, an 
" antient law in Scotland, by whichL. eas%%79-making was 
capitally punished. I am, indeed, far from desiring 
to increase in this kingdom the number of executions: 
yet I cannot but think, that they who destroy the 
confidence of society, weaken the credit of intelli- 
gence, and interrupt the security of life; harass the 
delicate with shame, and perplex the timorous with 
alarms; might very properly be awakened to a sense 
of their crimes,. by denunciations of a whipping post 
or pillory: since many are so insensible of right and 
wrong, that they have no standard of action but the 
law; nor feel guilt, but as they dread punishment. " 
138. Idler 89, p. 276: "But in a world like ours, where 
our senses assault us, and our hearts betray us, we 
should pass on from crime to crime, heedless and re- 
morseless, if misery did not stand in our way, and 
our own pains admonish us of our. folly. " 
139. All citations from this work are taken from Samuel 
'Johnson: The Life of Savage, ed. Clarence Tracy, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971). Tracy's notes and 
comparisons with the anonymous Life which Johnson 
utilized in writing his, are ind spens(ble. However, 
my concern is with Johnson's handling of the facts as 
he understood them, not the actual record. 
140. Richard Savage, The Poetical, Works of' Richard Savage, 
ed. Clarence Tracy, (Cambridge: At the University 
Press, 1962). Although Johnson thought Savage pos- 
sessed much 'genius', the'general opinion and the one 




claimed to be the illegitmate son of the Earl 
Rivers, was arrested for debt more than once, and was 
142 
tried for murder during a coffee-house brawl. in his 
biography Johnson creates -a sympathetic though inaccurate 
3 
view of the circumstances surrounding Savage's birth 
and parentage. Moreover, Johnson argues that throughout 
his life Savage had to endure the burdens of illegitimacy 
and shameful treatment accorded him by his mother the 
144 
Countess of Macclesfield. Such treatment affected 
Savage's psychological development and influenced his 
. 145 
subsequent behaviour. Although this situation allows 
Johnson to discuss the legal implications of illegitimacy, 
141. 'Life I, pp. 161-164. 
142. Account, pp. 30-33; Clarence Tracy, The Artificäl 
'Bastard: ' A Biography of Richard Savage, Ca ri ge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 82-83. 
143. Tracy, pp. 3-37; Tracy surveys the historical record 
and takes a middle view of the scandal by suggesting 
that whatever the truth, Savage believed his own 
story; Life I, pp. 161-174. 
144. Account, p. 20: Johnson attacks the state of the law 
t aiF t permits a' ; moral'' infanticide to exist: ". The 
Punishment which our laws inflict upon those Parents 
who murder their infants, is well known, nor has its 
Justice ever been contested; but if they deserve 
Death, who destroy a Child in it's Birth, what Pains 
can be severe enough for her who forbears to destroy 
him only to. inflict sharper Miseries upon him; who 
prolongs his Life, only to make it miserable; and who 
exposes him without care and without Pity, to the 
Malice of Oppression, the Caprices of Chance, and the 
Temptations of Poverty; who rejoices to see him over- 
whelmed with Calamities; and when his own Industry, 
or*Charity of others, has enabled him'to rise for a 
short tic above the Miseries, plunges him again into 
his former Distress? " Moreover, Johnson suggests but 
avoids the issue of abortion when he seems to consider 
the'quality of life and not mere existence. 
145. cf. The Bastard, which also argues the plea for 
self-defense. 
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he concentrates instead'on the abuse of legal procedure 
and the subversion of evidence that. characterize the mur- 
146 
der trial. 
At a late evening altercation in Robinson's Coffee- 
house, Savage who was accompanied by Merchant and Gregory, 
became involved in a dispute over the control of heat from 
a fireplace. Johnson points out that not only was the 
subsequent murder of Sinclair unpremeditated and thus, 
really a degree of manslaughter; 
... Swords were drawn on both Sides, and 
one Mr. James Sinclair was killed. 
Savage having wounded likewise a Maid 
that held him, forced his way with Mer- 
chant out of the house; but being intimi- 
dated and confused, without Resolution 
either to fly or stay, they were taken 
in a back Court by one of the Company 
and some Soldiers, whom he had called 
to his Assistance; 
147 
but that Savage had no serious intention to flee eventual 
prosecution: 
With regard to the Violence with which he 
endeavoured his Escape, he declared, 
that it was not his Design to fly from 
Justice, or decline a Trial, but to 
avoid the Expences and Severities of a 
Prison, and that he intended to have 
appeared at the Bar without Compulsion. 
148 
146. Thursday 7 December 1727; Select- Trials, for Murder 
'at' the Old Bailey, pp. 249-250; Account, pp. 32- 
cf. Tracy, pp. 83-93, for his discussion of the trial 
and the events surrounding the appeal. 
147. Account, p. 3')' . 
148. '"Ibid. p. 33. 
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Johnson's recital of these facts-is calculated to mini- 
mize Savage's willing participation in the" incident and 
149 
undercut any suggestion of wilful intent. This be- 
comes much clearer in his -report of the actual trial. 
Here Johnson tells of slight discrepancies in the 
depositions of the prosecuting witnesses. At first, he 
uses this point not to impeach 'their testimony but to 
show the general'confusion*_tha't affects the reliability 
of their description of events: 
This Difference however was very far from 
amounting to Inconsistency, but it was 
sufficient to shew, that the Hurry of the 
Quarrel was such, that it was not easy to 
discover the Truth with relation to par- 
ticular Circumstances, and that therefore 
some Deductions were to be made from the 
Credibility of the Testimonies. 
150 
it is only later in his account that Johnson tries to 
impeach the witnesses' credibility by showing their bad 
reputations and thus, -questioning implicitly their verac- 
ity: 
The Witnesses which appeared against him 
were proved to be Persons of Characters 
which did not entitle them to much Credit; 
a common Strumpet, a Woman by whom Strum- 
pets were entertained, and a Man by whom 
they were supported. 
'151 
Johnson intends to show that the conduct of these persons 
149. cf. this chapter pp. 56-58, for my discussion of mens 
rea. 
150. OR cit. 
151., Ibid. p. 34. 
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is inconsistent with their testimony. *It is relevant for 
him to do this so that he can highlight the contrast with 
Savage: 
... the Character of Savage was by 
several Persons of Distinction asserted, 
to be that of a modest inoffensive Man, 
not inclined to Broils, or to Insolence, 
and who had, to that Time, been only 
known for his Misfortunes and his wit. 
152 
Moreover-, Johnson desires to lay the foundation for an 
153 
appeal to the Monarch and so, he must present Savage 
as favorably as possible. The need for this is easily 
seen when the Judge's conduct and the invidious compari- 
sons he makes are reviewed. 
154 
Johnson takes exception to Sir Francis Page's sum- 
152. Ibid. 
153., Ibid. pp. 36-38, for the efforts made by his mother 
to frustrate the appeal for pardon which was even- 
tually ordered by the King 6 January 1728. However, 
Johnson has this final bitter comment on the trial: 
"Thus had Savage perished by the Evidence of a Bawd, 
a strumpet, and his Mother, had not Justice and 
Compassion procured him an Advocate of Rank too 
great to be rejected unheard, and of Virtue too 
eminent to be heard without being believed. His 
merit and his Calamities happened to reach the Ear 
of the Countess of Hertford, who engaged in his 
Supp. mrt with all the Tenderness that is excited by 
Pity, and All the Zeal which is kindled by Generos- 
ity, and demanding an Audience of the Queen, laid 
before her the whole series of his Mother's Cruelty, 
exposed the Improbability of an Accusation by which 
he was charged with an Intent to commit a Murder, 
that could produce no Advantage, and soon convinced 
her how little his former Conduct could serve to be 
mentioned as a Reason for extraordinary Severity. " 
p. 38; also see my remarks on pardons I, p. 55 and 
on ranks III, pp. 275-278. 
154. cf. Tracy, ' Artificial Bastard, p. 86, for the noto- 
riety Page enjoye . 
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mation: 
... that good Characters were of no 
Weight against positive evidence, 
though they might turn the Scale, 
where. it was doubtful; and that though 
when two Men attack each other the 
Death'of either is only Manslaughter; 
but where one is the?, gressor, as in the 
Case before them, and in Pursuance of 
his first Attack, kills the other, the 
Law supposes the Action, however sudden 
to be malicious; 
155 
and especially the language he uses to indicate his loath- 
ing of Savage: 
Gentlemen of the Jury, you are to con- 
sider, that Mr. Savage is a very great 
Man, a much greater Man than you or I, 
Gentlemen of the Jury; that he wears very 
fine Clothes, much finer Clothes than you 
or I, Gentlemen of the Jury; that he 
has abundance of Money in his Pocket, much 
more Money than you or I, Gentlemen of the 
Jury; but, Gentlemen of the Jury, is it 
not a very hard Case, Gentlemen of the 
Jury, that Mr. Savage should therefore kill 
you or me, Gentlemen- of the Jury? 
156 
Naturally, Johnson abhors the binding instructions to con- 
vict, but he accepts the duty of the court to inform the 
jury on the law. However, Page gives a charge that could 
only sustain a conviction and one which assassinates 
Savage's character as well. 
Johnson's portrayal of this trial foreshadows his 
155. Ibid. P. 34. 
156. Ibid., p. 34; This harangue is related by Savage; see 
also Tracy's note 30 for his remarks on the reliabil- 
ity of this quotation; Johnson also quotes Savage's 
unsuccessful plea for mercy, pp. 35-36. 
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interest in the Dodd"affair157 and the movement for crim- 
inal law reform. The flagrant abuse of legal procedure 
and judicial ethics characterizeSthe type of failure 
that attracts Johnson's interest. Certainly, he has a 
vested interest in vindicating Savage, but this in no way 
lessens his desire to seek reform. Although Johnson 
shapes his description of events to place Savage in the 
best possible light, his efforts must-be seen in the con- 
text of his understanding o. f the legal system. Johnson's 
trial scene eloquently points up how arbitrarily judges 
subvert Intent and thus, deny justice. 
---- viii ---- 
Johnson's major legal concerns in these periodical 
essays and his remarks on Dodd and Savage show the 
thY {stages of his legal philosophy. This philosophy is 
characterized by the strong moral presumption that per- 
meates the texture of these writings and the intense per- 
sonal involvement these issues stirred in him. This is 
evident by Johnson's frustration at the state of legal 
education and the quality of those'persons drawn to the 
law. Because Johnson appreciates the close connection 
between the law and those who administer it, much of his 
jurisprudential thinking refers to the development of 
this relationship. This moral component helps to define 
the 'habit of mind' Johnson brings to each question of 
157. cf. this chapter pp. 51-63. 
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legal rights and duties. 'The presence of a strong humani- 
tarian impulse in all his comments indicates Johnson's 
recognition that the law relies too much on disproportion- 
ate punishment.. Not only does his recognition of this 
fact help to place him among Enlightenment thinkers, but 
also reveals the relationship between legal theory and 




Johnson was a generalist whose concern with the 
function of the law in society is evident in his comments 
on the specific legal cases mentioned in Boswell's Life 
of Johnson. In these cases Johnson as a moral philosopher3 
2 
is interested in the scope of the law and its function in 
the interaction between man and society. Johnson realized 
the delicate balance between vested interests and society's 
The idea is that: values in terms of rights and duties 10 
"Legal rules confine a person's duties towards others within 
previously defined limits"5' In. this way Johnson conceived 
of the law as a facet of a universal, jI ustice that is endemic 
in the mind of intelligent man. As the product of a classical 
education6 Johnson would certainly have absorbed Cicero's 
maxim: "a lege ducendum est juris exordium; ea est enim 
-4-a 6o e 
naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea 'uff risýn'iiuriae 
re 9ula7. The conflict between individual and community 
1. W. K. Wimsatt, jr., The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson, 
(New Haven; Yale Univers tyPrress, -1 1) ppp- 6 
2. James Boswell, The_ Life of Samuel Johnson, LL. D., edited by 
George Birkbeck Hi11, D. C. L., revise and enlarged by L. F. 
Powell, six volumes, (Oxford; At the Clarendon Press, 
1934). 
3. *J. L. Clifford, Johnsonian Studies, 1887-1950, (Minneapolis; 
University of Minn ota Press, 1951), pp. 121-124. 
J. L. Clifford, D. J. Greene, :A Bibliography of Johnsonian 
Studies, 1950-1960", in Johnsonian Studies, edited by Magdi 
Wahba, (Cairo: 1962; distributed outside he U. A. R. by the 
Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 337-338. 
4. 'London'53, * Vanit 108 
5. Stein, Shand, 1974, p. 3. 
6. Life IV, p. 102: "The classical quotation is the parole 
of Titerary men all over the world". 
7. Cicero, De Legibus, I vi 19; cf: Donald J. Greene, Samuel 
Johnson's Library An Annotated Guide, English Literary 
Studies, University of Victoria, 1975; J. D. Fleetman, editor, 
of The Sale Catalogue of Samuel Johnson's Library (Christie 
. 
1785) A Facsimile Edition, English Literary S es, 




rests on an internal moral discipline guided by both 
wisdom and piety. Johnson's moral didacticism finds its 
expression and illustration in the technicalities of law 
and the supporting jurisprudential concerns that approach 
the "mutability of mankind" (Preface to the plan of an English 
tictionarv). The social function of the law in the fabric 
of eighteenth-century society is acutely perceived by 
Johnson in his understanding of the law as an instrument for 
the regulation of society and of the nuances it creates in% 
varied class relationships8. 
In Boswell's biography a view of Johnson emerges which 
expands the idea of the "alternation which time is always 
making in the modes of' Life"9. This is clear in the way 
in which Johnson's involvement with the law and jurisprudence 
, acts as a counterpoint 
in his reactions to the more familiar 
occurrences and speculations in the Life. It is important 
to recall that Johnson wrote in Rambler 24: "The great 
praise of Socrates is, that he drew the wits of'Greece, 
by his instruction and example, from the vain pursuit of 
natural philosophy to moral inquiries, and turned their 
thoughts from stars and tides, and matter and motion, upon 
10 
the various modes of virtue, and relations of life. " For 
Johnson the law offers a framework in which practical human 
expression is entwined with the interests of society and its 
8. cf. Chapter III, pp. 275-278, Johnson appreciates'the 
effect land: l* have in maintaining property and sus- 
taining rank and social order. 
9. Adventurer, 95. 
10. Rambler 24, pp. 131-132; Alkon, p. 7: 'Tradition of 
Socratic Humanism. 
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attendant moral impulse. Hugo Grotius, a favorite legal 
and moral philosopher of Johnson's,. encäpsulates this 
Johnsonian viewpoint: ". Law is the doctrine'of reason, 
determining every rational being to that which is 
congruous and convenient for the nature and condition 
thereof. '" It is for an understanding of this perspective 
that Boswell's record is essential as it permits a 
glimpse of Johnson's jurisprudential thinking and its 
application in realistic terms. An analysis of Johnson's 
comments in this context provides an' understanding of 
legal institutions-and their function in society as 
perceived by a mind characterized by its "splash of strong 
bold thought". An examination of Johnson's legal comments 
12 
allows his humanitarian spirit to be discerned in the 
regulation of society. In this context there is the 
realization that "the role of law in society depends on the 
spirit of that society, if by spirit we understand an 
amalgam of moral attitudes, political organization, social- 
traditions, and level of economic development. "13 To 
appreciate Johnson's personal inclinations, it is 
necessary to analyze the texture of comment in each 
instance of his writing, to penetrate the lawyer's role as 
11. Stair, Sir James Dalrymple, 1st Viscount, -The Institutions 
of the Law of Scotland, Deduced from its Ö iginals, and 
Collated with the Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, and 
with the Customs of Neighboring Nations, (Edinburgh, 1681) 
edited Brodie, T826. 
12. G. B. Hill, Johnson Miscellanies Vol. I. P. 74, quotes 
Richard Cumberland's Memoirs 1806). Vol. I. P. 353: 
"splash of strong bold thought about him.: 
13. Stein, Shand, p. 16. 
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he sees it if possible, and ascertain the philosophical 
14 
undercurrents evidenced in the diction and content of 
his work. 
All of the major cases mentioned in Boswell's Life 
deal with factual situations and reveal general principles 
that have a personal meaning for Johnson. The schoolmaster 
case, Hastie V. Campbell, enables Johnson to utilize his 
own pedagogical experience. The interesting defamation 
cases; Paterson v. Stirling, Menis v. Jam, Scotland v. 
Thompson, Societ of Solicitors v. Robertson with their 
political overtones naturally would be of interest to any 
literary. man or journalist. Johnson as periodical essayist, 
satirist, and journalist for Cave's Gentleman's Magazine 
would also be concerned with the copyright cases, Donaldson 
V. Beckett, and in re Trapp. Since property and its 
'security reflect a dominant concern of current political 
15 
and social action , Johnson's interest in this area forms 
a major part of his legal thinking. In Knight V. Wedder- 
bourne, Wilson V. Smith et al., in re Auchinleck, Douglas 
v. - Hamilton, and Maclean V. Argyle, Johnson discusses 
the nature and function of property. It does not surprise 
one that Johnson's moral and political views would find' 
expression in the law's treatment of these concepts. 
14. ct. Life I, p. 342; Life III p. 356; Gay, The Enlightex ncxt An Interpretation vol. I: The Rise of Modern Paganism, 
p. -21: "... Johnson, who detested the philosophes as 
unprincipled infidels, accepted much of their program: he had The Enlightenment Style". 
15. Boorstin, pp. 167-186. 
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Indeed, Johnson's observations on these specific legal 
cases indicate his traditional habits of thought, even 
16 
when he assumes an advocate's mask. 
While there is an element of speculation in elucidating 
any coherent legal philosophy from these cases, what does 
emerge is the confirmation of his advice to Boswell: 
"lawyers are a class of the community, who by study and 
experience, have acquired the art and power of arranging 
evidence, ' and of applying to the points at issue what the 
17 
law has settled". These cases evidence the applicability 
of this definition to Johnson himself. It is characteristic 
of the quality of Johnson's mind that his interests lie 
in all the ramifications of the law and emphasize its 
general quality. The comprehensive nature of the law in 
its reflection of the interactions among all elements 
within society attracts Johnson with his penchant for wide- 
ranging analysis and comment. Indeed, Johnson's wide-angle 
vision has its focus on the law because he felt, "it is 
always a writer's duty to make the world better" (Preface 
to Shakespeare). Since the law is inextricably connected 
with the moral condition of its society, Johnson main- 
tained that "he that thinks reasonably must think morally" 
(Ibid), and thus understood his responsibility in dealing 
with the interrelationship between the law and its society. 
16. Wimsatt, The' Prose: Style'of Samuel Johnson, p. 96-98. 
17. Life V. p. 26-27 
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The legal questions raised in these cases reflect 
issues that are fundamental to Enlightenment concerns8. 
1 
How the law relates to educational practice, the limits 
of authority, the nature of discipline, the balance between 
rights and duties, and the extent of and qualification for 
government intervention figure prominently in contemporary 
intellectual debates. Conflicting opinions ön the nature, 
control, and disposition of property; control over the 
dAssemination of ideas; the ability to protect or husband 
one's own ideas; social prestige and how it affects the 
fabric of society; communal responsibility and the issues 
of moral- duty, are questions that occupied Enlightenment 
thinkers. All issues and concerns of this kind are present 
in the cases, and it is clear from the texture of Johnson's 
remarks that he assimilated arguments advanced by continental 
19 
philosophes 
Not only do Johnson's comments on these cases reflect 
current thinking but they show him to be the heir of 17th- 
century Christian humanism. In England especially after the 
Revolution of 1688, there was a release of intellectual 
activity encouraged by an entire century of philosophical 
enquiry that rejuve-na ted civilization20. The writings of Bacon2lý' 
18. Gay, II, p. 8; "The Enlightenmentwas the age of what 
David Hume called the moral sciences; sociology, 
-psychology, political economy, and modern education. " 
19. cf Gay, Vol. I, p. 21; Lifte It p. 342; Kasselas and 
Candide; Voltaire II, 125 
20. Willey, The Eighteenth-Century Background, p. 1. 
21. Life III, p. '11,194, II, p. 158. 
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Newton22, Locke23, and Hale24 exerted considerable influence 
on Johnson. All of these thinkers cultivated scientific 
enquiry and in conjunction with the concepts of the natural 
law articulated by Grotius and Puffendorf set the stage for 
the intellectual revolution of which Johnson was a part. 
From these antecedents Johnson drew up his methodology of 
reviewing facts, emphasized close personal observation, and 
applied rigorous common sense to formulg, e his legal opinion. 
Despite the tendency. for an idiosyncratic response, there is 
logic to Johnson's legal reasoning that these cases help-)to 
define . 
----i---- 
In a letter dated 3 March, 1772 from Edinburgh, Boswell 
wrote to Johnson deeking his advice in the matter of a 
discharged schoolmaster from Campbelltown. In an abbreviated 
history of the case, Boswell related that Hastie was dismissed 
from his position "for being somewhat severe in the chastise- 
ment of his scholars , 
25. In this letter Boswell continued: 
"The Court of Session, considering it to be dangerous to the 
interests of learning and education, -to lessen the dignity 
of teachers, and make them afraid of too indulgent parents, 
instigated by the complaints of their children, restored 
him". Then he invited Johnson to help draft the defense 
26 
22, cf Life II, 125; Life IV, 23, p. 3. 
23. cf Wimsatt, Philosophic Words, %9Ji8; Alkon, Samuel 
Johnson and Moral Discipline, Chapter-5, rp. 9y-Y$ 
24. Life II, p. 158. 
25. Life II, p. 144. 
26. Ibid, p. 145. 
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for the appeal to the House of Lords: 
I hope there 
fear of a reversal; 
your air in my plan 
It is a general que 
particular law. 
will be a little 
but I must beg to have 
of supporting the decree. 
stion, and not a point of 
27 
Johnson's guidance in terms of general legal principles 
yields constituents of the theoretical foundation for 
his overview of jurisprudential concerns. Although Boswell 
was a practicing advocate28, he realized Johnson's considerable 
ability in generalanalysis and understood the necessity 
for reason and experience that shaped a response essential 
for legal speculation. Johnson's response of "collateral 
help" illustrates his ability to generalize and presume 
the moral problems the case raises. An examination of 
Johnson's construction of the issues in the case reveals 
a masterful legal presentation. - Johnson's approach enabled 
27. Ibid. 
28. W. H. Bond, Daniel E. Whitten, "Boswell's Court of Session 
Papers: A Preliminary check-list, " in 18th-century 
Studies in Honor of Donald F. Hyde, ed. -V. H Bond, 
(NY: The Gaslier Club, 1970) pp. 231-265; Walker 
Lowry, " James Boswell, Scots Advocate and English 
Barrister, 1740-1795, " Stai'Jford Law Review (vol. 2, 
1949-1950), pp. 471-495; John Murray, "Some 
Civil Cases of James Boswell: 1772-74, " 52 Juridical 
Law Review (1940), pp. 222-51; T. B. Simpson, "Boswell 
as an Advocate, " 34 Juridical Review (1922), 
pp. 201 - 225; William K. Wimsott, jr. and 
Frederick A. Pottle, eds. Boswell for the Defense 
1769-1774, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). 
s 
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him to develop a line of reasoning that seems to foreclose 
potential opposition. The power of Johnson'. s legal acumen 
leads him to concentrate the argument on the need for a. 
disciplined educational process instead of the particular 
activity of the respondent. 
John Hastie, Boswell's client schoolmaster, had been 
summarily removed from his position on the charges that: 
"he was irregular in his attendance upon the school; that 
he-was in the practice of correcting his scholars in a 
cruel and barbarous manner, to, the danger of their health", 
(Hastie v. Campbell, 28 June; Faculty, Decisions, p. 351). 
Corollary. issues in this action involve a question of libel 
and the rules governing legal evidence. However, Johnson 
did not focus his remarks on these issues but dealt with 
the broad principle of "authority"29. "The discipline of a 
school is military. There must be either unbounded license 
or absolute authority"30. "Authority" is a tool for the 
management of society that is effective through the fictions 
of justice and the impartiality of law. Johnson understood 
the dominant currents needed to sustain a social order 
311 
29. Among the definitions Johnson offers in the Dictionary 
(1755) for; AUTHORITY (auctoritas) include: legal power; 
influence, credit; power, rule; support, justification, 
court use; testimony; weight of testimony, creditability. 
30.2R. Cit: p. 184. 
31. Life of Roscommon (17481, "In absolute governments, there is 
sometimes a general reverence paid to all that has the 
sanction of power and the countenance of greatness. 
How little this is the state of our country needs not 
to be told". 
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and-in this case he exhibits an ambivalence toward the 
maintenance of that order. On one hand his argument showed 
him humane to the individual, but on the other there is a 
harshness present in his assumptions about the control 
of the individual in that society. 
Johnson's initial reply; "Why, Sir, 'till you can fix 
the degree of obstinacy and negligence of the scholars, 
you cannot fix the degree of severity of the master. 
Severity must be. continued until obstinacy be subdued, and 
negligence be cured32, frames the-issue of force involved. 
Johnson does not specify a lex talionis but that degree of 
retaliative sanction required to maintain the dignity of 
the schoolmasters: 
The degreesof obstinacy in young 
minds are very different; as different 
must be the degrees of persevering. A 
stubborn scholar must be corrected till 
he is subdued. 
33 
The object of this personal form of administration of law 
is ostensibly to create the most favorable environment for 
learning. In his argument Johnson grants wide discretion 
in the need and choice of discipline'as a precondition for 
the schoolmaster-to teach: 
32. Life II, p. 146. 
33. Ibid, p. 184. 
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No severity is cruel which obstinacy 
makes necessary; for the greatest cruelty would 
be to desist, and leave the scholar too careless 
for instruction and too much hardened for 
reproof, 
34 . 
Here Johnson is al; 
element of cruelty 
By suggesting that 
proper pedagogical 
Hastie's action is 
so careful to anticipate and refute the 
that the'appellants would introduce. 
the ability to enforce discipline is a 
method, Johnson is able to maintain that 
no more than an effort made in good' 
faith to fulfill his teaching responsibility. 
At a dinner in the Mitre tavern, Johnson succinctly 
sets out his first argument on Hastie V. Campbell: 
Sir, (said he), the government of a 
schoolmaster is somewhat of =the nature of 
military government; that is to say, it must 
be arbitrary, it must be exercised by the will 
of one man, according to particular circumstances. 
You must shew some learning upon the occasion. 
. You must show that a schoolmaster has a pres- 
criptive right to beat; and that an action of 
assault and battery cannot be admitted against 
him, unless there is some great excess, some 
barbarity. This man has maimed none of his 
boys. They are left with the full exercise 
of their corporeal faculties. In our schools 
in England, many boys have been maimed; yet I 
never heard of an action against a schoolmaster 
on that account. P. vffendorf, I think, maintains 
the right of a schoolmaster to beat his scholars. 
35 
Johnson stipulates a special analogy where limited privilege 
due to position or status is granted, and the exercise of 
auctoritas vests its discretion in a schoolmaster as a 
34. Ibid, p. 184. 
35. Ibid, p. 157. 
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sovereign. An abnegation of any semblance of due process 
of law exists as Johnson has-framed-the particular society 
within narrow constructs. This military analogy enables 
Johnson to advance an administrative rule that severely 
curtails the operations of'individual students. Johnson's 
argument rests on the theory that the best schoolroom 
situation depends upon an acceptance of unquestioned rules 
as in the army. The principle is that a schoolmaster 
acting in the name of an efficient educational process may 
do what he considers necessary for successful administration. 
This rule of law which-allows the schoolmaster to exercise 
such broad discretionary powers may undermine the student's 
sense of well-being by leaving his rights uncertain and 
subject to chance. However, this problem is not specif- 
ically dealt with by Johnson in this discussion but is 
alluded to in his belief that the end product benefits the 
society at large. "He (Johnson) was-rather one who believed 
that the chief end of action was the good of society, and 
that to this end the princip4i concern was getting things 
done"36. Indeed, Hastie's method of discipline is seen 
by Johnson as an effort to satisfy the schoolmaster's role 
in society. 
The philosophical ramifications of Johnson's viewpoint 
set out a control vested in the use of power that defines 
the nature of the duty needed for benevolent despotism. 
There is a restriction present in the privilege for any 
... . 
36. Herman W. Liebert, "Reflections on Samuel Johnson", in 
Samuel Johnson A Collection of Critical Essa s, edited 
by Donald J. Greene, ()Englewood Clitts; Vxentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1965), p. 19, 
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remedy 
37, i. e. means by which a right is enforced or 
the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or 
compensated. The effect of Johnson's argument is an emphasis 
on the minimal corresponding rights granted to the individual 
students. Johnson's justification for-this legal comment 
approached his answer to the American Colonists in Taxation 
No rann : I 
Government is necessary to man, and where 
obedience is not compelled, there is no government 
.... Society cannot subsist but by force, first by making laws, and-+4e6 bf enforcing them. 
38 
In this instance Johnson affirms all these government 
powers to be in the complete domain of the schoolmaster. 
The precedent found in Justinian's 'force of law'39 serves 
as an external source for comparison and authority. Terror 
or a form of it provided a foundation for the social fabric 
40 
in eighteenth-century Britain. Johnson was aware that 
37. Among the definitions offered in the Dictionary for REMEDY 
include: cure of any easiness;. that which counteracts 
any evil (civil government is the proper remedy for 
the inconvenience of the state of nature, Locke); 
reparation, means of repairing hurt. 
38. Taxation No Tyranny (1775); (Yale Edition)Volume 10, 
edited by Donald J. Greene, p. 448'. 
39. Henry John Roby, An Introduction to the Stddy of Justinian's 
Digest, (Cambridge;. At the University Press, 37-886T, p. 
XXV; the Digest was made the exclusive legal authority 
and its emphasis on the reason of law attempts to give 
a unity to the whole. 
40. Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. 
Thompson, and Cal Winslow, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and 
"Society. in Eighteenth-Century England, 
(New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 17-65. 
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control by force is not incidental but substantive to a 
present legal and legislative remedy. He realized that 
some use or element. of force was a universal-instrument for 
state sanction or control. 
41 
Public rebellion was odious to Johnson , and its 
prejudicial effect on the rule of law was viewed through the 
microcosm of his own experience. This encouraged Johnson 
to view the possibility that lawlessness which could reign 
in a classroom demands a method of regulation for the better- 
ment of all. Johnson avers that "The degrees of scholastic, 
as of military punishment, no stated rule can ascertain, 
it must be enforced till it overpowers temptation; till 
stubbornness becomes flexible, and perverseness regular"42. 
Johnson's argument does not reveal any'. understanding of 
independence in the relationship between freedom and the need 
and right of authority. His only guidance lies in the 
nebulous concept of custom and a somewhat naive faith in 
the wise use of power. Johnson suggests unwritten but 
established pedagogical practice where the force, use, and 
temper of discipline is determined by experience. 
While learning demands external discipline, it is 
questionable whether Johnson was fully apprised of Hastie's 
1* overzealous enforcement: 
41. The False Alarm , Vol. 10, pp. "313-345. 
42. Life 'II, p. 184. 
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that scarce a day passed without some of 
the scholars coming home to their parents with 
their heads cut, and their bodies discoloured. 
(2 Paton 277) 
Here is an example of a caveat in Boswell's reporting for 
the official report of the case stresses the severity of 
the punishment and the resulting damage done to the students. 
The unreliability of Boswell's reporting must be kept in 
mind as well as his motive in the presentation of Johnson's 
argument 
43 
. It must be realized that the presentation of 
a faclsal situation in any legal case 
is a prime determinant 
for analysis. Boswell's function as a reporter in this 
case enabled him to arrange and edit events and thereby 
modify the material Johnson used to develop his response. In 
this instance it appears Boswell reflects his involvement 
as an advocate44, and thus the 
facts are refracted. 
Johnson's predisposition for and conviction that any 
government is better than none at, all reflects Hobbes' 
43. James L. Clifford, ed., Twentieth Century Interpretations 
of Boswell's Life of Johnson A Collection of Critical 
Essays , (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Halle Inc., 1970). 
David L. Passler, Time, Form, and Style in Boswell's Life 
of Johnson, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1971). 
Irma'S. Lustig, "Boswell's Portrait of Himself in The Life 
of Samuel Johnson, " (unpublished, Ph. D. Diss., Univer- 
sity-of Pennsylvania, 1963). 
44. William K. Wimsatt, jr, and Frederick A. Pottle, editors, 
Boswell for the Defense 1769-1774, The Yale Editions of 
the P vate Papers of James Boswell, (New York: McGraw- 




In his dictated remarks on the case Johnson 
respects some limitation by external standards: "Correction 
must be proportioned to occasions. The inflexible must 
be subdued by harsher standards "46. Yet his-discussion 
reaffirms a principle of sovereignty47 vested in a master 
over a classroom that fills out the parallel with milit. r#ry 
law. In this framework of martial law, one may apply John- 
sonis-basic . 'premise that"All government supposes subjects, 
4 
all: authority implies obedience"8. That is to say the 
concept of sovereignty that a schoolmaster enjoys has to 
be unrestricted by virtue of the quality of this sovereign 
authority inherent in his position. Johnson understands 
a form of covenant instituted among parents, students, 
and teachers, and thus underscores the powers in sovereignty 
Hobbes' appreciated: 0 
.... to the Sovereign is committed the Power 
of Rewarding with Riches, or honour; and of 
Punishing corporall, or ;. pe cuniary punishment, 
or with ignominy every Subject according to 
the Law he hath formerly made;; or: "if there be 
no Law made, according as he shall judge most 
to. conduce to the encouraging of men to serve 
the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from 
45. Greene, Politics of Samuel Johnson, p. 245,253; 'Life I, 
408. 
46. Life II p. 184. 
47. Among the definitions in Johnson's Dictionary for 
SOVEREIGNTY include: supremacy; highest place; 
supreme power; highest degree of excellence. (The 
sole authority of making war and peace, are the true 
marks of sovereignty Davies) 
48. The Works of Samuel Johnson, Volume 10, p. 12. 
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döing dis-service to the same .............. :. 
49 
This theory of government allows Johnson to expound in a 
straight-forward way the arbitrary principles that operate here. 
Proceeding in his legal discussion Johnson advances 
to a discussion of Hastie's method of punishment. Johnson 
dismisses the unusual use of the measuring instrument 
known as the "word square" as a weapon on the grounds that 
its physical effect was temporary: 
No instrument of correction. is more proper 
than another but as it is better adapted to 
produce present pain without lasting mischief. 
Whatever were his instruments, no lasting mischief las ensued; and therefore, however unusual, 
in hands so cautious they were proper. 
50 
Carefully, Johnson discusses this device, and refutes any 
suggestion of brutality that may result from Hastie's 
use of it. 
Finally, the discussion concludes with a sympathetic 
portrait of a schoolmaster living in a hostile community 
both frightened and errVious Of him: 
If it be supposed that the enmity of their 
fathers proves the justice of the charge, 
it must be considered how often experience 
shews usithat men who are angry on one ground 
AN Thomas Hobbes; Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power 
of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civiil, selected 
may, Ric and S. Peters, edited by Michael Oakeshott, 
(Collier Macmillan, London, 1975 printing), Chapter . 18, p. 139. ,- 
50. Life II, p. 185. 
92'' 
will accuse oneanother; with how little kindness 
in a town of. low*trade, a man who lives by 
learning is regarded; and how implicitly, where 
the inhabitants are not very rich, a rich man 
is hearkened to and followed, 
51 
Johnson's exposition of this petty jealousy demondtrted by 
the people in Ca'Pbelltown is an attempt to pre-empt any 
revocation of their covenant. He impugns their motives 
in bringing the action and warns one to carefully distinguish 
the specious elements. in their arguments. Johnson does 
this by discussing molfpsychology. and persecution based 
on abuse of legal process: 0, 
In a place like Campbelltown, it is easy for 
one of the principal inhabitants to make a party. 
It is easy for that party to heat themselves 
with imaginary grievances. It is easy for them 
to oppress a man poorer than themselves; and 
natural to assert the dignity of riches, by 
persisting in oppression. The argument which 
attempts to prove'the impropriety of restoring 
him to his school, by alWying that he has lost 
the confidence of the people, is not the subject 
of juridical consideration; for he is to 
suffer, if he must suffer, not for their judgment, 
but for his own actions. It may be convenient 
for them to have another master; but it is a 
convenience of their own making. It would be like- 
wise convenient for him to find another school; 
but this convenience he cannot obtain. -- The 
question is not what is now convenient, but what 
is generally right. 
52 
In this way Johnson not only deals with the legal questions 
raised in the issue but subtly throws doubt on the good faith 




Although Johnson was not blindly reactionary, aspects 
of his argument are profoundly disturbing. Almost any 
educational theorist53 would have been horrified at his 
assertion that "children, not being reasonable, can be 
governed-only by fear". Evidently, Johnson's great powers 
of observation failed him in this matter. A foundation 
is laid for a position able to do severe psychological 
damage to a child. Moreover, the extension of Johnson's 
argument suggests an equation of learning with fear. The 
tension induced in a student undermines the acquisition of 
learning and this causes eventual damage to the proper 
reception of knowledge. This approach may discourage any 
instinctive desire for learning and is itself destructive. 
It is inconsistent for Johnson who took such care in 
learning not to realize the damaging prospects of his argument. 
Johnson's attack is paradoxical since he labeled his 
own schoolmaster Mr. Hunter, "very severe and wrongheadedly 
severe, 
54. This illiberal approach to student discipline 
is at odds with other views of discipline Johnson was known 
to espoüse55. Certainly, the focus of Johnson's position 
is on the schoolmaster's status and the respect for his 
judgment required in the classroom. 'Specifically, Johnson's 
argument develops his parallel with martial, law and the 
53. cf Roger Ascham, The Schoolmaster (1571), The Whole Works 
of Roger, Ascham, Now First Collected and Revised by Rev. 
Dr. GTilees, Volume 111, (London; John Russell Smith, 1864), 
p. 120. 
"Ascham" in the Lives of Sundry Eminent Persons, The Works 
of Samuel Johnson, A New Edition iý n 12 Vol sw th an Essay 
on his Life and Genius, by Arthur Murphy, Esq., (Landon; 
J. Nichols and Son, 1810), vol. 12, p. 308-328. 
54. Life I, p. 46. 
5ý. Life II, p. 476.. 
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complex legal duty present in the master-servant relation- 
ship. The legal relationships contained in the concept 
in loco parentis hold the same legal relation for a citizen 
under military domination. In this case Johnson sees. that 
the power exercised by Hastie is expressed in Hobbes's terms 
as the "present means to obtain some future apparent good"56. 
Thus contrary to the opinions characteristic of the. 
Enlightetio, etit, Johnson views-this society existing in a 
school from a positivist point of view and avers that the 
reasonableness of authority lies in-the power to exercise 
that authority. Future civilization iequires that "the 
master, who punishes, not only consults the future happiness 
of him who is the immediate subject of correction; but he 
propagates obedience through the whole school; and 
establishes regularity of exemplary justice58. The broad 
question for this case is not the vital interests of the 
students but-the position the master plays in moulding the 
future. 
Johnson appeals to the principle-of the 'reasonable 
man', where limits are determined by ad monendum et docendum, 
and his assertion that "custom and reason have, indeed, set 
some bounds to scholastic penalties"59. Yet, his limitation 
56. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 10, p. 72. 
57. Gay, The Enlightenment An Interpretation Vol. I; 
The Rlse of Modern Paganism, pp. 3-27.4 
The Enlightenment An Interpretation Vol. II; 
The Science of Freedom, pp. 397-447. 
58. Life II, p. 184. 
59. Ibid. 
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is a civil law principle that "a master who strikes at a 
scholar's eye shall be considered a criminal"60. Johnson 
extends this principle in a way that is almost ludicrous; 
"the schoolmaster inflicts no capital punishment, nor. 
enforces. his edicts by either death or mutilation"61. 
For this capital response would subject the schoolmaster 
to civil authority that would naturally prohibit such 
extreme chastisement. The issue concerns the limitations 
of punishment within the classroom and the paramezb. rs of 
punishment. Johnson the schoolmaster's discretion in that 
develops his argument to this extent in order to obscure 
the real issue and by exaggeration bury it. 
Johnson's memorandum on this case hints at the basis 
of the corollary issues where Hastie is accused of 
irregularity in attention to his duties. Also, jealousy 
in business competition may yield the motive behind the 
charge that Hastie "traded 
in cattle grazing and farming - 
dealt in black cattle-shipping business. - herring fishing" 
(2 Paton 277). An appreciation of the structure of a legal 
argument is evident as Johnson minimizes Hastie's putative 
business interests and puts the prosecution on the defensive. 
Johnson introduces this aspect by the suggestion that "those 
who are-: dispersed cannot be found; those who remain are the 
sons of his persecutors, and are not likely to support a 
"62 
man to whom their fathers are enemies This challenge 
to the veracity of the accusers shifts the focus from the 
60. Ibid, 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid p. 185. 
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accused in a clear, transparent advocate's device. 
Possibly Johnson's view would place Scotland and the reaction 
63 
to her schoolmaster as evidence of a primitive culture. 
Also, Johnson's well known prejudice against the Scotch and 
64 
his English chauvinism appear as undercurrents here. 
Problems of evidence and the way this evidence may be 
tainted are suggested as well as the correctness of the facts 
themselves. A question is raised as to what or who 
constitutes Hasties peers. Is a schoolmaster's position 
unusual and does it require a. different set of social norms 
especially in a society whose prejudice is transparent? 
A presumption of guilt is certainly present for Hastie 
in the climate of Campbelltown. Toward this end Johnson 
questions the fundamental elements of jury qualification 
and conflict of interest in the citizens. 
This final concern with the hostility and the distrust 
to which a schoolmaster may be subject reflects the indignity 
Johnson endured as an assistant instructor in a school at 
Market-Bosworth, Leicestershire. Johnson portrays Hastie 
sympathetically as a disparaged victim of a malicious 
community that is leery and suspicious of knowledge. 
The techniques used in presenting the accused Hastie as 
victim are designed to create sympathy in the jury. 
Identification with the accused and the staged prosecution 
is intended to elicit the most favorable response whether 
63. Samuel Johnson, A Journey to the Western Islands of 
Scotland, Yale Edition Volume IX, edited by Mary 
Lascelles, 1971. 
64. Life II, pp. 126,171,363,520,300 n. 5. 
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justified by fact or not. -Observation and an acute 
awareness of psychological ploys serves Johnson's legal 
presentation. His performance is consistent with Hagstrum's 
understanding: 
Virtually every thing that Samuel Johnson 
said about the mind indicates firm adherence 
to the principle that most human knowledge 
arises from the closest possible contact 
with objective, inescapable, coercive 
experience. 65 
An intuitive understanding of the persuasive arts is 
revealed in this very effective summation of Johnson's 
thinking. For Johnson's grasp of human nature is most 
readily realized in his legal comments. Aware of the 
subtle response needed for a jury to support his contention, 
Johnson in his legal presentation plays on the nuances 
of his client's position to elicit the most favorable 
reception. 
Characteristically, Johnson is able to respond to 
Lord Mansfield's dictum: "My Lords, severity, is not the 
way to govern either boys or men", by creating a distinction 
which displays his legal acumen: "Nay, (said Johnson) it is 
66 
the way to mend them" Later Johnson wrote to Boswell on 
this decision: "I am glad if you got your verdict by your 
cause, and am yet of opinion, that our cause was good, 
and that the determination ought to have been in your favor. 
65. Jean H. Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism, 
(1952; rpt. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1967), 
p. 19. 
66. Life II, p. 186. 
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67 
Poor Hastie, I think, had but his deserts" Does Johnson 
object to the justice of the summary removal of Hastie or 
does he maintain the rights and privileges of schoolmaster? 
The narrow legal issue rests on an application of 
Act 1693. c.. 22 where schoolmasters are declared liable to 
the trial, judgement, and censure of the presbyteries of 
the borough, for their sufficiency, qualifications and 
deportment in their office (2 Paton 277). Under this act, 
discretion rests with the community and Johnson's general 
argument on discipline may only be viewed in the meaning 
of deportment. However, since the discretion is vested in 
the local-presbytery, the weight of Johnson's argument 
would be defeated on the narrow legal issue. Nevertheless, 
despite Hastie's seemingly excessive brutality, Johnson's 
dfrsquisition on the interrelationships between students, 
master, and community is successful in carrying through most 
of its general assumptions. 
While Johnson successfully encloses his brief on points, 
the distinct propositions of law or questions of law arising 
or propounded in a case, his habit of mind demands further 
elaboration and question. It must always be remembered that 
legal argument necessitates a calculated effort to present 
aýtrong case for any client. And thus, this need to make 
a strong case for the client renders suspect any general 
principles developed in the course of a plea.. While 
Johnson stresses the dangerous implications in the subversion 
67. Ibid, p. 202. 
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of pedagogical authority, he was aware of its limitations. 
As his experience at Oxford indicated, he, nevertheless, 
realized that the learning process must accommodate a degree 
of individuality. Despite his countless personal 
inconsistencies and contradictions, Johnson's motive is 
Jo1ý.. ýson -Yeýc, 34 
clear'. Wearing the mask of an advocate,, his forte in 
grasping essential situations and moulding them into 
coherent, reasoned argument... To 
generalize from this case, Johnson's legal acumen is 
revealed by a firm, sympathetic identification with a 
schoolmaster's problems that is persuasive and compelling. 
These qualities in his comments make his brief stronger 
and-even convincing. Johnson is able to do this despite 
' his own feelings about the merits of the issue. Certainly, 
he abstracts from this case an argument for discipline in 
society at large, but this in no way lessens his understanding 
of Hastie's predic1x ment. Indeed, Johnson's integrity 
is enhanced despite his cautious, traditional response 
to Boswells' plea. 
---- ii---- 
Discourse on the law and especially on the events that 
require its intervention was commonly considered to be 
within the province of an eighteenth-century man of letters68' 
68. Paul Fussell, Samuel Johnson and the Life of Writing, 
(New York: Harcourt Brace JovanoVich, Inc., 1971), p. 
. 
45. "It would be a mistake to imagine that in his leanings 
toward the. law Johnson is behaving very idiosyncratically. 
He is only one among countless eighteenth-century writers 
who were bred to the law only to deviate into literature". 
100 
Indeed, Johnson is in no way deterred by his amateur status 
from commenting on aspectd of the law and its integration 
within society. As a former political commentator for 
Cave in writing parliamentary reports69, Johnson is keen. to 
answer Boswell's summons for consultation in the Stirling 
election case. This case provides an opportunity for 
Johnson to-comment on the political process such as it 
existed at this time and the possible corruption that may 
occur. In his remarks Johnson asserts that a legal and 
moral duty exists for citizens to-guard their own freedom. 
As Demetrius in Irene proclaims: 
A thousand horrid Prodigies foretold it. 
A feeble Government, eluded Laws, 
A factious Populace, luxurious Nobles, 
And all the Maladies of sinking States. 
When publick Villainy, too strong for Justice, 
Shows his bold Front, the Harbinger of Ruin, 
Can brave Leontius call for airy wonders, 
Which Cheats interpret, and which Fools regard? 
When some neglected Fabrick nods beneath 
The Weight of Years, and totters to the Tempest, 
Must Heaven dispatch the Messengers of Light, 
Or wake the Dead to warn us of its Fall? 
70 
Here, Johnson is concerned with the specific considerations 
69. Life It p. 150 n. 2; Greene, Political Writings, pp. 5, 
77,127 n., 282 n.; Samuel Johnson, Debates in the 
" Senate of Lilliput; Joh, JWain, Samuel Johnson, (London: 
Macmillan Company, 1974), pp. 89-92. 
70. Samuel Johnson, The Poems of Samuel Johnson, edr; David 
Nichol Smith and Edward L. McAdam, (1941, rpt. Oxford: 




that operate in his understanding of an electoral process. 
Primarily, his innate conservatism requires the citizenry 
to endure the consequences of any breach in their vigilance. 
The Stirling case reflects a moral position where the breach 
demands the acceptance of punishment or of suffering. 
Hence, it will be evident that Johnson expects a form of 
lex talionis or a moral retaliation dictated by his natural 
reason to exist. 
John-Paterson et al v. Alexander et al (Magistrates of 
the Town Council of Stirling),. 1 March, 1775, Faculty 
Decisions, is a case that involves a pactum illicitum. 
An association of three leading politicians conspired to 
protect their interests by trying to avoid an election contest. 
These politicians used undue influence in their efforts to 
undermine the public, and their mutual bond subverted the 
quasi-fiduciary relationship they enjoyed in respect to the 
council. On account of their secret, unjustifiable compact, 
the court set aside the subsequent election. Johnson's 
remarks71 discuss the effective disenfranchisement of the 
innocent because of these counat'llors' surreptitious activity. 
Legally, Johnson's remarks focus on the equitable principles 
operative in the court's ruling, but'in no way minimize the 
moral responsibility inherent in the electoral process. 
Public policy regarding the relationships involved 
in an election demands the recognition of both civil and moral 
71. Life II, pp. 373-374. 
i 
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law. The contractual nature of the election process in 
society permits an application of conventional principles 
of contract. While Johnson's argument suggests an element 
of confirmation by the parties in the Stirling election, 
the right. of recission must still exist because of the 
presence of undue influence. Little distinction needs to 
be made in this contact since the councillors clearly 
violated their fiduciary capacity. In the opinion of the 
court the election is invalidated by the councillors' 
subversion of their guardianship. ' In contemplating a wrong 
to society, the ultimate aim of the litigants in Alexander 
et al is'the destruction of liberty for the Stirling electorate. 
Unfortunately, Johnson's argument forecloses a plea of 
ignorance on behalf of the populace as it attempts to 
suggest that the responsibility for a free election is vested 
solely in the constituents: 
All societies, great and small, subsist, upon 
this conditions that as the individuals 
derive advantages from union, they may likewise 
suffer inconveniences; that as those who do 
nothing, and sometime those who do ill, will 
have the honours and emoluments of general virtue 
and general prosperity, so those likewise 
who do nothing, or perhaps do well, must be 
involved in the consequences of predominate 
corruption. 
72 
It is regrettable in this instance that Johnson does not 
realize4 a function of the law is to protect the weak and 
72. Ibid, p. 374. ' 
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uncertain. The potential. '. *--, for . an abuse of power 
is 
evidenced in most societies, and the existence of corruption 
may be due to misplaced trust by the people. Such contractual 
unfairness has been discussed by modern commentators:. . 
In such cases as these (Fiduciary relationships) 
there is a presumption that the subordinate 
party has confidence in and yields to the 
. authority of the dominant party, so that 
transactions between them are not on the 
ordinary footing of transaction between strangers. 
73 
This analysis is appropriate here since. the basic theory 
of contractual relations explored in this case conforms to 
the modern view. The thrust of Johnson's argument is on 
one of collective guilt in the citizens themselves for the 
existence of this corruption: 
That borough, which is so constituted as to 
act corruptly, is in the eye of reason corrupt, 
whether. it be by the uncontrollable power of 
a few, or by an accidental pravity of the 
multitude. 
74" 
Indeed, Johnson's argument intimates that the entire 
community should suffer for allowing this type of influential 
corruption to fester. 
In his observation that power survives non numero 
Red mindere, Johnson applies general principles for his 
analysis. There is a duty in the community to regulate 
an abuse of influence and the attendant power it wields. 
Power relationships in a society must, however, be subjected 
73. Keith, The Law of Contract, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1931), P. 42. -- - 
74. Life II, p. 373. 
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to the rule of law and the spirit of justice. Johnson's 
view disregards the peculiarities of political organization 
where there is some abdication of responsibility to the 
system; yet, he reflects a skepticism of the political 
process.., Johnson neglects to consider the degree to 
which the community is informed as"to the intricacies of 
the dominant power structure. His broad castigation of and 
demand for group responsibility rests on a principle of 
lim, i+iSimposed on. the activities of officials by the 
society. Johnson asserted that the'councillorS.. r compact 
only reflects the custom or normal operation of the 
community . 
However, this is not to say that Johnson is either a" 
political reactionary or blase' about political realities75. 
Naturally, in the context of the Stirling case, Johnson 
must function as an advocate and shape his comments to 
support Boswell's clients and advance their case. However, 
a hortatory moral impulse in the texture of his discussion- 
does emerge and suggests the makings of a positive contribution 
on behalf of the electorate. Johnson's comments imply the 
responsibility for a constructive watch rests with the 
members in a society on the activity of its elected officials: 
The objection, in which is urged the injustice 
of making the innocent suffer with the guilty, 
is an objection not only against society but 
against the possibility of society. 
76 
ýE. 
75. Greene, The Politics of Samuel Johnson) for a major 
discussion ohoErs awareness o-politics and the 
political activities in which he was engaged. 
76. Life, II, p. 373 
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He refutes this objection by his argument that the error 
of the councillors now exposed would make the citizens 
skeptical of the political process in the future. Greene 
appraises this attitude in Johnson: 
Johnson carried his skepticism further, and 
comparing proposed systems of government with 
the realities of human nature saw their fallacies 
and potentials for danger easily enough. Yet 
his skepticism was not of a kind to cause him to 
lapse into cynical inaction: he had the 
empiricist's faith that by careful observation 
and analysis, improvement can be brought about 
- slowly, perhaps, but certainly; and he had 
the rationalist's conviction-that absurdity and 
ignorance and obscurantism are absolute evils, 
to be combated at all times. 
77 
Johnson's argument in Paterson et al v. -Alexander et al is 
didactic in its common sense and in its stress on community 
responsibility. It is from his observation on human 
nature that Johnson realized error may bring eventual 
benefit78. 
.. ý .-ý iii --". ., 
In general observation and the communication of 
reasoned legal commentary, Johnson is particularly 
successful in defamation cases. 
9 
As an expert on language' 
77.2E cit. p. 235. 
78. cf. The Rambler Essay for Johnson's finest writing on 
morals and human experience. 
79. James H. Sledd, Gwin J. Kolb, Dr. -Johnson's Dictionary; 
Essays in the Biography of a Book, Chicago; University 
of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 25-37. 
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Johnson possesses unusual skill, in applying'a blend of 
authority. and common sense to the specific circumstances 
of each example that comes to his attention. He is able 
to discern differences in interpretation and in the effect 
words have, 'and offer incisive comment on the intention 
behind the language used80. Defamation cases require the 
refined wisdom of a "right thinking individual" to weigh 
the general import of the words chosen and the extent' of 
injury they may do to the reputation. Insight into the 
effect of language on an individual and the community is' 
essential for any test for defamation. Therefore, these 
cases are of specific interest to Johnson for they permit 
him to study the most detailed elaboration of words both 
in their meaning and context. Johnson-is deftly able to 
weld his knowledge of the impact of language with an 
understanding of legal reasoning that reveals his broad 
acquaintance with human experience. - 
Johnson's attitude to one's reputation is not that 
of a perfunctory concern common to the literary man but 
suggests the strengths of a moral satirist 
81. 
In "London" 
Johnson shows the value he places on one's self-esteem: 
But thou, should tempting villainy present 
All Marlb'rough hoarded, or all Villiers spent, 
Turn from glitt'ring bribe thy scornful eye, 
80. W. K. Wimsatt, jr., Philosophical Words; A Study of Style 
and Meaning 'in the Rambler and Dictionary of Samuel 
Johnson, (1948; rpt. New York: Archon Books, 1968). 
81. Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 17-23. 
George"ýSherburn, Donald Bond, A Literary%History of 
England(';, Vol, III, The Restoration & Eighteenth Century, 
(London: Routledge & an Paul ltd., 1967), pp. 990-991. 
107 
Nor sell for gold, what gold could never buy, 
The peaceful. slumber, self-approving day. 
Unsullied fame, and conscience, ever gay. 
82 
Thus,. while Johnson is known to place a premium on reputation, 
it is, instructive to follow his arguments primarily for 
the defense. His achievement is an ability to understand 
all aspects of an issue, compromise his initial impulses, 
and conclude by wearing the mask of an advocate. Especially, 
in these cases there is a constant interplay between his 
principal legal concerns and those of his own personal- 
struggle. 
In Dr. John Memis V. Provost James Jop et al, Manager 
of the Infirmary of Aberdeen, 12 July, 1776; Faculty 
Decisions, Johnson writes for the defense. The issue concerns 
the choice of an appellation of title granted a professional 
man that is alleged to be degrading. The question is to 
distinguish whether the use of "Doctor of Medicine" instead 
of "Physician" is demeaning and if so, whether'this diminishes 
Memis' reputation in the eyes of the community. Naturally, 
Johnson refers to the tortious quality of interfering with 
a prospective-advantage and then'skillfully introduces the 
legal maxim de minimis non curat lex. * He does this by 
treating Memis' claim as insignificant. However, the texture 
of his argument relies on the denotative and connotative 
values in the respective words 'medicine' and !; physician'. 
82. London: ' A Poem in Imitation'of the Third Satire of 
. Juvenal, lines 85-90. 
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Johnson discerns no significant difference between the two 
titles and avoids the seduction of tangential argumentation. 
His brief, though perceptive, comments reflect the concrete 
nature of his experience and his skill in avoiding mere 
tautology.. 
Johnson discusses possible rational. es2 for a rejection 
of the title 'Doctor of Medicine'. He suggests that one 
refuses this title "because he supposes himself disgraced 
by the doctorship, or. supposes the doctorship disgraced by 
himself". Johnson attempts to point out the illustrious 
83 
nature and lineage of the title: 
To be disgraced by a 
in common with every 
profession, with Boe 
and with Cullen, can 
man's reputation. 
title which he shares 
illustrious name of his 
rhaave, with Arbuthnot, 
surely diminish no 
84 
Johnson avers that in no way may a person's reputation be 
harmed by the substitLt4Gnof 'Medicine' for 'Physician'. 
Indeed, he maintains the same quality of prestige and 
respect is invested in each word. Johnson's argument 
cleverly introduces a respect by association. 
In the Dictionary Johnson defines 'Doctor' as "a 
physician: one who undertakes the cure of disease"; 'Medicine' 
as "physick: any remedy administered by a physician", and 
'Physician' as "one who possesses the art of healing". There 
83. L_ II, p. 372. 
84. Ibid. 
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exists an interrelationship among all these words that 
precludes gradations and degree. By offering an examination 
of the precise meaning of each word, Johnson's. tactic is 
to establish the similarity and compatibility for each term. 
Thus, Johnson confidently concluded that "a Doctor of Medicine 
is a physician under the protection of the law, and by the 
stamp of authority"85. From this conclusion, Johnson questions 
if Memis can legitimately sustain-his action since he sought 
and received his diploma: 
That this gentleman is a Doctor, his diploma 
makes evident; a diploma'not obtruded upon him, 
but obtained by solicitation, and for which 
fees were paid. With what countenance any man 
can refuse the title which he has either begged 
or bought, is not easily discovered. 
86 
Having successfully qualified as a doctor, Memis is barred 
from relief on a fictitious difference in the nomenclature. 
On the basis of this point Johnson pleads that Memis's 
challenge lacks substance and should be denied. 
In his discussion Johnson defines the effect of 
defamation by slander: 
All verbal injury must comprise in it either 
some false position, or some unnecessary 






Johnson understands the need to carefully scrutinize the 
truth of potentially corrosive language. His legal under- 
standing of defamation conforms to that of Blackstone: 
injuries affecting a man's reputation or 
good name are, first, by malicious, scandalous, 
and slanderous words, tending to his damage 
and derogation. 
88 
In a civil action, we may remember, a libel 
must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; 
for, if the charge be true, the plaintiff has 
received no private injury, and has no ground 
to demand a compensation for himself, whatever 
the offence, it may be against the public peace: 
and therefore, upon a civil action, the truth 
of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of the 
suit. 
89 
The placement of Johnson's definition at this point in the 
discussion enables him to set out a framework from which 
he can effectively concentrate on those elements of the 
tort he wants to be argued. This tactic permits Johnson 
to control the direction and tone of the legal argument, 
and thus, reveals his fine grasp of advocacy. 
Johnson focuses on the prestige inherent in the term 
'Doctor'. Most clearly, Johnson stresses the rights and 
privileges vested in 'doctor' and studies the veneration 
common to that title. A vernacular use of doctor is 
88. B1. Comm III, p. 123. 
89. B1. Comm. IV, p. 150. 
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examined in particular to its full implications: 
'What is implied by the term Doctor is well 
known. It distinguishes him to whom it is 
granted, as a man who has attained such knowledge 
of his profession as qualifies him to instruct 
others. A Doctor of Laws is-a man who can form 
lawyers by his precepts. A Doctor of Medicine is 
a man who can teach the art of curing diseases. 
90 
Professionally, the term requires an ability to instruct 
in the arts of that discipline and thus suggest-the maxim 
nil dat quod non habet. To operate under this principle 
an assertion of skill in the art is required. And, Johnson 
maintains "whoever practises physic, not being a Doctor, 
must practice by a license, but*". the doctorate conveys a 
license in itself"91. Essentially, this argument appeals 
to the common sense logic of the "right thinking members of 
society", and satisfies the legal test for defamation 
unobtrusively. 
Dismissing any suggestion of malicious intent, Johnson 
avers accident and encourages Memis' appellation to be seen 
in fact to be the more honorable one. "By what accident it 
happened that he and the other physicians were mentioned in 
different terms, where the terms themselves were equivalent, 
or were in effect that which was applied to him was the more 
honorable, perhaps they who write the paper cannot now 
remember 
g2" It is interesting that Johnson speculates on 




the intent behind the institution of civil proceedings. 
Any hint of possible abuse of the legal process is denied 
as is an inadvertent negligence. His argument concludes 
in a refusal to discern the Infirmary's behavior as evidence 
of a lack-of reasonable foresight. Johnson vigorously 
maintains that the Infirmary exercised proper judgement as 
it "consulted only what appeared to them propriety or 
convenience". 
Endeavouring to-circumscribe the tort within the frame- 
work of defamation, Johnson's strategy is to confine the 
tort to libel and minimize any hint of-malice by casually 
dismissing the basis of the action as irrelevant. Alternatively, 
Johnson pleads the alleged defamatory words must be read 
in mitiori sensu. Usually, pleaded in spoken defamation 
actions, the mitior sensus rule would determine the test 
as to whether the words are not defamatory unless no'-other 
sense could be read or construed. Johnson's argument on 
behalf of the Infirmary reasserts that in substance the 
two titles for a medical man are equivalent and honorable. 
Therefore, Johnson maintains that the impact of the language 
used holds no capacity for injury. 
Johnson is not insensitive to the vanity in man that 
demands accurate and proper recognition for achievement and 
position. In the Vanity of Human wishes a dominant theme 
is the varied manifestations of human pretense and hope: 
With distant voice neglected Virtue calls, 
Less heard and less, the faint remonstrance falls; 
Tir'd with contempt, she quits the slipp'ry reir3n, 
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And Pride and Prudence take her seat in vain. 
93 
Aware of the desires of one's ego, Johnson is concerned 
Jack -3f 
with the frustrations inherent in the4acknowledgement of. 
personal achievement. While he invests more integrity than 
was warranted in the Infirmary's activity, Johnson implies 
the transitoriness of human satisfaction but does not neglect 
the need for the reassurance of personal worth. Johnson 
is justified in thinking that fame is "a desire of filling 
the minds of others with admiration". 
94. In his dictated 
remarks on the Memis' case, Johnson discerns a false 
vanity that nevertheless is common even to intelligent 
minds. 
In the next defamation case John, Robert, and David 
Scotland v. The Reverend. Mr. James Thompson, 8 August, 1776, 
Faculty Decisions, the court held against Mr. Thompson. 
Boswell describes the circumstances behind the cause of action: 
In the course of a'contested election for the 
Borough of Dunfermline, which I attended as one 
of my friend Colonel (afi rwards Sir Archibald) 
Campbell's counsel; one of his political agents, 
who was charged with having been unfaithful to 
his employer, and having deserted to the opposite 
party for a pecuniary reward -- attacked very 
rudely in a newspaper the Reverend Mr. James 
Thompson, one of the ministers of that place, 
on account of a supposed allusion to him in one 
of his sermons, Upon this the Minister, on a 
subsequent Sunday, arraigned him by name fromui 
the pulpit with some severity; and the agent, 
93. -The Vanity of Human Wishes, lines 333-336, p, 46, 
94. Rambler 49, p. 265. 
after the sermon was over, rose up and asked 
the minister aloud, 'What bribe he had received 
for telling so many lies from the chair of verity. ` 
95 
In retaliation for this attack from the pulpit, the Scotland 
family brought an-action against Thompson in-the Court of 
Session. The Scotlands alleged successfully that they were 
defamed and sought punitive damages. However,. "Johnson was 
satisfied that the judgement was wronq"96 and dictated to 
Boswell an argument in confutation of the court's decision. 
For Johnson the circumstances in this case are especially 
grave since both political and religious issues are involved. 
As a-dedicated religious thinker97 Johnson's comments 
on this case are not polemical, but with forensic ingenuity 
114 
focus on the rights and duties of a minister to advise 
his congregation. Johnson's remarks reflect a shrewd grasp 
of the stylized common sense that most effectively persuades 
a jury. Subtly developed to minimize the confused entangle- 
ments of a legal jargon, Johnson's argument relies on ec- 
clesiastical history as precedent and advances a. Llimited 
defense of privilege. In addition, his argument expounds 
a theory of public policy, and intimates the contractual 
nature inherent in the clergy's duties and position. 
Naturally, Johnson advances the defense of veritas convicii 
and weaves all his defense points into a tight and structured 
fabric. Although the Reverend Mr. Thompson discussed 
95. L= III, P. 58. 
96. Ibid. P. 59. 
97. James Gray, Johnson's Sermons"A Study, (Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1972). - 
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personalities from his pulpit, Johnson is not dismayed as 
the Court of Session is at the potential abuse of the minister's 
position. Indeed, Johnson suggests that the office of a 
clergyman is generally : enhanced by . c.. -ob'sp 
lay o 
moral outrage. 
Johnson attempts to frame his discussion by initially 
confusing the defamation as one of libel per uod, i. e. "with 
regard to words that do not thus apparently, upon the face 
of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious, 
it is necessary that the plaintiff should aver some 
particular damage to have happen ßd98. The defense strategy 
is to mitigate the innuendo, colloquium (an averment that 
the words in question are spokedof or concerning some Usage, 
report, or fact which gives to words otherwise indifferent 
the peculiar defamatory meaning assigned to them, Carter 
v. Andrews, 16 Pick., Mass. 6), and to present explanatory 
circumstances which strengthen Mr. Thompson's position. 
It is important that Johnson develops and refines most 
favorably the circumstances from which the minister spoke. 
Even if the words would be construed as one of libel per 
se, i. e. "the words must be of such character.. that 
presumption of law will arise therefrom that the plaintiff 
has been degraded in the estimation of his friends or of the 
public has suffered some other loss either in his property, 
character, reputation, or business or in his domestic 
98. B1. Comm. III, p. 124. 
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or social relations. " Whitcher v.. Serbook Distributing Co. 
189 S. C. 243,200 S. E. 848,849, Johnson suggests that 
Thompson's words were responsible ahd privileged. However, 
the necessity to lay a foundation for the mitigation of 
damages is behind the effort to portray the defamation as 
per quoa" 
Typical of Johnson's style of argument, the use of 
exempla and analogy predominate. A characteristic of 
Johnson's prose is his use of these amplification devices to 
advance his arguments and to broaden the scope of his 
speculation on public issues at the same time. In main- 
taining "the right of censure and rebuke seems necessarily 
appendant to the pastoral office"99, Johnson introduces 
concepts of legally enforceable. contractual relationships 
between minister, church, and congregation. With 
characteristic insight Johnson adopts three easily 
apprehended examples to illustrate the extent of 
contractual relations: 
He, to whom the care of a congregation is, 
entrusted, is considered as the shephený 
of a flock, as the teacher of a school, 
as the father of a family, 
100 
Johnson applies general principles'to the facts of the 
case to suggest those salient principles which are derived 
from the relationships contained in these examples. 
Buttressed by-the strictures of the Church of Scotland's 
constitution (Second Book of Discipline Act. 4), the 
99. Life III, p. 59. 
100. Ibid. 
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obligations of Mr. Thompson's office are advanced to form 
the basis of the contract element, Clearly, by his chosen 
analogies Johnson avoids entering into the legal 
niceties of contrtid-. He plays with aspects of contcac}- in 
his teacher-wage example; 
As a teacher giving instruction';, for wages 
and liable to reproach, if those whom he 
undertakes to inform make no proficiency, 
he must have the power of enforcing attendance, 
of awaking negligence, and repressing contra- 
diction, 
101 
but expands the body of his argument in strong, common 
sense terms. 
Precedents from Church history and accepted custom 
provide the substance for Johnson's refutation: 
If we enquire into the practice of-the primitive 
church, we shall, I believe, find the ministers 
of the word exercising the whole authority of 
this complicated character. We shall find them 
not only encouraging the good by exhortation, 
but terrifying the wicked by reproof and 
denunciation. In the earliest ages of the Church, 
while religion was yet pure from secular advantage, 
the punishment of sinners was publick censure, 
and open penance; penal -. ' s. . inflicted merely by 
ecclesiastical authority, at a time while the 
church had yet no help from the civil power; 
......... 
'............................... 
The hour came at length, when after three hundred 
years of struggle and distress, Truth took 
possession of imperial power, and the civil laws 
lent their aid to the ecclesiastical constitutions 
.............. But the State, when it came to the 
assistance of the Church, had no intention to 
diminish its authority. 
102 
101. Ibid. 
102. Life III, pp. 59-60. 
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An ecclesiastical authority's viability in a secular court 
is recalled by Johnson in his statement that: "the Christian 
magistrate interposed his office, not to rescue sinners 
from censure, but to aupply more powerful means of 
103 
reformation". Restricted but not eliminated, the 
power of the Church to reproach and condemn remained. 
Manipulation of ecclesiastical interiits operated within 
the laws of secular authority to reinforce each other. A 
realization of this combination is advanced to underscore 
those rights to exhort and denounce. Most clearly, 
104 
Johnson recognized the theocratic character of Scots society 
For while his discussion implies the far reaching influence 
of the Kirk, Johnson treats this factor in such a way as to 
distinguish the particular situation of his client. 
Although his argument endeavours to enlarge the scope of 
civil power by its historical association with the Church, 
the placing of Thompson's case in this perspective indicates 
the precarious nature of Kirk responsibility. Moreover, in 
an effort to balance his argument, Johnson suggests the 
strength of the clandestine power the Kirk wields by obscuring 
103. Ibid. 
104. Life I, 387, The awareness of the interchanging positions 
of power held by men such as Alexander Wedderburn; II, 
28; Life v, p. 41. 
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its impact into personal terms and ultimately Post 
Reformation society 
105. 
While acknowledging the disposition of Pre-Reformation 
ecclesiastical power, Johnson maintains the existence of 
a legacy which both permits and requires Thompson's action. 
"A minister who has in his congregation a man of open and 
scandalous. wickedness may warn his parishioners to shun his 
conversation. To warn them is not only lawful, but not to 
106 
warn them would be criminal . The spectre of negligence 
or misfeasqnce is suggested to. demonstrate liability against 
which Thompson is portrayed as a conscientious practitioner. 
Moreover, the participation of the Scotlands in the Church 
enforces their voluntary submission to the minister's power 
and must undermine their standing. To avoid a breach of 
contrccd, Thompson must carry out all the duties of his 
office in good faith, and this clause requires him to exercise 
his unfettered, honest judgement. In this requirement 
Johnson admits the opportunity for error or the possibility 
105. J. H. S. Burleigh, A Church History of Scotland, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 261-308. 
A Ian Dunlop, William Carstares and the Kirk t Law 
Established The Chalmers Lectures 1964, (Edinburgh: 
Saint Andrews Press, 1967), pp. 100-147. 
Anand C. Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment A Social 
History, (Totowa: Rownan and Littlefield, 1976), 
pp. 43-74. 
J. D. Mackie, A History of Scotland, (1964; rpt. Penguin 
Books, 1975), pp. 294-306. 
Malcom B. Macgregor, The Sources and Literature of 
Scottish Church Histor , (Glasgow: John McCallum 
and Company, 1934). 
106. Life III, p. 61. 
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of abuse: 
..., if a minister be thus left at liberty to delate sinners from the pulpit, and to 
publish at will the crimes of a parishioner, 
he may often blast the innocent, and distress 
'. *-. the timorous .................................. 
he may be malignant and partial, and gratify 
his private interest or resentment under the 
shelter of his pastoral character. 
Of all this theze is possibility, and of 
all this there is danger. But if possibility 
of evil be to exclude good, no good can ever 
be done. If nothing is to be attempted in 
which there is danger, we must all sink into 
hopeless inactivity. The evils that may 
be feared from this practice arise not from 
any defect in the institution-but from the 
infirmities of human nature,. 
107 
However, the demands of contract and'the status of a minister 
in a community8 require that he risks formulating a 
10 
thoughtful position. 
In the case at bar, Johnson urges a defense of 
veritas convicii-and without malice. Mr. Thompson's efforts 
to vindicate himself were required in his pastoral capacity: 
To be charged with polluting the pastoral 
office with scandal and falsehood, was a 
violation of character still more atrocious, 
as it affected not only his personal but his 
clerical veracity .......................... 
The crime of which he (Scotland) is accused 
has frequent opportunities and strong temp- 
tations. It has already spread far, with much 
depravation of private morals, and much injury fo 
107. Life III, p. 61. 
108. Life II, p. 243. 
.ý 
121 
publick happiness. To warn the people, there- 
fore, against-it was not wanton and officious, 
but necessary and pastoral. . 109 
An ordinary defense of privilege is advanced based on-the 
quality and position of clergy. Johnson draws attention 
to a seeming lack of malice in the remarks and displays 
Thompson's comments againstt the background of common 
knowledge. 
Establishing that the statement is not defamatory 
under this rule; "Slander is a. defamatory statement maliciously 
made to the injury of another, if the statement; however, 
defamatory is not malicious, - it is slander"110. Johnson 
in the alternat-4ve pleads a qualified privilege'. "But if 
the occasion be privileged, if the statement be made in the 
discharge of a duty or in the reasonable attention to 
man's own business and affairs which gives him legitimate 
cause to write a speech of his neighbor, the occasion 
displays the presumption of falsehood, and he is only 
answerable if malice be shown to have existed in fact, and 
if the statement be untrue"111. Johnson maintains that 
Thompson did not violate any law: 
His (Thompson's) censure was directed against a 
breach of morality, against an act which no man 
justifies. The man who appropriated this censure 
to himself, is evidently and notoriously guilty. 
" 109.22 cit., p. 62. 
110. John Erskine ..... of Carnock, Principles of the Law 
of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1809). 
111. Ibid. 
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His consciousness of his own wickedness 
incited him to attack his faithful reprover 
with open insolence and printed accusations. 
Such an attack made defence-necessary; and 
we hope it will be at last decided that the 
means of defence were just and lawful. 
112 
Indeed, in his remarks Johnson asserts that Thompson would 
be derelict in his duty had he not commented on the Scotlands. 
The texture of Johnson"s remarks indicate a finely crafted 
argument for the minister's active role in the community 
and the correctness of pastoral admonition. An absence of 
malice and an intent for correction in keeping with the 
pastoral propriety form the substance of Johnson's defense 
and Thompson's activity. 
The-third defamation action involves a form of press 
freedom. The Society of Procurators had by royal charter 
changed their name to the Society of Solicitors. In the 
Edinburgh Gazette113 this change met with. ridicule: 
A correspondent informs us that the Worshipful 
Society of Chaldeans, Cadies, or Running 
Stationers of this city are resolved, in imitation, 
and encouraged by the singular success of their 
brethren, of an equally respectable Society, 
to apply for a Charter of their Privileges, 
particularly of the sole privilege of PROCURING, 
in the most extensive sense of the word, 
exclusive of chairm. eri, porters, penny-post men, 
and other inferior ranks; their brethren the 
R_. Y L_S_LL RS, alias P_C RS, before 
the INFERIOR courts of this City, always 
excepted. 
Should the Worshipful Society be successful, 
they are farther resolved not to be puffed up 
0 
112. Life III, p. 62. 
113. Life IV, App. J, p. 497. 
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thereby, but to. demean themselves with more 
equanimity and decency than their R_y_l, learned, 
and very modest brethern above mentioned have 
done, upon their late dignification and 
exaltation. 
114 
This satiric comment rankled in the minds of the Society's 
members, and they pursued redress as a clearly defined 
class to whom these allegedly defamatory imputations caused 
great harm. The members of this royal society took their 
action against Thomas Robertson, the publisher, and thus 
attempted to avenge themselves. 0 
Johnson in his comments on the'Preses of Society of 
Solicitors-v. Thomas'Robertson, 16 November, 1781, Faculty 
Decisions115, cites the concepts of'de minimis and animus 
injurandi he previously employed in the Royal Infirmary case 
and the principle of incognitas auf vaqum used in Wilson v. 
Smith, 'Armour. Immediately, Johnson distinguishes animus 
in'urandi from irritandi and lays a foundation for pleading 
both the lack of damages and the loss of potential legal 
fees. In the alternative Johnson avers that at most the 
defamation is damnum abs ue iniuria. Fair comment honestly 
made and one a matter of public interest should certainly 
prohibit the soltcctors's action. And indeed, Johnson, like 
Blackstone, felt that "freedom of expression itself helped 
116 
conserve the existing social order", In this case a 
114. Ibid. p. 128-129. 
115. Boswell's legal brief incorporates most of Johnson's 
actual language, and in this study the text used for 
the argument is Johnson's. 
116. Boorstin, p. 166; B1. Comm. IV, p. 151. 
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silencing of expression is. noxious especially when attempted 
by the supposed guardians of the law. For, it is a function 
of the law to guarantee unfettered expression from the 
virulence of censorshipll7. But in his cautious manner 
Johnson understood the need for an unrestrained press so 
long as it did not endanger his paternalistic view of 
state authority118. In this specific instance, the issue 
involved does not harm the state but instead pierces the 
solicitor's conceit. 
In this case Johnson pleads that there is no showing 
of special loss or damage to justify the solicitor's action: 
They (Solicitors) have never gained half-a-crown 
less in the whole profession since this 
mischiev. oc. i paragraph has appeared. 
119 
If their collective reputations had been harmed, there 
would be a loss of fees as a demonstrable correlation exists 
between revenues and reputation for a professional man. 
The absence of such proof leads Johnson to skillfully play 
the de minimis non curat : _far etor (lex) principle. However, 
120 
117. cf. John Milton, Areopaaitica, for his pervasive argument 
warning of the dangers of censorship. 
118. Edward A. Bloom, Samuel'Johnson in Grub Street, 
(Providence: Brown University Press), pp. 237-248. 
119. Life IV, p. 129. 
120. The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small 
or trifling matters. The law does not concern itself 
about trifles. Croke's English King's Bench Reports 
Tempore Elizabeth, 353. 
125 
Johnson realizes a critical attitude that lurks behind the 
mask of jocundity and must be conscious of the serious 
intent hidden by the veil of satire. Johnson's treatment 
of the issue is made prominent by its Horatian urbanity. 
Fundamentally, Johnson argues that truthful and efficient 
criticism must be protected as a matter of public interest. 
But it is essential that the dignity given such an 
opportunity to voice criticism must not conflict with 
121 
Johnson's view of the limits of public authority 
In this case Johnson contends that the intent of the 
articles in the journal was not injury but stimulation. 
His admission that it provoked a violence of resentment 
encourages a charge of public offence, and thus may undermine 
his defense. "For every libel has a tendency to the breach 
of the peace, by provoking the person libeled to breach it; 
which offence is the same (in point of law) whether. the matter 
contained be true or false; and therefore the defendant, 
on an indictment for publishing a libel, "is not allowed to 
l2 
allege the truth of it by way of justification2. However, 
in his understanding of the elements necessary for the tort 
to be reasonably introduced, Johnson suggests "all injury 
is either of the person, the fortune, or the fame", and 
does not admit physical violence to any degree operative 
in this case. The proverb "a jest breaks no bones" is 
advanced in an effort to mitigate any hint of public breach 
121. Life II, 374; Adventurer-67,126,128. 
122. B1. Comm III, 125. 
126' 
and reject the introduction of criminal libel. Johnson 
finds the solicitors'. action annoying and resents their 
l23 
unreasonable attitude and pomposity. 
The language of Johnson's argument is a series of 
carefully `cue ý_ýs cý ýG+! 'aS USINý a mixture of interrogative 
and statement that throws the. solicitors' action into sharp 
relief. The literary character of his argument reveals a 
pointed attitude in the texture of ironic import vested in 
each sentence. The tone fuses with a factual presentation 
portraying a weak, ignorant printer struggling against the 
vast and immoral power of the solicitors. An undercurrent 
of the argument is an awareness of the corrupt misuse of 
power and authority. There is a suggestion of an established 
relationship between the court and its officers that implies 
a mutuality of protection in their shared profession. 
Therefore, Johnson recognizes that he must flatter the 
court: 
We consider your Lordships as the protectors 
of our rights, and_P-guardians of our virtues; 
but believe it not included in your biy}t.: off cej 
that you should flatter our vices, or 
solace our vanity: and, as vanity only 
dictates this prosecution, it is humbly 
hoped your Lordships will dismiss it. 
124 
Johnson's diction is obsequious and peflt'_-ent as it re- 
123. Life IV, p. -128. 
124. Life IV, p. 130. 
127 
inforces the irony he sees. present in the issue. His 
delightful handling of the remarks and position of the 
solicitors is reminiscent of Aristophanes' characterization 
of vv Sah Ne'Oý`aý in the Wasps125, a sardonic commentary on 
the law and. human nature. Aristophanes develops an ironic 
corns dy that satirizes a decaying system of justice and 
exposes the venality in a corrupt legal process. Johnson 
in his characterization of the solicitors and judges 
broaches a form of fraternal bribery that questions an assurance 
of justice to all. Johnson despite his understanding of the 
role of solicitors in court is actually. trying to disprove 
Horace's observations Naturam expellas furca, tarnen us ue 
recurret. 
Johnson strengthens the implication that the institution 
of these proceedings is a cruel abuse of the legal process: 
It was natural for an ignorant printer to 
appeal from the Lord Ordinary; but from 
lawyers, the descendants of lawyers, who 
have practised for three hundred years, 
and have now raised themselves to a higher 
denomination, it might be expected, that 
they should know the reverence due to a 
judicial determination; and, having been 
once dismissed, should sit down in silence. 
126 
Moreover, the persistently litigious activity by the members 
of the society undermines the authority of the court. Common 
sense militates against the action since it diminishes the 
125. Aristophanes, The Wasps, ed. and Trans., Benjamin Bickley 
Rogers, (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1924), Vol. Z ; 
pp. 404-549. 
126. Life IV, p. 13'0. -131, 
128 
value of the tort and legal proceedings as effective 
correctiveness in society. It would seem. that public 
policy would recognize the opening of 
legal processes and 
those actions that would encourage its veneration, not-the 
subversion which the solicitors' 
indulge. Johnson's perception 
of the law in this case is based on the 
formulation of 
free intellectual discourse. To this end he is aware of 
the constraints in society but seeks to keep open the 
available methods of comment permitted. 
Although Johnson's 
discussion is cloaked in satire, his understanding of and 
desire for proper, unencumbered legal process remains 
paramount. 
The pattern of Johnson's comments on these defamation 
cases goes'beyond cliche' and requires the constant 
realization of his own adjustment to society. He is aggressive 
in his advocacy and yet is aware of his earlier advice to 
Boswell: 
....... every cause has a bad side; and a lawyer is not overcome, though the cause 
which he had endeavoured to support be 
determined against him. 
127 
Johnson realizes that many actions in defamation are doomed 
to failure. However, he understands the positive act of 
pressing a cause may be the only way one can challenge 
the remark. What particular jurisprudential thinking does 
127. Life II, p. 214. 
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emerge can not be systematized'. Johnson evaluates each' 
case on its own merits but applies his wide experience 
with general principles of solid common sense. Johnson's 
emphasis on understanding the particular circumstances of 
each case does not minimize his penchant for drawing large 
scale conclusions. In this instance Johnson illustrates a 
universal trait of lawyers, and that is the unfailing talent 
for extrapolation. 
Specifically,. the-expressiveness of the language and 
the effect it has in a legal sense'sets out*Johnson's 
salient observations on the cases. The-application and 
elaboration of word meaning hold the essential quality 
for any just determination. Johnson is "..... more interested 
in the alignment of reasoning, the relation of premises to 
conclusions, than in the individuality of the premises 
128 
themselves" . The structure of his legal argument in 
these cases employs a mixture of general diction with specific 
legal terminology. The texture. assumes the act of 
generalization but moves toward abstracted legal thought 
Johnson uses these legal words and phrases to give a stamp 
of authority to his disquisitions. Thus, he is able to amplify 
his general observation and effect a penetrating analysis in 
favor of the client's position. Johnson; s legal style 
permits an analytical disposal of his material and thus 
128. Wimsatt, The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson, p. 50. 
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advances the logic of his argument. While specific legal 
imagery appears diluted, the language of his defamation cases 
perceptibly shades the special points expressed in his 
position. Within the context of his argument, Johnson's 
interpretations of legal points show how the law functions 
in its best general sense. 




Johnson's thinking on the morality, of the law is 
evidenced in the great concern he shows on the issue of 
slavery. His personal connection with Francis Barber may 
explain an aspect of Johnson's passionate interest; yet, 
Johnson was horrified by the very concept of involuntary 
servitude. In this attitude Johnson shares a viewpoint held 
by most Enlightenment thinkers in their crusade to abolish 
this institution. "Johnson's abolitionism rose above a 
humane and angry sympathy for particular victims to general 
principles and his expression of those principles sounded 
practically like a plagiarism from a writer whom he 
detested almost as much as he detested slavery: Jean 
Jacques Rousseau~129. The expression that slavery was against 
the "rights of nature'130 was a manifestation of Johnson's 
humanism, and shows how he absorbed Enlightenment Thinking. 
129. Gay, Vol II, - p. 422; cf. Taxation No Tyranny, where 
: Johnson'prosecutes'the American Colonists on the issue 
of slavery. 
130. Life III, p. 202. 4 
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In his argument on Knight v. Wedderbourne131' Johnson 
weaves a moral discourse. in the texture-of legal principle. 
Indeed, Johnson's argument extends as its reasoning follows 
the precedent in the habeas corpus decision of Sommersett v. 
Stewart, Kings Bench; 12 George III A. D., 1771-1772, which 
held that: 
The power of a master over his slaves has 
been extremely different, in different 
countries. The state of slavery is of such 
a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or 
political, but only by positive law, which 
preserves its force long after the reasons, 
occasion, and time itself from whence it was 
created, is erased from memory. It is so 
odious, that nothing can be suffered to 
support it, but positive law. Whatever 
inconveniences, therefore, may follow 
the decision, I cannot say this case is 
allowed or approved by the law of England; 
and therefore the black must be discharged. 
132 
In his own comments on Knight V. Wedderbourne, Johnson was 
able to expound an argument that expanded the Sommersett 
holding by moral dictum and specific legal reasoning. The 
opportunity to examine Johnson's view of slavery must not 
be limited by his advocate's role because abundant 
131. III, pp. 202-203,212; 8 Fac. Cdll. 5; 33 Mor. Dic. 
14545 (1778) 
132. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, Sommersett v. Stewart; 
cf: H. Fischer, 'The Suppression of Slavery in 
International Law', The International Law Quarterly, 
3 January, 1950, pp. 28-32; for a discussion of the legal 
aspects of Mansfield's judgement. 
132. 
documentation 133 of his own outlook permits a partial 
dismissal of the lawyer's mask. 
At Boswell's invitation to join in on a question 
involving slavery, Johnson on 15 'January, 1778 dictated his 
argument on the issues raised in Knight v. Wedderbourne. 
In these comments on this Scots slavery case, Johnson was 
able to advance an argument in which his moral feelings 
were in concert with his legal position. Johnson develops 
a moral stance which has a foundation in natural rights 
concepts and drafts a strict legalistic posture against. 
laws that modify his conception of conventional morality. 
The direction of Johnson's reasoning moves from the general 
to the particular as it balances a moral position against 
positive law. A logical, coherent discussion emerges that 
undermines the acceptance of slavery as a legitimate 
institution. Johnson realizes that the scope of a rule 
of law requires the classification of doctrine in controlling 
cases as well as incorporating contemporary theory and 
currents in society. Slavery enjoyed an ambiguous status 
as an institution in the eighteenth century based upon 
the illusion of economic advantage134 and the articulate 
133. Irene, line 46, p. 277; 87,292; 
p. 36-37; Idler 87, p. 270, The 
ed. W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt, 
Yale Papers Edition, 1963,1970 
134. Richard Nelson Bean, The*British 
Trade, 1650-1775, (Ann Arbor,, M 
1crofilms, 1971). 
31,. 320; Idler 11, 
Idler and Adventurer, 
and L. F. Powell, 
Trans-Atlantic Slave 
is igan, University 
cf: F. O. Shyllon, Black Slaves in Britain (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), comments on Blackstone's 
thinking, pp. 55-76. 
opposition of enlightened öpinionl35. Johnson's argument 
may be viewed as a crucible in which moral imperative and 
positivist jurisprudence are tried. 
While acknowledging, the existence of slavery in many 
countries, Johnson questions "whether slavery was ever to 
. To the be supposed the natural condition of man 
136 
answer of hjs own question Johnson rejects the consensus 
opinion: "It is impossible not to conceive that men in 
their original state were equal; and very difficult to 
imagine how one would be subjected to another but by violent 
.A profound disgust at this imposition of compulsion137 
force to effect control is indicated by the sharp tone of 
the sentence. Emphasizing his despair of humanity in bondage 
confirms the illegality and moral bankruptcy inherent in 
this forced institution. Johnson's argument is essentially 
Lockean in its assertion that slavery was a violation of 
the natural rights of man. 
Johnson's rejection of slavery is strikingly modern 
in its corollary that men are equal'before the law. Lloyd 
in his treatise somewhat supports Johnson's view of history: 
In most previous ages when inequality, rather than 
equality was regarded as the fundamental law of 
human society, freedom operated in law as little' 
more than a concept whereby a man was to be 
guaranteed, so far as the law could achieve, 
security in the station of life in which Providence 
a- 
133 
135. David Brion Davis, The Problems of Slavery in Western Culture, 
'(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 422-445. 
136. Life III, p. 202. 
137. Ibid. 
134 
had placed him, together with theprivileges, * 
if any, to which law or custom has' established 
his entitlement, 
138 
This condition in rude society does not obviate Johnson's 
basic assertion. Indeed, the element of "violent compulsion" 
is the key on which Johnson's history depends. This condition 
violates Johnson's humanitarian and Christian principles. 
In the context of this case, Johnson echoes Lord Auchinleck's 
opinion: 
Although, in the plantations, ' they have laid 
hold of the poor blacks, and made slaves of 
them, yet I do not think that that is 
agreeable to humanity, not to say to the 
Christian religion. Is a man a slave because 
he is black? No. He is our brother; and he 
is a man, although not our colour; he is in 
a land of liberty, with his wife and his child: 
let him remain there. 
139 
Both Auchinleck, Boswell's father, and Johnson, Boswell's 
father-figure, advance a view of humanity that has a strong 
Christian component. This historical theory with its 
essential humanitarian aspect illuminates the philosophical 
position from which Johnson's principles derive in this case. 
While the questionable legality of servitude is hinted 
at, Johnson accepts that "an individual may, indeed, forfeit 
140 
his l4erty by a crime...... In this way Johnson main- 
tains that the responsibility for the consequences of an 
138. Lloyd, p. 138. 
139. Sir David Dalrymple of Halles, Bart., Lord Hailes, 
collected by, Decisions of the Lords of Council and 
Session, from 1766 to 1791, selected from the original 
Mss. by M. P. Brown, Esq., Advocate, Vol, I, II, (Edinburgh: 
Wm. Tait, 1826), p. 777. 
140. Life III, p. 202. 
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action must be borne by an-individual himself. It is the 
nature of society that requires this, 
Hoc enim vinculum est huius dignitatis, 
qua fruimur in re publica, hoc fundamentum 
libertatis, hic fons ae uitatis: mens et 
animus et consilium et sententia ciitatis 
oý sita est in legibus. 
141 
The loss of freedom as part of a-legal sentence is distinguished 
by Johnson from the situation in the Knight case. There 
is a duty to understand and obey the law for the common' 
good but the legitimacy of the law itself is implied in 
its governing function. Naturally Johnson accepts that 
one is not only morally but also legally accountable for 
one's actions. However, the extent of justification in the 
law is questioned in this case. For Johnson maintains that 
"he cannot by that crime forfeit the liberty of his children142. 
The extension of this argument to a captive enables Johnson 
to employ certain basic techniques. of legal reasoning. 
His use of "reasoning by example shows the decisive role 
which the common ideas'of the society and the distinctions 
made by experts can have in shaping the law143. This stylistic 
quality of using parallel example allows Johnson's personal 
opinions to be balanced with legal principle. 
Concepts from contract theory are introduced in a 
Lockean manner as well as in a strict legal sense. Locke 
141. Cicero, Pro Cluento, LIII, 146. 
142.0E dit. 
143. Levi, p. 5. 
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postulates an essential equality of man in a pre-political 
society. "In a pre-political society everyone is equal in 
that none has any power over his fellows. All are subject 
to the law of nature, according to which no-one ought to 
harm another in his life, or property-44. The argument 
suggests "that no-one can convey to*another a greater right 
than he has himself, and therefore no-one can convey to 
another absolute power himself"145. This position in Lockean 
terms determines the right to overthrow such an outmoded 
institution as slavery on both its inherent immorality and 
inequality. As a chattel, the slave had no standing to 
contract himself; yet, an awareness of his humanity vitiates 
the chattel theory and deems any contract madetine&forceable. 
"The disciples of Locke found moral freedom not in self- 
denial and transcendence of wordly condition, but in a lack 
of dependence upon the will of others, in the natural 
exercise of human faculties, and in the unfettered pursuit 
of enlightened self-interest"146. In this acceptance of 
Locke, Johnson reaffirms the importance of morality in law 
and promotes the increase Qf virtue in society. 
Johnson maintains that a slave does not have an 
adequate legal capacity to enter into'a contract: 
144. Stein, Shand, p. 11. 
145. Ibid., p. 12. 
146. Davis, p. 412. 
137 
He is certainly subject ly no law, but that 
of violence, to his present master; who 
pretends no claim to his obedience, but that 
he bought him from a merchant of slaves whose 
right to sell him never was examined. It is 
said that, according to-the constitutions of 
Jamaica., he was legally enslaved; these 
constitutions are merely positive; and 
apparently injurious to the rights of mankind, 
because whoever is exposed to sale is 
condemned to slavery without appeal; by what- 
ever fraud or violence he might have been 
originally brought into the merchant's power. 
, 147 
Legally, if a contract is essentially a promise made for 
14 
a set of promises which the law will enforce8, an 
appreciation of the restriction of duress and undue 
influence must be considered. ""At common law the coercion 
which will be a sufficient cause for avoiding a contr4ct nay 
consist in duress or menace; that is, either in actual 
compulsion or in the threat of it"149. Johnson does not 
doubt that the status of a slave imprints its own control 
and denies any right. of action arising from slavery. 
Juridicid observation would find. such a contract voidable. 
Johnson's illustration of a criminal becoming a 
captive seems to have its foundation in history. "A man 
may accept life from a conquering enemy on condition of 
147. Life III, p. 202-203. 
148. Restatement of the Law of Contract with Explanatory Notes, 
edited and compiled by the Members of the Association 
of American Law Schools, (The American Law Institute, 
Philadelphia, 1928). @1. 
149. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart., Principles of Contract: 
bean a Treatise on the general Principles Concerning 
te Validity of Agreements in the law of England, (3rd. 
ed., London, Stevens, 1881), p. 472. 
138' 
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perpetual servitude; but it is very doubtful whether he can 
entail'that servitude on his descendents; for no man can 
stipulate without commission for another"l'S6. While this 
position suggests'the presence of Roman legal concepts, 
it also indicates contemporary ideals advanced by major 
continental philosophers151. Indeed, Montesquieu presents 
a similar acceptance of servitude in conquest: 
There is no such thing as a right of reducing 
, people 
to slavery, but when it becomes 
necessary for the preservation of the conquest,... 
Even in that case it is contrary to the nature 
of things that the slavery should be perpetual. 
152 
Both Montesquieu and Johnson allow for the condition of 
temporary slavery as a result of warfare but deny its 
lasting validity. Nevertheless, while this acceptance 
of slavery reflects and admits the custom of warfare, the 
absurdity of the "choice" element present in the theory of 
contact militates against any proffered justification for 
the institution. 
Bondage in perpetuity is in no way countenanced and 
finds only a specious foundation in pure contract theory. 
Slaves may be most favorably considered as participants 
in a service contract where consideration would occur in the 
Atz; 
150. Ibid. 
151. Gay II, 117.118; 330-331; 410-411; 419--421. 
152. Montesquieu, The'Spirit'of Laws, Book X, Chapter '111, 
sec. 8-9. 
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exchange of an implied or stated obligation to grant life 
in the'action of one party for unrestricted labor in the 
other. Under this theory of contractual promise any 
consent to standing and freedom to contract would be repugnant 
to the. norms of civilized society. However, the central 
question would be of benefit conferred between service and 
existence as constituting a legitimate or sufficient 
quid pro quo. Johnson questions the arbitrary nature of the 
"compact" and perceptively analyzes the terms operative in 
this case: 
In the present case there is apparent right 
on one side, and no convenience on the other. 
Inhabitants of this island can neither gain 
riches nor power by taking away the liberty 
of any part of the human species. The sum 
of the argument is this: -- No-man is by 
nature the property of another: The defendant 
is, therefore, by nature free: The rights of 
nature must be some way forfeited before they 
can be justly taken away: That the defendant 
has by any act forfeited the rights of nature 
we require to be proved; and if no proof of 
such forfeiture can be given, we doubt not 
but the justice of the court will declare him 
free. 
153 
Under Johnson's examination the set of legal relations 
involved do not constitute a bona fide contract either in 
law or morality. 
Though Boswell was not himself counsel in this case, 
he nevertheless was exceptionally interested in its outcome. 
Since Johnson and he differed in principle on the issue of 
153. Life III, p. 203. 
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slaveryl54, Boswell is reluctant to concede the value of 
Johnson's argument.. - Having charged that Johnson showed 
"a zeal without knowledge"155 on the issue of slavery, 
Boswell's report of Johnson's brief in no way lessens its 
dignity or impact. If anything, it*contributes to Boswell's 
prestige as a biographer. This report of Johnson's 
argument provides evidence of his view that all men are 
or should be equal before the law. The emphasis on this 
point contrasts with prevailing social custom but shows 
Johnson to be in. the mainstreams of enlightened intellectual 
thought. "Give Wealth to Poverty to Slavery Freedom'156 
manifests the deep humanitarian feeling to which Johnson. 
responds in this case157. 
r- - %ý - 
-- Boswell was much vexed by the Scottish Court's gradual 
relaxation of the ancient doctrine of vicious intromission: 
"It was held of old and continued for a long period, to be 
an established principle in that law, that whoever inter- 
154. Boswell, No Abolition of Sl=avery; or the Universal Empire 
of Love, 1791; discussed in Frank Brady, Boswell's 
Politi al Career; (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1965) , pp. 169-170. ' 
Roland E. McFarland, "No Abolition of Slavery: Boswell 
and The Slave Trade, " The New Rambler (spring, 1972), 
pp. 55-64. 
155. Life III, p. 200. 
156. Irene, line 13, p. 356. 
157.22. Cit. 
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meddled with the effects of a person deceased, without the 
interposition of legal authority to guard against 
embezzlement, should be subject to pay all debts of the 
deceased, as having been guilty of what was technically 
called vicious intromission158. The Court of Session in 
Wilson v. Smith, Armour, 19 June, 1772, Faculty. Decisions 
continued the relaxation of this principle. In this case 
James Wilson sued Janet Smith and Robert Armour, her 
husband (representing his debtor Patrick Smith, the deceased 
father of Janet). Wilson alleged that there was a private 
super intromission in the effects of Patrick Smith before 
Wilson's claim could be considered. The defendants had 
obtained a warrant from the bailie of Kilmarnock to sell 
some of the articles in order to pay funeral expenseSº 
However, there was a dispute. as to what was sold and the 
amount of money obtained. In London, Boswell sought to 
consult Johnson on this technical question of intromission 
raised by Wilson and request his aid in drafting the re- 
claiming petition. An examination of Johnson's comments 
reveals his appreciation of human nature which necessitates 
the development of legal institutions. It is the instructive 
quality of this application that reveals Johnson's tragic 
159 
sense of life. 
Johnson frames his argument by. the premise that 
vicious intromission was a judicially. inspired doctrine: 
158. Life II, p. 196. 
159. Joseph Wood Krutch, Samuel Johnson, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1944), p. 176. 
., 1.1, u' 14 2 
'This, we are told, is a law which has its force 
only from the long practice of the Court: and 
may, therefore, be suspended or modified as 
the Court shall think proper. 
160 
Accepting the court's power . to suspend law, he considers 
"that every just law is dictated by reason, and that 
161 
the practice of every legal court is regulated by equity". 
Moreover, Johnson also suggests a subtle attack on this 
aspect of judicial review. The question involves the 
authorization of a judge to "disregard the legal norms 
in favor of the non-legal ones"162. Essentially, Johnson 
asserts that the law is a rule of action that requires 
continuity for it to be effective: 
The advantage which humanity derives from 
law is this: that the law gives every man 
a rule of action, and prescribes a mode of 
conduct which shall entitle him to the 
support and protection of society. That 
the law may be a rule of action, it is necessary 
that it be known; it is necessary that it be 
permanent and stable. The law is the measure 
or civil right; but if the measure be changeable, 
the extent of the thing measured never can 
be settled. 
163 
His quest for stability controls this argument and determines 
a conservative approach. The Court of Session's function 
should be to encourage a logical and secure advance in 
society, and the abandonment of the vicious intromission 
doctrine undermines the confidence of the citizens. For 
160. OP. cit. 
161. Life II, p. 196. 
162. Eugene Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology 
of Law, Tr. W. L. Moll, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936 
163. Life II, p. 196. 
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this position, Johnson argues in favor of restraint in 
the court's review. of established legal doctrine and process. 
Potential abuse in law fashioned by opinion is expressed 
by the maxim, "misera est servitus ubi est auf incognitum 
aut-va um"164. Under the logic of this principle, Johnson 
assaults the wisdom of the court in its diminution by a 
general philosophical argument which it is not unusual for 
Johnson the supreme general philosopher to do. Nevertheless, 
in expanding the specific elements in the doctrine to the 
society at large, Johnson fulminates, "He that is thus 
governed, lives not by law but by opinion; not by a certain 
rule to which he can apply his'intention before he acts, 
but by an uncertain and variable opinion which he can never 
know but after he has committed the act on which that 
165 
opinion shall be passed" Stressing iura vaga and 
iura incognita, Johnson exploits their connative powers 
to reduce the court's wisdom to a general term of absurdity. 
At least an appearance of consistency is one requirement 
for a law to function successfully: 
To permit a law to be modified at discretion, 
is to leave the community without law. It 
is to withdraw the direction of that publick 
wisdom, by which the deficiencies of private 
understanding are to be supplied. It is to 
suffer the rash and ignorant to act at discretion, 
and then to depend for the legality of that 
action on the sentence of the judge. 
166 
164. Life II, p. 197. 
165. Ibid. 
166. Ibid. 
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Johnson understands this need for an application of a rule 
for any civilized society to function with uniformity. Yet 
his advocacy on this point may betray his recognized desire 
for stability in the progress of society167. 
Johnson sees the origin of vicious-intromission as 
a device to protect the individual and society from 
fraud. He suggests "that society only is well governed, 
where life is freed from danger and from suspicion; where 
possession is so sheltered by salutary prohibitions that 
18 
violation is prevented more frequently than punished"8. 
Security of property and the desire to protect it reflects 
a viewpoint prevalent in the eighteenth century: 
For there must be an end of all social 
commerce between man-and man, unless private 
possessions be secured from unjust invasions; 
and if an acquisition of goods by either force 
or fraud were allowed to be a sufficient title, 
all property would soon be confined to the 
most strong, or the most cunning; and the 
real and simple-minded part of mankind (which 
is by far the most numerous division) could 
never be secure of their possessions 
169 
Aware of and concurring with the legitimacy of property 
rights, Johnson's understanding of human nature and his 
167. Life III3383; 46, n. 5 Wilkite Riots; cf Chapter 3 Footnote 
109; Boulton, The Language of Politics in the Age of 
Wilkes and Burse, T- pp. 32-44; The False Alarm, Volume IV, 
pp. 30,104. 
168. Life II, p. 197. 
169. B1. Comm. III, p. 145. 
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passionate conservatism demands the retention of vicious 
intromission as essential for orderly social and economic 
progress. Johnson shares Blackstone's view that: 
y there is nothing which so generally strikes 
the imagination, and engages the affections 
of mankind, as the right of property; or that 
-sole and despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe. 
170 
Johnson realizes that the sanctity and preservation of 
171 
property are at the foundation of his society. 
Johnson discusses legislative wisdom and its facets 
that develop methods of administration. Johnson dis- 
tin9uishes vindictive from preventive justice and analyzes 
the social fallacy in relaxing the doctrine of vicious 
intromission: 
To punish fraud when it is detected, is the 
proper act of vindictive justice; but to 
prevent frauds, and make punishment unnecessary, 
is the great employment of legislative wisdom. 
" 172 
In-a most modern way and yet with a hint of a stern Christian 
moralist, Johnson promotes the concept of prevention of 
crime and suggests that the law of vicious intromission will 
170. ' B1. Comm II, p. 7. 
171. John H. Middendorf, 'Johnson on Wealth and Commerce', 
Johnson, Boswell and Their Circle, Essays Presented to 
L. F. Powell, (Oxford; At the Clarendon Press, 1965), 
pp. 47-64. 
172. Life II, p. 197. 
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limit temptation. The enticement for illegal gains under 
a cloak of legality is the danger Johnson associates with 
a reduced and circumscribed application of this doctrine. 
Johnson avers: 
The temptation to intromit is frequent and 
strong; so strong and so frequent/ as to 
require the utmost activity of justice, and 
vigilance of caution, to withstand its pre- 
valence; and the method by which a man may 
entitle himself to legal intromission is so 
open and so facile that to neglect it is a 
proof of fraudulent intention: for why should 
a man omit to do (but for reasons which he will 
not confess, ) that which he can do so easily, 
and that which he knows to be required by the 
law? If temptation were rare, a penal law 
might be äý. c3Mý iýýngGeSsar 
/y. 
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Johnson, s concern with the retention of this device re- 
cognizes the non-static nature of property. The appeal 
of vicious intromission is in its assertion of state 
protection of the personal freedom which property embodied. 
In Sermon XXIV, Johnson shows his personal concern on the 
proper sphere for legal protection of property: 
that established property and inviolable freedom 
are the greatest of political felicities, no 
man can be supposed likely to deny. 
174 
By choosing to express his concerns on property in the genre 
of the sermon, Johnson indicates his insistence on seeing 
173. Life II, p. 199. 
174. Samuel Johnson, Sermons, ed., Jean H. Hagstrum and 




religion and the material needs of society as'indistin- 
guishable. 
An extensive quotation from the pen of Henry Home, 
Lord Kames (Historical Law Tracts, 1761, Tract I, 
"Criminal Law", p. 46-47) is set in the'text of the dis-, 
Gussion as evidence of prevailing Scots legal thought on 
vicious intromission. Kames' words "seem to be considered 
as irresistibly decisive" and Johnson must argue against 
them equally presumptively as Kames employs the 
authoritative quality in language that Johnson favors. 
In terms of content, Johnson is now given an opportunity 
to attack the "ameliorative view of human nature held 
by Kames and others of the Scottish historical school"175. 
Indeed, Johnson must effectively deal with Kames' dismissal 
of the doctrine: 
it(vicious intromission) is at present so 
little in repute, that the vicious intromission 
must be extremely gross which provokes the judges 
to give way to the law in its utmost extent; 
and it seldom happens, that vicious intromission 
is attended with any consequence beyond reparation, 
and cost of suit. 
176 
After paying proper homage to Kames' intellectual stature 
and judicial talent, Johnson launches into a refutaK. on 
of the rule's present interpretation: 
175. Ian Simpson Ross, 
_Lord 
Kames and the Scotland of his 
Dom, (Oxford; At the Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 255. 
176. Lord Kames, Henry Home, Historical Law Tracts, (Edinburgh; 
1761), p. 47. 
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I find myself under a necessity of observing, 
that this learned and judicious writer had 
not accurately distinguished the deficiencies 
and demands of the different conditions of 
human life, which from a degree of savageness 
and independence, in which all laws are vain, 
passes or may pass, by innumerable gradations, 
to a state of reciprocal benignity, in which 
laws are no longer necessary, 
177 
Johnson's understanding of current society determines hew A e, 
sthe social fabric which defines judicial apprehen' 
inju'ctions. 
This discussion on vicious intromission uncovers the 
sordid desire for unjust riches present in human nature. 
Johnson is certainly distressed that such riches could be 
obtained at the expense of a dead man. His pessimistic 
viewpoint reveals a disconcert ny note in'the human 
condition which seems to require external law to frustrate 
temptation. The social conditions present that demand 
such regulation reflect Johnson's basic Christian theology. 
Indeed, this omnipresent venality seen in man can only be 
controlled by the retention of laws such as vicious 
intromission and those of similar design. Johnson's own 
poverty ("Slow rises worth, by Poverty depress'd"178) and 
his understanding of the conditions in which people 
177. Life II, p. 198. 
178. London: A Poem In Imitation of the Third Satire of 
Juvenal, line 177, p. 18. 
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live 179-combine-with his appreciation of the social 
structure to make him aware of the charms of money and 
power. This violation of fiduciary responsibility is a 
fear to which Johnson succumbs. 
Personal observation leads Johnson to disagree with 
Kames and distinguish "the deficiencies and demands of the 
different conditions of human life . $' Johnson's' focus is 
on the desire to produce general happiness, and on an 
understanding of the conditions required to achieve this. 
And this focus determines whether certain laws should 
remain operative or not. Johnson's brand of conservative 
pessimism asserts a fault in human interaction. "Men 
continue to prosecute their own advantages by the nearest 
way; and the utmost severity of the civil law is necessary 
to restrain individuals from plundering each other180. 
As the commercial elements of society become more developed, 
179. Boswell, a Journey To The Western Islands of Scotland, 
ed. Mary Lascelles, (Yale ed), Vol. IX, p. 28. 
M. Dorothy George, London Life in The Eighteenth 
Century, fifth impression, (New York: Capricorn 
Books, 1965). 
Henry Grey Graham, The Social Life of Scotland in The 
Eighteenth Century, Fifth edition, ed. Eric Linklater, 
2 Vols., (1899: rept. London: Adam and Charles Black, 
1969). 
Marjorie Plant, The Domestic Life of Scotland in The 
Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh: At the Univers ty 
Press, 1952). 
180. Life II, p. '198. 
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sophisticated criminality also increases. Exponential 
growth in civilization is not restricted to its more 
savory aspect but concurrently advances its sinister side 
as well. "Those who before invaded pastures and stormed 
houses; now. begin to enrich themselves by unequal contracts 
and fraudulent intromissions. It is not against the 
violence of ferocity, but the circumven. 1'icr_A5 of deceit, that 
this law is framed.... 'F. 18-. History forms the basis of 
Johnson's argument. His view of the evolution of criminality 
is presented to refute Kames' fundamental assumptions. 
Johnson is not resistant to change but presents the 
argument for the necessity of reasoned enquiry first. 
Johnson dissects the principle of vicious intromission 
in terms of its penalty'. He reviews the governing quality 
of a penal law to determine whether it is reasonable and 
just. Conditions necessary for a criminal penalty to be 
effective are of its adequacy and the importance of the 
crime to merit sanction. The argument rests on the 
prominence of property and an indispensable need for 
protection in society. "Its end (the law of vicious 
intromission) is the sanctity of property; and property 
very often of great value"182. Significantly, this law 
defies refinement as it "keeps guilt and innocence apart 
by a distinct and definite limitation"183. Johnson 
argues that the motives for fraudulent intention in 
181. Ibid. 
182., Life II, p. 199. 
183. Ibid. 
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intromission are easily ascertained. It is precisely 
for this rationale that individuals and society must 
be protected from unlawful intervention. 
Johnson argues against the capricious and indiscriminate 
application of this doctrine. "Deviations from the law 
must be uniformlypunished, or no man can be certain when 
184 he shall be safe". Johnson petitions for uniform 
decrees, and claims the foundation of a just society 
demands such consistency. While he accepts that varied 
facts influence a case, Johnson in this instance asks for 
a rule of action that is clear, concise, and constant. 
A vigorous adherence to the doctrine of vicious intromission 
would easily prevent fraud and its commission with 
impunity. Johnson avers that relaxation of this principle 
of intromission would encourage the worst aspect of 
society to assert itself. The major consequence would 
be the strong and ruthless dominating the weak and helpless. 
The sanctity. -of property would become illusory and the 
fabric of'society damaged. 
However, Johnson's argument did not take sufficient 
account of the factual circumstances of the specific cases 
of this kind that had already come before the crown. In 
the case Johnson was considering, the court relied on 
Erskine's treatise': 
Passive titles, in general, and that of 
vicious intromission, in particular, being 
-Z- 
184. Ibid, p. 200. 
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introduced as a check to fraud, and the 
penalty of vicious intromission being so 
great, every equitable and favorable 
circumstance tending to exclude the 
presumption of fraud is pleadable of 
the party, and will enter into the 
consideration of the judge. Where, 
indeed, there is ground to presume 
a fraudulent intention, or other. 
unfavorable circumstance attending 
it. There the sanction of the law will 
be applied; and, on the other hand, where 
the presumption of fraud is taken off by 
any favorable circumstances, for 
instance, the smallness of the intromission, 
and where the intromission itself cannot be 
ascribed to any tortious or fraudulent 
design, then it will not fall within the 
rule, nor the reason of introducing this. 
penal passive title. 
185 
Under this rule Johnson's seemingly unanswerable argument 
was refuted. However, the quality of Johnson's discussion 
ISto 
of the issue must be appreciated. His concern for the 
introduction of a form of judicial review suggests potential 
constitutional problems. In this discussion Johnson 
displays a sophisticated understanding of the role of 
property in eighteenth-century Britain. The salient 
issue expressed in Johnson's answer stresses the prominence 
of fraud in society, and concurs with the just and reasonable 
elements needed for a penal law to exist. "The proper role 
of government is to guarantee political liberty and the right 
or possession, but political power can ultimately do no*-. 
more than set the ground rules and prepare the arena; the 
individual must regulate his liberty and control his use of 
property1O'ý" Johnson avers that vicious intromission is a 
185. Erskine, 3, Book 3, title 9, @26, cited in Wilson v. 
Smith, Armour, Faculty Decisions. 
186. Life III, p. 102. 
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principle by which the law-can effectively protect property 
and permit the maximum freedom in the exchange of commerce. 
His advocacy for the retention of this principle illustrates 
Johnson's view of how and why a law should function in 
society. 
vi 
As an author, Johnson would naturally be interested 
in the protection of literary output. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that Boswell's-Life of Johnson contains 
considerable comment on a copyright case that proved to 
be a landmark in legal history: Donaldson v. Beckett 
189; 
4 Burr. 2408,98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774), 17 Cobbett 
Parliamentary History 954. This case discussed the issues 
of customary or common law right in literary property. 
The interpretation of a custom that determines a common 
law right and the force of the copyright statute 8 Anne 
co 1918F1 forms the background to the technical legal 
problems involved in this case. Again, the structure of 
Johnson's remarks reveals an analysis of the case on general 
common sense principles and reflects his personal interest 
in the subject 
1" 
. Johnson's view of the issues is balanced 
187. Middendorf, p. 53. 
188. Augustine Birrell, Q. C., MP., Seven Lectures on the Law 
and History of Copyright in Books, (London: Cassell 
and Co. LTD, 1899), pp. 120-138. 
189. F. C. Avis, The First English Copyright Act 1709, (London: 
Glenview Press, 1965). 
ß 
Sir. Frank MacKinnon, "Notes on The History of English 
Copyright, " The Oxford Companion to English Literature, 
ed. Sir Paul Harvey, Fourth Edition, rev. Dorothy 
Eagle, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
pp. 921-931. 
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as he realizes the ramifications of a perpetual copyright 
and the potential abuse that could ensue. An examination 
of Johnson's comments indicates his desire to promote the 
free access for learning and information in society, and 
yet 'support the author of a work in maintaining control 
over the dissemination of his output. Significantly, a 
tension develops between property and its control on 
society. Johnson's observations on the nature and function 
of copyright191 perceive its role: in a society that is just 
experiencing an explosion of knowledge. 
In his initial comments on this case, Johnson recognizes 
the potentiality of abuse in legal process. The situation 
involved a "Mr. Alexander Donaldson, bookseller or Edinburgh, 
had for some time opened a shop in London, and sold his 
cheap editions of the most popular English books, in 
defiance of the supposed common-law right of Literary 
Property19? -. Johnson opines that: 
He (Alexander Donaldson) is a fellow who 
takes advantage of the law to injure his 
brethren; for, notwithstanding that the 
statutet secures only fourteen years of 
exclusive right, it has always been under- 
stood by the trade, that he who buys the 
copyright of a book from the authour, 
obtains a perpetual property; and upon 
that belief, numberless bargains are made 
to transfer that property after the 
expiration of the statutory term. 
193 
190. J. A. Cochrane, Dr. Johnson's Printer; The Life of William 
Strahan, (cambridge: Härvard University Press', 1964), pp. 134-135. 
191. Paulette Nichot, 'Dr. Johnson on Copyright', Revue des 
langues Vivantes, (Brussels) xxiii (1957), pp. 137-147. 
192. Life I, p. 437. 
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In addition to this opinion Boswell interposes that "Dr. 
Johnson was. zealous against a perpetuity; but he thought 
that the term of the exclusive right of authors should be 
considerably enlarged. He was then for granting a hundred 
year s"191. In essence Johnson's focus is on the nature of 
a monopoly and its character and desirability is both in 
economic and intellectual terms. Johnson attempts to 
distinguish the need for economic benefits from an 
ambition to encourage intellectual discourse. Moreover, 
Johnson is constant in the assumption that the primary 
concern of copyright is authorial protection. Indeed, 
Johnson's analysis of the role'of copyright and his 
concern for the protection of the artist has modern support: 
Authours, musicians, painters are among the 
greatest benefactors of the race. So we incline 
to protect them. Yet the very effect of 
protecting them is to make the enjoyment of 
their creations more costly-and hence to limit 
the possibility of that enjoyment especially by 
persons of slender purses. Moreover, a monopoly, 
here, as always, makes it possible for the wares 
to be kept off the market altogether. 
19! 
The general principles from which Johnson formulates his 
analysis of the issues in this Donaldson case embrace the 
conflicts'which arise between author and'society. 
On 8 May, 1773 Boswell records Johnson's elaboration 
of his view against a perpetual copyright: 
193. Ibid. P. 438. 
194. Ibid. p.. 439. 
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No book could have the-advantage of being 
edited with notes, however necessary to its 
elucidation, should the proprietor perversely 
oppose it. For the general good of the world, 
therefore, whatever valuable work has once 
been created by an authour, and issued out by 
him, should be understood as no longer in his 
power, but as belonging to the publick; at 
the same time the authour is entitled to an 
adequate reward, 
19 ¢ 
For most of his comments on copyright, Johnson adopts the 
persona of an academic with the underscored desire for 
access to another's work. The availability of texts is a 
major component of Johnson's argument, and the texture 
of his language intimates the personal conflict between 
author and critic. While Johnson sincerely wants to 
encourage an economic return for the artist, he sees 
substantial advantage in facilitating a11 forms of 
intellectualesc. hange. Behind Johnson's argument lies his 
understanding that the statute 8 Anne c. 19 benefits 
publishers more than it does authors, for whom the statute 
was designed. The structure and emphasis of his language 
in these comments on Donaldson indicate a deep concern 
"for the interests of learning". However, if Johnson 
accepts a metaphysical right of property over its creation, 
it would seem that his motive reflects the salutary and 
altruistic argument that would appeal to the populace of a 
jury. 
Johnson's reiteration of his argument against perpetual 
copyright is preceded by a comment on the nature of literary 
property. "There seems,. (said he), to be in authours a 
195. Zechariah Chafee, jr., "Reflections On The Law of 
Copyright"; XLV Columbia Law Review (1945) p. 505. 
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stronger right of property than that by occupancy; a 
metaphysical. right, as it were; of creation, which should 
from its nature be perpetual.... 
197. In part Johnson concurs 
with Blackstone who in his treatise considers the origin 
of copyright to derive from that occupancy based on a 
Roman Law concept of occupation. 
193, While Johnson accepts 
this concept, his attitude on the foundation of copyright 
is almost mystical. The reverence which property rights 
enjoyed in eighteenth-century thought is evidenced in 
Johnson's apprehension of copyright concepts. The 
foundation of copyright'is a mixture of legal and 
philosophical ideas where conflict abounds in function 
and vested interests199. The sense with which Johnson 
balances the inherent burdens and benefits contained in 
this peculiar monopoly rests on the experience he gained 
from the varied professions he assumes in his career. 
Johnson's discussion of copyright enabled him to widen the 
scope of Donaldson to include natural law concepts from 
which his own general principles of justice derive. 
Johnson's most concise statement on copyright or 
literary property is to be found in a letter dated 7 March 
1774, to William Strahan, Johnson's printer. Here, Johnson 
is forthright and detailed in his discussion of copyright: 
The Authour has a natural ani peculiar right 
to the profits of his own work. 
196. Life II, p. 259. 
197. Life II, 259. 
198. Justinian, Digest 4 I. 2. I. I.; B1 Comm II, pp. 405-407; 
cf. Blackstone as counsel in Millar v. Ta lor, 4 Burr 
2303 (1769). 
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But as every Man who claims the protection 
of Society, must purchase it by resigning some 
part of his natural right, the authour must 
recede from so much of his claim as shall be 
deemed injurious or inconvenient to Society. 
It is inconvenient. to Society that an 
useful book should become perpetual and exclusive 
property . ........................................ But the authours enjoyment of his natural 
right might without any inconvenience be pro- 
tracted beyond the term settled by the Statute. 
And it is, I think, to be desired. 
. 200 
While Johnson repeats much of the quality of comment found 
in the Life, the logic of his argument is developed, and 
maintains a Johnsonian aura of. its being the definitive 
word on the subject. Indeed, the appeal to natural right 
concepts is still perceived as a problem: 
The difficulty of transforming the natural 
justice of copyright into positive law is 
shown by the enormous differences of opinion 
about the proper length of the monopoly. 
20(, 
Johnson's letter addresses itself to the peculiarities of 
this question, and his examination both forecasts and 
considers an intriguing modern issue of reversion. 
In this letter Johnson advances a practical and 
intelligent approach to the nature of copyright. Essential 
elements of a copyright law must be reconciled with the 
interests of society at large, yet protect the unique 
199. Augustine Birrell, Q. C. M. P., Seven Lectures on The Law 
and History of Copyright in Books, (London: Cassell & 
Company, Ltd., 1899), p. 121-138. 
200. Johnson Miscellanies, ed. G. B. Hill, (1897; rpt. 
New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966) Vol. II, 
pp. 442-444. 
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property relationship existing between the author and his 
work. Johnson maintains that "the author has a natural 
and peculiar right to the profits of his own work". In 
this Johnson shares Blackstone's understanding that copy- 
right is based on a natural claim of an author over the 
product of his own labor: 
And this is the right, which an author may 
be supposed to have in his own original 
literary compositions: so that no other 
person without his leave may publish or 
make a profit of the copies. When a man 
by the exertion of his rational powers 
has produced an original work, he has 
clearly a right to dispose of that identical 
work as he pleases, and any attempt to take 
it from him, or vary the disposition he has 
made of it, is an invasion of his right of- 
property. 
20ý 
Accepting this premise, Johnson understands the contractual 
aspects in protecting an author from society. While an 
author must relinquish part of his natural right to owner- 
ship in exchange for remuneration. and protection, 'the 
question is the limit to which this resignation would harm 
the author and thus society at large. Johnson's social 
compact militates against any "perpetual and exclusive 
property". Indeed, the legal and political implications 
of copyright and literary property demand such a balanced 
position. It is therefore consistent in this letter for 
Johnson to affirm the House of Lords- decision in Donaldson 
v. Beckett. 
However, Johnson extends the limits of the decision 
in Donaldson as well as the wisdom of the statute which he 
scrutinizes. The balance of this letter sets out Johnson's 
201. Chafee, p. 719. 
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proposal for what the law should be. Enumeration of the' 
specific clauses in this letter reflect-the need to maintain 
an equilibrium between what is "agreeable to moral right, 
and not inconvenient to the public interest.... ". The 
reasonableness of his draft is evident in its consideration 
of terms of years, renewals, economic concerns, and alienation. 
Of all these clauses the most significant is the third: 
"that, when after fourteen years the copy shall revert to 
the authour, he be allowed to alienate it again only seven 
years at a time"203. Protection for an authors who assigns 
his property rights away early and may not be aware of the 
potentiality of his work provides the motive behind the 
reversion. The attention to authors_ or artists who should 
maintain a legal interest in their work parallels the 
direction of present day copyright theory. Johnson fore- 
shadows the concern for a remainder interest in a work 
and thereby adds a new dimension to the protection copyright 
affords. The third clause recognized the injustice to an 
autho-tr who assigns his rights away only to discover he 
can also lose artistic control as well as a prospective 
economic advantage. By statutory reversion, Johnson offers 
a defense to the author-: who must out of immediate circum- 
stances sell his,, -property disadvantageously. Although it 
is speculative, Johnson's sympathy for the author in this 
condition is witnessed by his own Grub-Street experiences20LI. 
The scope of: copyright protection should include an 
encouragement for an author. to revise and amend 
his work. 
-it is proper that the aiithour always be incited to polish 
202. B1. Comm. II, pp. 405-406. 
203. Johnsonian Miscellanies II, p. 444. 
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and improve his work, by that prospect of accruing interest 
which those shorter periods of alienation will afford hire . 
The unique protection of monopoly is a 
"privilege that entails 
a corresponding obligation for the author to serve the. 
public better in his vocation. A form of constructive 
notice of establishing the full implications in one's mind 
is served on the author in terms of this responsibility. 
An opportunity to re-examine and provide for critical 
commentary would eventually be required for most major 
work. Johnson arbitrarily assigns a period of fifty years 
within which one should enjoy the right. to perform this 
type of work. The material part of his discussion is in 
the necessity to protect a reciprocal right in author and 
society. Johnson's reasonable approach stresses the value 
of compromise in order to effect a situation that is fair 
to publisher and author alike. The nuances that may be 
gleaned from Johnson's position indicate that such a 
compromised position benefits most the society at large. 
Trust concepts vested in the public for an author's 
guardianship sustain their common interests. Johnson's 
legal talent is apparent in his ability to perceive the 
need to understand the "negative right-of preventing the 
copying of physical material in the field of literature 
and the arts" 
206. 
A positive approach to an understanding 
of all aspects in copyright theory is the effect Johnson' 
204. Bloom, Samuel Johnson in Grub Street, (Providence: Brown 
' Universe y Press, 1957). 
A. S. Collins, Authorship in the Days of Johnson, Being a 
Study of the Relation Between Author, Patron, Publisher 
and Public 1726-1780, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 
1927. ) 
205. Op. cit. 
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desires. His specific proposals outlined in the Strahan 
letter endeavour to create accessibility to texts and 
preserve any present or latent rights to ownership that 
may 'remain in. the author, his heirs, or assigns. In 
particular Johnson realizes that the statute 8 Anne c. 19 
extinguishes any vestige of common law copyright as these 
rights are merged into the statute. However, the incomplete- 
ness of the Lords' decision requires a refinement of the legal 
concepts in their opinion. Thus, Johnson's interpretation 
of this decision in Donaldson provides necessary corollaries 
in the function of copyright and points out the philosophical 
and legal technicalities inadequately considered. 
Many of Johnson's thoughts on copyright evolve from 
the advice he gave Edward Cave while writing for his 
magazine in 1739 (published in 1787). Cave published 
some extracts from the sermons of Joseph Trapp and queried 
Johnson on the best method to handle a potential threat 
of prosecution. Johnson-responded with a comprehensive 
brief that guided Cave on the complexities of literary 
abridgements. Johnson, who operates from a revered concept 
of property, nevertheless offers incisive comment on the 
disposition of this form of personal property and understands 
the peculiar relationships involved in. individual reputation. ' 
Johnson is careful to distinguish the rights of authors and 
proprietors as he suggests that their inherent "liberties 
are encouraged and allowed for the same reason with writing 
itself, for'the discovery and propagation of truth, though, 
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like other human goods, they. have their alloys and ill 
consequences; yet, as their advantages abundantly preponderate, 
"207 they have never yet been abolished or restrained. 
The nature of a literary abridgement requires an altered 
set of rules and practice in terms of copyright law. 
Johnson advances and details the exceptions and variances 
needed under a reasoned principle for the common good. 
Johnson does not deny that a book is the primary 
property of, the author and that he enjoys the right to 
transfer and assign that right.. Moreover, he stresses 
that this right vested in the author must be protected 
and encouraged. Balanced against the position of the-author 
is that of the proprietor who also has an argument of merit. 
"He that purchases the copy of a book, purchases the sole 
right of printing it, and of vending the books pron. 
+ed-- 
according to it, but has no right to add to it, or take 
from it, without". the authov, -$ consent, who still preserves 
such a right in it, as folio-$ from, the right every man has 
'20S 
to preserve his own reputation. However, Johnson does 
aver that every book purchased becomes the property of the 
buyer. He realizes the reader accepts the major rights 
in the book and understands the disadvantages that may 
accrue to both author and proprietor. Since the reader 
holds the ultimate dispo. Jp*ion of a book, Johnson argues 
about the nature of this determination'in the following 
206. Walter Arthur Copinger, The Law of Copyright in Works 
of Literature and Art, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
S$7 @4. 
207. "Considerations on the Case of Dr. T (rapp's) Sermons. 
Abridged by Mr. Cave 1739", The Works of Samuel 
Johnson, LL. D., p. 463. Vol. 5,1825; rpt. New York: 
AMS Press, Inc., 1970). 
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terms: 
Thus every book, when it falls into the 
hands of the reader, is liable to be 
examined, confuted, censured, translated, 
and abridged; any of which may destroy 
the credit of the authour, or hinder the 
sale of the book. 
That all'these'liberties are allowed, and 
cannot be prohibited without manifest 
disadvantage to the publicI, ',. o y be easily 
proved; but we shall confine ourselves 
to the liberty of making epitomes, which 
gives occasion to our present inquiry. 
209 
He sees an overriding interest on behalf of the society 
in the free exchange of ideas. Any limitation on a reader's 
freedom harms the fabric of intellectual discourse. Johnson 
sees the value of precedent and natural right behind this 
protection for the reader and understands the need to 
encourage potential readers to respond. 
In this brief for Cave Johnson presents an abbreviated 
history of literary abridgements with supporting exempla: 
The numberless abridgements that are to be 
found of all kinds of writing afford suf- 
ficient evidence that they were always thought 
legal, for they are printed with the names of 
the _- abbreviators and publishers, and without the least appearance of a clandestine transaction. 
Many of the books, so abridged, were the properties 
of men who wanted neither wealth, nor interest, 
nor spirit, to sue, to sue for justice, if they 
had thought themselves injured. Many of these 
abridgements must have been. made-!. by men whom 
we can least suspect of illegal practices, for 
there are few books of late that are not abridged. 
210 
208. Ibid, p. 462. 
209. Ibid., pp. 463-464. 
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This element of good faith. which Johnson sees in the initial 
process of abridgement coincides with his, understanding 
of public policy. In essence Johnson holds such abridgements 
as a liberating influence lessening the dependence on weaWWW 
that can control the realm of'ideas. In the development 
toward literacy in the eighteenth century, the literary 
abridgement opened additional avenues to encourage a reading 
public. Johnson maintains that: 
The design of an abridgement isjto benefit 
mankind by facilitating the attainment of 
knowledge; and by contracting arguments, 
relations, or descriptions, into a narrow 
compass, to convey instruction: in the 
easiest method, without fatiguing the 
attention, burdening the memory, or 
impairing the health of the student. 
211, 
Though presented as a rudimentary educational tool, 
Johnson suggests that literary abridgements accelerate the 
cultural progress of society by an approved and additional 
access to books. His pragmatic response dismisses trivial1 
entrenched legalistic principles. 
In his discussion Johnson established the right of 
abridgement by both custom and reason. Then he quickly 
shifts the focus of his argument to an understanding of 
what prohibition would mean: 
If abridgements be condemned, as injurious 
to the'proprietor of the copy, where will 
211. Ibid., p. 46g. 
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this argument end? Must not confutations 
be, likewise, prohibited for the*same 
reason? Or, in writings of entertainment, 
will not criticisms, at least, be entirely 
suppressed, as equally hurtful to the 
proprietor, and certainly not more necessary 
to the public? 
Will not authours, who write for pay, and 
who are rewarded, commonly, according to 
the bulk of their work, be tempted to. fill" 
their works with superfluities and digressions, 
when the dread of an abridgement is taken 
away, as-doubtless more negligenceswould 
be committed, and more falsehoods published, 
if men were not restrained by the fear of 
censure and confutation. 
212. 
Johnson's structure of argument effectively frames each 
category against his controlling premise. Each example 
or analogy in his position mixes with ideals common to 
an educated and civilized society. In this process Johnson 
allows the discovery of his own logic to prevail. The 
movement of his argument illustrates a constant idea set 
off against its converse to eventually return and emphasize 
his initial point. Thus, Johnson's presentation of the 
various aspects of this controversy illustrates his forensic 
skills. In this instance he utilizes his literary judgements 
to produce a well-designed legal memorandum. Johnson's 
systematic analysis epitomizes the manner of argumentation 
that refutes and forecloses an adverse position. Indeed, this 
memorandum articulates a substantial and persuasive argument 
for the practice and style of literary abridgement that Cave 
wants to continue. 
212.. Ibid, p. 466. 
I 
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Johnson was aware of and interested in the problems 
that occur in the transfer and maintenance of real property. 
In 1776, Lord Auchinleck wanted to entail his estate to 
heirs general instead of a succession of heirs male as his 
son James Boswell desired. Seeking support for his preference 
for male succession, Boswell sought Johnson's. advice and 
counsel. Johnson, naturally aware of the discord caused 
by this issue in Boswell's family, politely tried'to with- 
hold an opinion. Nevertheless, intrigued by the legal 
question involved, Johnson sent a reply to Boswell's letter 
213 
Unsure of the specific tliXee week-5 later. 
technicalities in Scots inheritance and land law, Johnson's 
discussion is of a general nature. Unfortunately for 
Boswell, this surrogate father-figure Johnson supported 
his own father Auchinleck in the admission of succession 
by heirs general. Most significantly, Johnson advances 
an enlightened view of the status 'of women, yet continues 
to endow property with a mystique that expresses its function 
in eighteenth-century society and law. 
Exhibiting an unusual diffidence in his ability 
to fully understand the issue, Johnson then launches into 
a discussion that examines the intricate relationship between 
law and real property. Johnson frames his discussion by 
asserting that "land is, like any other possession, by 
natural right wholly in the power of the present owner 
214". 
213. Life II, p. 416-420. 
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Yet he immediately refines the freedom to exercise personal 
discretion and unfettered control over its possession. 
"But the natural right would avail little without the 
protection of law; and the primary motive of law is 
2 1S' 
restraint in the exercise-of natural right". The 
limitation on the private manipulation of property is 
necessitated by the restrictions developed pro bono püblico216. 
Johnson takes the opportunity in this problem of Boswell's 
to focus his attention on the function of law for property 
in determining man's relationship with society. 
In his appreciation of the position property enjoyed 
in present society, Johnson concurs with Blackstone: "The 
permanent right of property is no natural but merely a 
civil right"217'. Johnson amends this thought as he adopts 
a view of the natural right to property where society must 
have an interest and some measure of control. His discussion 
reflects a doctrine of the general function of law in 
society, and from property derives the fundamental concerns 
of that society as well as the attendant role of moral 
obligation21S. For additional authority Johnson reflects 
Grotius's concept of 'dominium eminens" which asserts a 
universal right in the public over property. The recognition 
of this concept does not constitute an invasion of property 
but considers the issue as one of conflicting individual 
214. Ibid. P. 416. 
215. Ibid. 
216. Erskine,. John... of Cardross, The Principles of the Law 
of Scotland, in the order of Sir George Mackenzie 's 
institutions ons of that Law, (Edinburgh: Eiphingston 
-Balfour 1802 ed. ) Bk II T. T. I. p. 114. 
217. B1. Comm. II, p. 2. 
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rights to be settled by indemnification and damages. Thus 
the public right is seen in the context-of a privileged 
case but does not deny the.. private right for redress. There 
is a legitimate right to private property but that incurs 
certain obligations to the society at large. 
While Johnson asserts as most natural philosophers 
did that all rights emanate from a Supreme source21'17; yet 
he accepts a fundamental principle common to Roman and 
English legal systems that one is limited by the 
supposition: "the conveyance of no greater right than one 
enjoys himself"2ZO. Under the proposition of this tenet, 
Johnson admits Boswell's status: "When he , 
(Auchinleck)extends 
his power beyond his own life, by settling the order of 
22' 
succession, the law makes your consent necessary Johnson 
understands the vested rights created in the modification 
of the natural law by the compelling interests of society. 
The security of property rights is a basic constituent of 
eighteenth-century thought and one which Johnson has 
constantly been seen to embrace. In framing the present 
circumstances*of alienation and remainder rights, Johnson 
is prepared to explore the problem further. 
218. Francis Hutcheson, a Short Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy, in Three Books; containing the Elements 
of Et hicks and The Law of Nature, (Glasgow: Robert 
Föulis-'ý , 1747) chap. VIII Bk. II pp. 171-3. 
219. cf. Sermon 24, where Johnson writes about the institutions 
of government and political rights in a religious 
context. He suggests that any "deficiencies in civil 
life" can only be corrected by an acceptance of religion. 
220. Life II,. `1 , 
22ý. It; d, jo . 
416. 
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The most revealing sentence in the text: 
Laws are formed by the manners and exigencies 
of particular times, and it is but accidental 
that they last longer than their causes: the 
limitation of feudal succession to the male 
arose from the obligation of the tenant to at+ed 
his chief in war; 
22Z 
presents a capsule history of land tenures with an analysis 
of the relevance of present legal institutions. Here, 
Johnson questions the viability of maintaining certain legal 
institutions and legal fictions. The tenure relationship 
which provides much of the foundation for land law is 
criticized because of the burdens and confusion it adds 
to legal administration. In his argument Johnson suggests 
223 
that the use of obsolete legal fictions may interfere with 
the ability of the law to adjust to modern requirements. 
However, he accepts the common practice of ignoring these 
fictions if they constitute too great an impediment to 
judicial action. 
Johnson's rhetorical question: "Is land to be treated 
with more reverence than liberty? " reflects the values of 
eighteenth-century progressive thought. Freedom and free-will 
in the exercise of choice for the dispersion of property is. 
the central issue. In his appraisal of the general aspects of 
22? -. Ibid. 'pp. 
416-417 
223. Ibid; cf. Erwin Hexner, Studies in Legal Terminology, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 
pp. 50-55, for a discussion both historical and theoretical 
on legal fictions and how legal rules are manifested in 
a human language. 
a 
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this-issue, Blackstone wrote: 
So great moreover is the rega: 
for private property, that it 
authorize the least violation 
not even for the general good 
community. 
rd of the law 
will not 
of it; no 
of the whole 
22`{ 
An interaction between property and freedom to contract 
is created in the tension developed by the interest of the 
society at large. Johnson moves from an acceptance of 
the rightful origin of property to the more advanced under- 
standing of its social function. 'Specific consideration 
of the order and nature of succession determines the dia- 
lectic of Johnson's argument. There is-a constant balance 
maintained between Boswell's and Auchinleck's respective views 
on testate succession. And by framing the issue in terms 
of freedom, Johnson is able to introduce concepts of individual 
right and its reciprocal responsibility to the society. 
Johnson avers that both parties must be cognizant of the 
effect that limitations on succession would induce. Executory 
limitations on future interests would be of questionable 
legality and if eventually destructible, undermine the 
control that is attempting to be established. In his 
understanding of the question Johnson displays his grasp of 
the legal and personal aspects that characterize Boswell's 
225 
interest . 
22v. B1. Comm. II, p. 139. 
224. cf. John Murray, "Some Civil Cases of James Boswell, 1772-1774", 
52 Juridical Review (1940), pp. 222-251, for a discussion 
of Boswell's remarks on entails in Sir Alexander Mackenzie 
v. Hector Mackenzie and Roderick Mackenzie (150 S. P. 4). 
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For the most part Johnson ignores the technicalities 
of strict settlement of* land to concentrate on the desir- 
226 
ability of entailment in gender fn this context he 
clashes with Boswell's predilection for antique and conser- 
vative prejudice against improving the legal'status of 
227 
women Boswell's attachment to the theory that the purity 
of the line is maintained or transmitted through the male 
is at the center of his argument. Working from the precedent 
established by his ancestor's decision on succession in tail 
male, Boswell relies on this position to argue for the re- 
tention and strengthening of this tradition 
228. However, 
Johnson questions the need and wisdom to perpetuate this 
line of reasoning especially since Auchinleck holds the fee. 
Johnson also questions whether Boswell's ancestor had the 
legal capacity to exclude his daughters, and if not, whether 
this was not merely an arbitrary act. Johnson supports the 
probably capricious succession document drafted by Boswell's 
ancestor when he bypasses his daughters; but it no more 
follows that he intended his act as a rule for posterity 
229 
than the disinheriting of his brother . Nevertheless, 
to answer this question Johnson again disclaims knowledge of 
the peculiarities of Scots legal technicalities in the rules 
for succession. But Johnson's ignorance does not 'stop him 
from framing an opinion on the general merits raised by 
the issue. 
0 
226. Stair, III, 4, p. 33. 
227 Life II, p. 419. 
228. Ibid, pp. 412-414. 
-1 
229. Ibid. p: ) 418.4 
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Johnson assumes that the succession of heirs general 
would be the law in Scotland, and this position would 
correspond with his view of free alienation and successicr.. 
Arguing from this assumption Johnson arrives at this 
. resolution:. 
It appears, upol 
father- excludes 
near females to 
remote;. and the 
consequential. 
1 reflection, that your 
nobody; he only admits 
inherit before males more- 
exclusion is purely 
230. A. 
Aware of the illogical and jumbled nature of land laws, 
Johnson intelligently suggests that Boswell seek specific 
and accurate advice from the more knowledgeCi5/e Lord Hailes. 
The response from Häiles advised: 
the succession of heirs general was the 
succession, by the law of Scotland from 
the throne to the cottage, as far as 
we can learn it by. _ record. 231 
Thus, both Johnson's assumptions and approach were well 
supported by Hailes' opinion on this issue. What Johnson's 
first letter does reveal is his habit of mind and the 
procedure he chose in dealing with a problem. -This is the 
most striking instance in the Life which admits the sequence 
and kinds of questions Johnson considered in formulating an 
answer. 
In the letter which contained Haile.? remarks, Johnson 
outlines his reasoning and shows the structure of his analysis. 
Johnson reiterates his lack of acquaintance with the 
230. Life II, p. 418 
231. Ibid. 
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appropriate Scots law, and states that his response is 
determined by the application of general principles. 
This is evidence. of his habit of generalization and 
shows how he ascertains the common principles inherent in 
any 'discussion. Johnson presents two propositions that 
neatly summ4rize the issue. The first considers "He 
who inherits a fief unlimited by his ancestor" and enjoys 
the unfettered exercise of power over that fief. The 
second, accepts the unlimited fief and an interest "that 
gives his heirs some reason to complain-, if he does not 
transmit it unlimited to posterity". Johnson balances 
these propositions in respect to the specific issues 
and concluded that neither Auchinleck nor Boswell would be 
entirely correct. However, Johnson suggests an 
equitable settlement would rest on Aüchinleck's least 
violation of the rules for legal succession. 
Boswell's opposi+''o^ to vesting the estate on 
Auchinleck's terms is based on the inclusion of females 
in the line of succession. Johnson, however, is unusually 
modern in his contention: "Women have natural and equitable 
, is 
claims as well. men, and these claims are not to be capriciously 
or lightly superseded or infringed"234. To appreciate 
Johnson's advanced, thinking one must accept the virtual 
233 
. non-status of women in political and legal aread 
23... Ibid. ' p. 419. 
233. Arthur Rackham Cleveland, Woman under the English Law; 
from the Landing of the Saxons to the Present Time, rLondon: 
Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., 1896); Janelle Greenberg, "The 
Legal Status of the English Women in Early Eighteenth- 
Century Common Law and Equity", Studies in Eighteenth-Century 
Cultures, ed. H. E. Pagliaro, (Madison: American Society for 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, 1975), v. IV, pp. 171-181. 
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-In his statement Johnson indicates a sociological--. under- 
standing of legal fashion: "As manners-make laws, manners 
likewise repeal them "231 The viability of the legal process 
admits change in status that either reflects currents-in. 
society or. anticipates them. 
Johnson concludes his thoughts on the question of 
Boswell's estate by asserting that: 
he who inherits an estate, inherits all 
the power legally concomitant,....... e he who gives or leaves unlimited an estate 
legally limitable, must be presumed to 
give that power of limitation which he omit- 
ted to take away, to commit future con- 
tingencies: future prudence. 
23S 
A balanced view of perpetuating the potential abuse of free 
alienation is the essence of Johnson's disquisition. It 
is important to realize Johnson strongly advocated entails 
for landed estates, and the perpetuation of both property 
rights and social order. Johnson was cognizant of the 
effect entails have in maintaining the social structure 
and therefore political stability. "Entails are good, be- 
cause it is good to preserve in a country, series of men, 
to whom the people are accustomed to look up th Fir their 
leaders". 
236 
This sentiment exposes the connection between 
the formulation of legal rules and the demands required 
23. L1. Life II, p. 419. 
235". Ibid., pp. 419-420. 
236. Life If, p. 428. 
ý4 
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for social order. Johnson's viewpoint clearly expresses 
not only a. desire for stability but recognizes the law to 
be an essential instrument to maintain and develop legitimate 
processes of government. This is especially evident in the 
complex realm of land law where the power structure can 
strengthen its position in the social order237 and accomplish 
its aim with a mixture of confusion and legality that seduces 
moral principle. Johnson with his penchant for a reasoned 
and conservat+veapproach to society is not immune to such 
seduc*ive. blandishments. It is in this way that Johnson 
fits the Tory cloak tailored by his critics. 
Although Johnson approached Boswell's problem from 
the perspective of a generalist whose forte J#. with 
philosophy and English law, it is important to consider his 
remarks on property with some understanding of Scots legal 
thought. Stein-writes that Scottish institutional writers: 
followed the natural law line, which on the 
one hand regarded strict adherence to agree- 
ments as dictated by nature and the contractual 
obligation as something sacred, and, on the Or/+¢'" 
hand, considered the holder of property to be 
subject to such restriction imposed by nature 
in the public interest that he was theoretically 
almost a trustee of his property on behalf of 
the community. 
239 
For the most part Johnson's remarks agree with both aspects 
237. L. B.. Namier, England in the Age of the American 
Revolution, (London: Macmillan antic Co-., Ltd., 1930), 
pp. 20-29. 
238. Peter Stein, 'The General Notions of Contract and Pro- 
perty in Eighteenth-Century Scottish Thought', 8 Juridical 
Review (1963), p. 5. 
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of this assessment and in this way seem to modify his 
natural law thinking into that of a more rational and com- 
parative one23q While Johnson usually supported the in- 
violability of contract, he also maintained that the needs 
of'the community must be considered. This does not mean 
that Johnson enthusiastically sought government'inter- 
ferences but that he recognized those aspects of social 
contract theory that would permit an intrusion if it were 
essential. Johnson's innate conservatism and respect for 
property would make the requirements for any intrusion ex- 
ceedingly stiff. Such rigorous requirements and the question 
of legitimate intervention are surveyed in Kames' essay on 
proper 
2qO 
In his approach to the history of property Kames sug- 
gests the influence of the justice of right reason that 
24f 
characterized his own view of morality . This moral 
base 
is not an extraneous consideration since property concerns 
form a determinant in the action of man and specifically, 
the questionable disposition of Auchinleck's property. 
Also, to Johnson the underlying moral imperatives in 
any action were always relevant. The wisdom and discretion 
239. cf. F. T. H. Fletcher, Monesquieu and English Politics 
(1750-18001, (London: Edward Arnold& Co., 1939 . Johnson's thinking on this point is clearly influenced 
by the ideas of Montesquieu despite Johnson's re- 
luctance to admit such an occurence. 
2/O. Henry Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law Tracts, (Edinburgh: 
T. Cadell; and J. Bell and W. Creech 3rd ed. , 1776), 
pp. 87-154; Life II, p. 198. 
241. Henry Home, Lord Kames, Essays on Principles of Morality 
and National Religion, (Edinburgh; 1751). 
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with which Auchinleck desires to disperse his'estate is 
the fundamental issue in Boswell's opinion. Since Johnson 
has been consulted on this matter, the moral aspect of 
Boswell's problem is within the proper realm of Johnson's 
enjuiryz' It is his strengths as a. generalist that Johnson 
must reconcile with his limited acquaintance with Scots 
law. 
Despite Johnson's limited knowledge of the technical- 
ities of Scots law, the specific legal value of his 
opinion on the personal disposal of real property. is 
paradoxically significant because of the nature of Scots 
law. While the common law system that reigns supreme 
in. England would require him to search out the previous 
line of cases and evaluate their judgments, the philosophical 
nature of Scots law would render this process less important. 
The Scots legal system with its prominent use of general 
principles, philosophy, and institutional writers is more 
in*harmony with Johnson's own thought process. Johnson's 
approach to this case may be characterized by the analysis 
of the general philosophical questions raised in the use, 
enjoyment, and disposition of real property. The sympathy 
with which the Scots legal system admits the contributions 
of philosophical enquiry enables Johnson'to make a sub- 
stantial advance not only on Boswell's problem but on the 
general issue of property dispersion itself. 
This question involving both the ability and choice of 
passing on one's wealth raises problems that effect the 
basic structures of society. In the eighteenth century the 
179' 
`complexity of these issues are treated by French Physio- 
crats, Adam Smith, and the larger community of legal and 
244 
moral philosophers . Although the achievements of these 
thinkers rests with their shift of economic emphasis from 
the Auchinleck type of estate to larger agricultural, com- 
mercial, and industrial concerns, the fundamental questions 
of property and ownership remain. And while Johnson was 
243 
cognizant of this shift in economic thinking he, never- 
theless, was vitally interested in stich individual cases 
as Boswell's. For Johnson understood that these individual 
estates created a class of persons that contributed to the 
24'I 
strengthening and maintenance of the society . The 
quality of this fabric of society is a prime concern of 
Johnson's in his desire to continue an orderly evolution 
toward general happiness in Britain. 
While Johnson's often expressed concerns about the 
nature and composition of society appear to parallel some 
of the points raised in Boswell's. argument, the particular 
choice and manner of entail discussed here can be dis- 
tinguished from the broader implications of the theory of 
24a. Ronald L. Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays 
and Translations, rLondon: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1962), especially pp. 345-398. 
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations 17763, ed. Edwin Cannan, (New 
York-. - Modern Library, 1937). 
243 cf. footnote 171. 
244. cf. Chapter III, pp. 275-7$ Kings 84, Part I: Lect: XII 
"Of Civil Rank, Order, & Precedence". 
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antail. The father-son relationship and. Auchinleck's 
freedom to dispose of his estate contribute to Johnson's 
inconsistency of argument. Johnson, wearing the mask of 
a good counselor, must narrowly scrutinize Boswell's pro- 
blem and be sensitive to his own relationship with him. 
The resulting, conflicting themes evident in Johnson's te- 
marks must be understood in terms of the specific issues 
raised by Auchinleck's plan and its impact on the family. 
In essence, the threads of Johnson's argument contain many 
colours and appear to be woven into a strange geometric 
design, when actually-they do nothing more than indicate 
the thought process of a wise and patient counsel. 
viii ---7 
A cause celebre that engrossed much of Scotland came 
245- 
to be known as the Douglas Cause .. This tangled and 
protracted legal case involved the factual determination 
of birth. The conflicting claim of Archibald Douglas 
putative son of Lady Jean Douglas was set against the in- 
terests of the collateral heir the Duke of Hamilton. The 
issue was whether Archibald Douglas was the legitimate son 
of Lady Jean as she maintained and thus. would inherit the 
estates of her brother or whether this son was an imposter 
and the rightful heir of the Douglas estates was the Duke 
of Hamilton. Elaborate arguments were made on behalf of 
245. Archibald Douglas v. Duke of Hamilton, House of Lords, 
2 Paton 143, Scots Revised Reprints 1.405. 
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both sides , and the legal aspects of this case found 
247 
their way into the House of Lords which reversed the Court 
249 
of Session's ruling in favor of Hamilton . Boswell as 249 
a young advocate became an active partisan on the victorious 
246. (Sir Adam Fergusson, Bart. ), Memorial for George-James 
Duke of Hamilton, Marquis of Dougalas, Earl of Angus-, 
& c. Lord Douglas Hamilton, and their Tutors, and Sir 
Hew Dalrymple of Northberwick, Baronet, Pursuers, AGAINST 
The Person pretending to be Archibald Steward, alias 
Douglas, only son now on life of the marriage between 
Colonel John Stewart, afterwards Sir John Stewart of 
Grandtully, and Lady Jane Douglas, sister- eg rman of 
Archibald Duke of Douglas, Defender. TO WHICH ARE 
ANNEXED, Sequel of the Memorial: in which the Objections 
urged by the Defender to the Conduct of the Cause, 
on the part of the Pursuers, considered; AND APPENDIX: 
containing Parallel Cases suppositio partus_: and Remarks 
on the French Cases quoted the Defender. (24 January 
1767). 
A°"Summary of the Speeches, Arguments, and Determinations 
Ff the Right Honourable the Lords of Council and Session 
in Scotland, upon that important Cause, wherein His 
Grace the Duke of Hamilton and Others were Plaintiffs, 
and Archibald Douglas of Douglass, Es ., Defendant. With an, '. Introductory Preface, än imprti l and distinct Account of this SUE,. Bgiving ya arrister at Law, 
(London: J. Almon, 1767). 
-----This work is attributed to James Boswell, cf: 
Pottle, The Literary Career of James Boswell, esq., 
pp. 293-294. 
Percy Fitzgerald, Lady Jean: A Study of the'Douglas 
Cause, (London: T. FF[-her Unwin, ' 1904)-. o 
Lady Jean Douglas, Letters 
247.27 February 1769; Archibold Francis Steuart, The 
Douglas Cause, pp. 136-177. 
24S. July 1767; Steuart, pp. 41-135. 
24q. James Boswell, Dorando, ed. Robert Hunting, '(Orono: 
Puckerbush Press, 1974). 
Frederick A.. Pottle, "The Incredible Boswell", Blackwoods 
Magazine, August 1925, vol. 218, pp. 149-165. 
----, "Three New Legal Ballads by James Boswell", 37 
Juridical Review (1925), pp. 201-211. 
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Douglas side. Boswell's passion and enthusiasm for Douglas 
encouraged-him to try to inveigle Johnson into his camp. 
Although the final legal determination was made in the Lords, 
Boswell the patriotic scot, considered the Douglas case 
2äc 
to be a landmark in Scottish civil litigation and history 
It was for this reason that Boswell recognized that 
the vigorous propaganda campaign would always continue, and 
he clearly hoped to add the moral force and judgment of 
Johnson to the Douglas banner. Unfortunately for Boswell, 
or) 251 
Johnson had little comment4or interest in this case 0 
However, Boswell did succeed in drawing out from Johnson 
his opinion on the considerations that should be reviewed 
in formulating a judgment: 
The. great Douglas Cause was at this time a 
very general subject of discussion. I found 
he (Johnson) had not studied it with very much 
attention, but had only heard parts of it oc- 
casionally. He, however, talked of it, and 
said, 'I am of opinion that positive proof of 
fraud should not be required of the plaintiff, 
but that the Judges should decide according .° as probability shall appear to preponderate, 
granting to the defendant the presumption of 
filiation to be strong in his favor. And I 
think too, that a good deal of weight should 
be allowed to the dying declarations, because 
they were spontaneous. There is a great dif- 
ference between what is said without our being 
urged to it, and what is said. from a kind of 
compulsion. 
252. 
The significant legal points in these remarks focus on 
the test for fraud and what should be considered in deter- 
2S'Q. Life V, p. 28 
251. Life II, p. 230, n. 1. 
252.. Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
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mining the veracity of testimony. For the testing of 
fraudulent filiation, Johnson echoes the opinion of Lord 
Strichen's citation ffont Stair: 
Filiation is presumed from marriage, whereby 
the children are presumed to be the lawful 
children-of those who are proved to have been 
married; which is yet more pregnant and favour- 
able on the part of the children, to give them 
the right of aliment and succession, and is the 
probation of the marriage betwixt those who are 
presumed parents, which is so strong a presumption, 
253 
Johnson's judgment on the degree of truth inherent in dying 
declarations reflects his religious inclinations. He 
seems reluctant to impuu h the statements made by Lady Jean 
and her husband Sir John while they rest on their deathbeds. 
The seriousness with which Johnson approached religion 
and conscience cannot necessarily be ascribed to Lady Jean 
or'Sir John. Moreover, the successful completion of such 
an elaborate and profitable scheme militates against the 
severe examination of motive and truth. At the very least,, 
the'affection engendered in the relationship between an 
adopted child and these parents as well as vanity and pride 
would encourage the Steuarts to affirm their testimony. 
Boswell, whose interest in Douglas was as intense as 
2514 
his advocacy of Paoli , tried to elicit more remarks 
253. quoted in Steuart, The Douglas Cause, p. 53; Lord 
Stair, The Institutions of the Laws of Scotland, 
Bk. 4, Tit. 45. 
2511. James Boswell, The Journal of a Tour to Corsica; & 
Memoirs of Pascal Paoli, ed. S. C. Roberts, Cambridge, 1923). 
Moray McLären, Corsica Boswell: Paoli, Johnson and 
Freedom, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1966 . 
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r from Johnson. However, when Boswell was successful, he 
could not have been pleased: 
If L. Mr. Douglas be indeed the son of Lady 
Jane, he cannot be hurt; if he be not her son, 
and yet has the great estate of the family of 
Douglas, he may well submit to have a pamphlet 
against him by Andrew Stuart. Sir, I. think such 
a publication does good, as it does good to show 
us the possibilities of human life. And, Sir, 
you will not say that the Douglas cause was a 
cause of easy decision, when it divided your 
Court asrnuch as it could do, to be determined 
at all. When your Judges were seven and seven, 
the casting vote of the President must be given 
on one side or other; no matter, for my argument, 
on which; one of the other must be taken; as 
when I am to move. the ie. is r+o mai-Ve i- u* ch keg 
Y"o-j e fh-tý I S, ,r, it way-u-F-hev^w 1scL No, Strj a. vp, or e duti t oLL% 
dý-Fe. -vrýýýnaý; avý oý es ýy g U-9 L 
4i try Cännol-bt-""& 25 
Indeed, Johnson's remarks should not be, read as pique at 
Boswell's insistence or his antipathy toward Mansfield who 
256 
vigorotisl 3 supported Douglas But rather Johnson's 
honest opinion on this scandal and his dismay at the mob 
and riot in Edinburgh that accompanied the affair. 
---- ix ---- 
Sir Allan Maclean v. the Duke of Argyle (Faculty Decisions, 
29 June 1781) is another. case of protracted litigation over 
landed property. The complicated dispute involved Maclean 
-trying to regain parts of his 
family-estate now in the-control 
255. Life II, p. 230. 
256. Steuart, pp. 142-150; Life IV, p. 178. 
"185 
of the Duke of Argyle. Johnsondoes not comment on the 
merits of the action but does exhibit sympathetic concern 
257 
for his friend entangled in the legal process: 
Of lawsuits there is no end; poor Sir Allan 
must have another trial, for which, however, 
his antagonist cannot be much blamed, having 
two Judges on his side. I am more afraid of 
the debts than of the House of Lords. It is 
scarcely to be imagined to what debts will 
swell, that are daily increasing by small 
additions, and how carelessly in a state of 
desperation debts are contracted. 
25g 
What these comments do indicate is the interest of the 
practical man of affairs who is aware°and disturbed at the 
expense and trouble that going to the law incur. S . 
Moreover, Johnson understands in this case as in both 
the Auchinleck matter and the Douglas Cause the attraction 
and needs of family tradition. In these cases the issues 
of property are entwined with inheritance and social 
position. Boswell, Douglas, and Maclean are men to whom 
social position and family history are bound up with landed 
estates. These cases corroborate the argument that "a 
concept of property-inseparable-from-personality- served 
25ry 
well the-social polity of a pre-industrial era" And 
this abstraction is not lost on Johnson who maintained that 
civilization required a committed class of persons to 
257. Life V, pp. 343,373,380. 
258. LifeIII, p. 127. 
25g. Walton H. Hamilton, "Property-According to Locke", 
41 Yale Law Journal (1931-32), p. 896. 
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ensure stability in Society 
26O. Although Johnson's legal 
contributions to these cases were not uniform, the philo- 
scphical and social questions raised find their way into 
his general jurisprudential thinking. All of these con- 
cerns and questions constitute the foundation for Johnson's 
understanding of relationships among law, individual, and 
society. 
_---X---- 
The major legal comments of Johnson recorded by Boswell 
in. the Life must always be read with a caveat in respect 
261 
to the reporting Boswell created a personality that 
26a. 
presents his own view of Johnson ; nevertheless, skepticism 
should not run rampant. The value of Johnson's comments 
lies inthe reflection and indication of his habits of mind. 
Despite the incidents of Boswell's shaping, the quality of 
Johnson's legal comments remains true to the fundamental 
concerns expressed in his own writings. The inconsistency, 
his moral emphasis, the advocate's mask, and an under- 
standing of the vicissitudes of life are threads that appear 
(n *he. +ape. s+t- j 'ý4 + rtye a, ls To hýntov, `l-h2 rnar. &r4. +41 to }-er, 
260. ' cf. footnote 24. '. 
261,. Life II, p. 220: "Talking of law cases, he said, 'the 
English reports, in general, are very poor; only the 
half. of what has been said is taken down; and of that 
half, much is mistaken, whereas, in Scotland, the arguients 
on each side are deliberately put in writing, to be 
considered by the Court.. I think a collection of your 
cases; upon subjects of importance with the opinions of 
the judges upon them, would be valuable. " 
26a. Richard B. Schwartz, Boswell's Johnson: A Preface to the Tom' ýjý 
"Life, (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin, 1978); William R. 
Sie e nschuh,. Form and Purpose in Boswell's Biographical 
Works, (Berkeley: U in v. of CaliTornia, 1972 . 
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A picture of the style. of Johnson's legal reasoning 
emerges from these cases. Johnson shows humanitarian impulses 
that resemble those of the philospphes, 
263yet 
evolve from the 
writings of 17th-century Christian humanists. These impulses 
give definition to the moral component Johnson findsUn the 
jurisprudential aspects of the law. However, Johnson appre- 
ciates the dichotomy between what the law is and what the law 
should be. For he respects the paradoxes inherent in any 
legal system controlled by man, and one that is based pri- 
marily on the principles governing advocacy proceedings. Cer- 
tainly, there is a logic in Johnson's approach to an indi- 
vidual case, but this approach is confined by the specific 
terms on which each case is argued.. There is no pattern or 
system to the specific legal positions Johnson advances, but 
there is an adherence to the principles of the working advo- 
. 
26V 
cate . This does not mean that Johnson abdicates his moral 
presumption, for ultimately his moral outlook affects his 
legal reasoning. And it is the problem of reconciling his 
moral disposition with the demands of the advocate's role 
that distinguishes JohnsonTs idiosyncratic positions. It 
is this feature in Johnson's legal argumentation that illu- 
minates the broad, general quality of his mind which grasps 
the range of 'justifying reasons' for the actions of man. 
These cases require Johnson to operate in the practical world 
of conflicting interests, and to confront-the world of legal 
demands with moral judgments. 
263. Gay, II, p. 31. 




Chambers who succeeded Blackstone as Vinerian Pro- 
2 
fessor of Law at Oxford was a protege of Johnson's 
Although Chambers was a skilled attorney and former 
judge in Bengal, he, nevertheless, required assistance 
from Johnson in framing the lectures he delivered as 
Vinerian Professor. While it may be logical to assume 
that Johnson's counsel took the form of organizing 
material and shaping language, it was not limited to 
those functions but included substantive comment on 
legal philosophy and on the law itself. This is partic- 
ularly evident in those passages that are of antiquarian 
and historical interest. Johnson's contribution to. these 
3 
lectures is attested to by Mrs. Thrale and intimated by 
4 
Boswell in his catalogue of Johnson's associations. 
5 
E. L. McAdam has gathered together and collated much of 
. 
1. Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) held the first 
Vinerian chair (1758-1763) and was also principal 
of New Inn in 1761. 
Sir Robert Chambers (1737-1803) succeeded Blackstone 
in 1766 and held the Vinerian chair until 1774, but 
received special permission from the University to 
hold it for three more years. Chambers was elected 
principal of New Inn in 1766. 
2. Life V, p. 482,16- travel to New Castle; Life I, p. 
274- affectionate letters; Life II, p. 264- New 
Castle trip. 7 
3. Mrs. Thrale, Thraliana: The Diary of Mrs. Hester 
Lesch Thrale (Later Mrs. Piozzi) 1776-1806, ed. 
Katharine C. Balderston, 2 vols, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1942), p. 204. 
4. Life V, pp. 62,482. 
5. E. L. McAdam, 'Johnson's Law Lectures for Chambers: 
An Addition to the Canon', 15 Review of English 
Studies 1939, pp. 385-391. 
'Dr. Johnson's Law Lectures for Chamber, 
II , 16 Review of English Studies 1940, pp. 159-168. 
, Dr. Johnson and the English Law, 
-(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951). 
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the information on the relationship between Johnson and 
Chambers. However, two distinguished legal scholars 
6,7 
Sir Arnold McNair and H. G. Hanbury disclaim Johnson's 
8 
involvement to the extent that McAdam and others accept. 
Also it is to be noted that Sir John Hawkins makes no 
mention of this aspect of the Johnson-Chambers relation- 
9 
ship in his biography 
There has been no proper investigation or analysis 
of Johnson's contribution to these lectures in terms of 
his own jurisprudential thinking. Johnson's jurispru- 
dence must be seen as an integral part of his general 
philosophical outlook regardless of its conflicting and 
idiosyncratic nature. No coherent system of Johnson's 
legal philosophy emerges from these lectures. However, 
what may be discerned is the conservative jurisprudence 
of a forceful moral philosopher. This conservative dis- 
6. Sir Arnold McNair, K. C., Dr. Johnson and the Law, 
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1948), pp. 77-79. 
7. H. G. Hanbury, The Vinerian Chair and Legal Education, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), pp. 14,52-56. 
8. W. J. Bate, Samuel Johnson, (New York and London: Har- 
court Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 418-421. 
Paul Fussel, Samuel Johnson and the Life of Writing, 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 29. 
Donald J. Greene, The Politics-of Samuel Johnson, 
(1960; rpt. New York and London: Kennikat Press, 
1973), pp. 192-197,317, note 27. 
Samuel Johnson, Political Writings, ed. Donald J. 
Greene, The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel John- 
son Vol. X, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 
pp. 290,303. 
S. Krishamunti, 'Johnson and the Law Lectures of 
Robert Chambers', 44 Modern Language Review 1949. 
9. Sir John Hawkins, Knt., The Life of Samuel Johnson, ed. 
Bertram H. Davis, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962). 
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position predominates especially in the discussion of 
historical events and in an appreciation of natural law 
concepts. An emphasis on the-concept of property and 
its legal and social ramifications maintains a traditional 
10 
approach to the central issue of-the lectures. The 
lectures reflect Johnson's influence in its effort to con- 
cur with the ideas of Blackstone especially where they 
develop questions of*property law. The basic structure 
of these lectures of course closely parallels that of 
Blackstone's commentaries as well as following the scheme 
of issues and topics covered by Justinian's Corpus Juris 
11 
Civis. However as in many positions that Johnson 
advances, his view of the sanctity of these rights is 
elastic and can temper this unusual conservative trend 
12 
to the factual situation. Again this evidences Johnson's 
intellectual fluctuations and underscores the lack of a 
coherent systematic philosophy. It is actually a tribute 
to Johnson's intellectual perspicacity that he. is willing 
to view a situation in particular, then generalize rather 
10. cf. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the 
Law, (1941; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 
pp. 167-180j for a discussion of property in the eight- 
eenth century. 
11. cf. appendix II. 
12. cf. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, 4 vols., 4th edition (Oxford, 1770). 
J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitu- 
tional History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 
pp. 160-213, 
Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law, 
1955; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 
W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 16 
Volumes, (London: Methuen & Co., 1903). 
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than fit the particular into a preconceived system or 
theory. Here Johnson shows a style of mental flexibility 
13 
that is common to the best practicing advocates. 
These lectures provide an opportunity to see Johnson 
as a moral philosopher in the Enlightenment tradition. 
The law permits scientific enquiry into the way general 
principles can govern factual situations, and Johnson's 
jurisprudential writings show these connections most clearly 
in his exposition of legal-historical events. While his 
observations are not always lucid from the perspective of 
. 
the twentieth century, the legal principles on which John- 
son's explanations are based indicate an appreciation for 
systematic characterization. Yet, Johhson's method and 
thought process lend credence to Adam Smith's comment: 
11 
Every-system of a positive law may be 
regarded as a more or less imperfect 
attempt towards a system of natural 
jurisprudence, or towards an enumera- 
tion of the particular rules of justice.... 
14 
What exists in these passages of legal-historical activity. 
is the realization that the rules of justice can defy proper 
organization. Indeed, Johnson's great interest in concepts 
15 
of equity underscores problems in the reconciliation of. 
fact, law, and justice. 
13. Joseph Wood Krutch, Samuel Johnson, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1944), p. 370. 
14. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (London, 
1759), * p. 608. 
15. cf. Life III, p. 22; Johnson's relationship with Henry 
Ballow who published A Treatise of' Equity (London, 1737). 
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The text of A Course of Lectures on the English 
Law is housed in'the manuscript collection of the British 
16 
Library. The manuscript comprises eighteen volumes 
bound and in the legible script of an amanuensis. The few 
marginal notes are written in the same hand, and must be 
considered addenda of the scribe and probably inserted by 
17 
Chambers' dictation or that of an editor. These lectures 
attempt to amplify Blackstone's Commentaries and develop 
a reasoned approach toward a more modern outlook of the 
law. Also it attempts to rectify Blackstone's neglect of 
important historical considerations as well as suggest 
additional reasons and interpretations of important legal 
principles. The introductory lecture to each section 
frames the issues on the individual topics to be offered. 
Each lecture discusses the range of historical, philosophi- 
cal, and technical questions involved. The tone and tex- 
ture are-of more general concerns than Blackstone's, yet 
do not neglect making a substantial contribution to the 
body of legal reasoning. 
Following Blackstone's seminal work, Chambers' lec- 
18 
tures have been ignored. For us, however, the prime 
value lies in the influence and considerable contribution 
Johnson made to these lectures. Not all the lectures were 
16. Kings Mss., volumes 80-97, approximately 1600 pages. 
17. cf. Sir Charles Harcourt Chambers, Knt., editor, A 
Treatise on Estates and Tenures by the late Sir Robert 
Chambers, Knt., Chief Justice of Bengal, (London: 
Joseph Butterworth and Son, and Dublin: J. Cooke, 1824). 
18. Dr. Thomas M. Curley of Bridgewater State College is now 
doing research for a two-volume edition of Sir Robert 
Chambers' A Course of Lectures on the English Law. 
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written or influenced by Johnson,. and it is difficult 
to distinguish clearly which were fully written by whom. 
Moreover, as McAdam his indicatedjthis can only be ascer- 
19 
tained by stylistic investigation and comparison. In 
the description of the results of his research, McAdam 
writes: 
The major fault in Chambers is longwind- 
edness. He is rarely able to make a point 
succinctly. At times there is a trace of 
Johnsonian bälance and periodicity, but 
it is the form without the substance. 
Habitual readers of Johnson will recall 
that his style never seems mechanical or 
contrived: however formal, it is his 
natural manner of speech. Moreover, when 
Johnson generalizes, he never leads the 
reader for long througha cloud of abstrac- 
tions: at frequent intervals an apt illustra- 
tion, a simple example, lights the way. So 
also with his latinity of vocabulary, which 
has been much exaggerated. He seldom, 
unless he is being jocular, uses more than 
a few learned words without some blunt 
Anglo-Saxon to set them off. 20 
Unfortunately, there are many passages which seem neutral 
or cannot be attributed with any assurance to Johnson. 
But what is clear is that Johnson did aid Chambers and 
was aware of the problems Chambers had with 'beginning': 
I suppose you are dining and supping, and 
lying in bed. Come up to town, and lock 
yourself up from all but me, and I doubt 
not but Lectures will be produced. You 
must not miss another term. 21 
19. cf. Appendix I, for my analysis of the writing styles 
of Johnson and Chambers. 
20. McAdam, p. 72. 
21. Samuel Johnson, The Letters of Samuel Johnson, ed. 
R. W. Chapman, vol 1.1719-1774, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952), Letters 187.2; 211.1. 




Indeed, Johnson's own professed procrastination and 
inertia enabled him to empathize with Chambers and pro- 
vide both the encouragement and the guidance needed to 
complete the lectures. 
In Chambers' scheme for the lectures, the mind of 
Johnson is most evident in its subtle expression of 
societal values. Moral beliefs that Johnson not only 
accepts but wishes to inculcate are woven into the fabric 
of these lectures. The lectures also reveal that they 
have absorbed basic principles of Blackstone's method. 
In his discussion of Blackstone, Boorstin understands the 
attempt to find a rational structure of law and society: 
In this quest for the rational principles 
of the law, Blackstone was satisfying the 
eighteenth-century desire to methodize 
and make a 'science' of the data of experi- 
ence. The charm of the Science of Law was 
great; it was witness to the power of man's 
reason, to the beauty of English Institutions 
and, ultimately, to the Intelligence of God. 
23 
Naturally, Johnson could not resist the intellectual exer- 
cise and the potential for influence that these lectures 
24 
would provide. Johnson, who was proud of his legal acumen, 
was not immune from this type of Ciceronian pride: 
Igitur doctissimis viris roficisci placuit 
a lege, haud scio an recte, si mo o, ut 
22. Samuel Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, ''and Annals, ed. E. L. 
McAdam, Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde, The Yale Edi- 
tion of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vol I, (New Haven 
and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1958), Easter Eve April 
18,1772, p. 146. 
23.. Boorstin, p. 23. 
24. Life III, p. 309-310. 
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idem definiunt, "lex est ratio summa insita 
in natura, quae iubet ea, quae fä enda sunt, 
prohibetque contraria. eadem ratio cum est in 
hominis mente confirmata et confecta, 1ex est. 
t 
The opportunity to help Chambers fashion his treatise ful- 
fills Johnson's internal desire to influence not only the 
general culture but clearly also the way in which the law 
26 
affects society. It is the large scope of human activ- 
27 
ity which the law covers that attracts Johnson. Con- 
cepts of law, justice, man, and God constitute the sub- 
stance of jurisprudence. These lectures enable Johnson 
to project an overview of society and analyze its meta- 
physical and historical components in a broad sweep. 
While Johnson's interest includes the minutiae of the 
legal process, the introductory lectures especially 
reflect a broad vision and authority. 
Naturally, it is Chambers who provides the scrutiny 
of the workings of the legal process and procedure. How- 
ever, Chambers' collaboration with Johnson admits not 
only Johnson's broad structure but also incidents of his 
28 
familiarity with specific facets of legal lore. It is 
25. Cicero, *Dc Legibüs, Book I, v. 18, ed. Clinton Walker 
Keyes, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 
p. 316. 
26. G. B. Hill, Johnsonian'Mi'scellanies, Sir Brooke 
Boothby, i. 223. 
27. W. J. Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson, (New 
York and London: Oxford Univ. Press, . 
28. E. S. Roscoe, 'Dr. Johnson and the Law', Johnson Club 
Papers'by Various Hands, (London: Fisher Unwin, MU), 
pp. 125-136.1 
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for this reason that insignificant portions of the lec-' 
tures Chambers can only be described as the nominal author, 
Nevertheless, where in the lectures there is a systainatic 
treatment of the law,. this must usually be attributed to 
Chambers. In spite of the difficulties there are enough 
passages where Johnson's style and ideas predominate to 
attempt, an analysis of his jurisprudence. The focus of 
this chapter will be on those passages that are clearly 
Johnsonian but will'not ignore those sections which show 
either close collaboration or indicate authorial dispute. 
----i---- 
With Chambers' inability to begin working on the 
lectures recognized, it is natural that the first lecture 
Clearly shows Johnson's influence. "Lecture 1 of the Law 
of Nature, the Revealed Law and the Law of Nations, the 
Primary Sources of the Law of England" is illustrative of 
Johnson's language and his thought process. Johnson, a 
29 
skilled writer of introductions. and prefaces, employs a 
style and language free from the encumbrances of legal 
terminology. Since the lectures were expected to be 
read aloud as well as studied, it is natural that John- 
son's conversational style would determine the structure 
30 
and diction of the lectures. In'this introductory 
lecture Johnson's catalogue of stylistic devices, i. e. 
29. Allen T. Hazen, ' Samuel' Johnson's Prefaces'and'Dedica- 
tions, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, . 
30. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Prose Style"of Samuel-Johnson, 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 74-78. 
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31 
parallelism, antithesis, and inversion mix pleasantly 
to suggest an ease and elegance of expression. The 
characteristic style is readily apprehended in the 
apologia: 
My fears proceed from Discouragements peculiar 
to myself. Professors like Princes are exposed 
to censure not only by their own defects, but 
by the virtues of their own Predecessors. I 
am-to read and explain the Laws of England, 
from a place just vacated, by a man equally 
eminent for extent of knowledge and Elegance 
of diction, for-strength of Comprehension and 
clearness of Explanation. That by the choice 
of this learned University I am called into his 
office, as it depresses my Hopes, must excite 
my Diligence. Abilities no man has the Power 
of conferring on himself, but Fidelity and 
Industry are always attainable. I hope to 
erect such a Fabrick of Juridical knowledge as 
may stand firm by its Solidity, though it 
should not please by its Elegance, and shall 
think it sufficient to mould those materials 
into strength, which only the Genius of a 
BLACKSTONE could polish into Lustre. 
32 
Language'structure that is easy and clear obviously ap- 
peals to auditory reception'. As the abstract quoted 
above indicates, Johnson's presentation proves to be most 
33' 
effective. Both the style and diction are appropriate 
to facilitate'retention and to confirm the learning pro- 
cess. This sleek and understandable language differenti- 
ates Johnson's wording from the usual contortions of 
Chambers' diction. 
it is Johnson's ability to set out succinctly the 
historical precedents and explain legal concepts that 
31. ibid, pp. 15-23,38-45,67-71. 
32. Kings'80, pp. 3-4. 
33. 'L'ife IV, pp. 236-237- remarks on Johnson's conversa- 
to al methods and style. 
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constitute his principal-function in the writing of these 
lectures. However, the focus of this investigation is on 
those ideas of Johnson's that can be discerned in the 
text. 'Lecture 1' is a discussion of natural law concepts 
and the-origin of positive institutions: 
The Laws of England like those of-other 
Christian Nations, consist partly of 
local and occasional Rules framed or 
adopted for the Government of this particu- 
lar'Society, partly of those which oblige 
men considered as Men, independantly of 
the Revealed Law oGod. In order there- 
fore to trace to this Fountain Head our 
Juridical Constitution,, I . shall in the 
present Discourse consider the Foundation 
of Natural Law and the 
Difference,, of Obligation between that and 
the revealed Law of God, the original of 
Government & of Positive Institutions, 
that general Division of Positive Law 
which*I propose hereafter to observe in 
explaining the Law of England....... 
34 
This lecture begins its discussion with an exposition of 
the relationship between legal morality and natural law. 
An attempt to articulate the demands of human activity 
within the need for'governance'and the impact of a 
Superior. Being forms the basis of legal theory. Utility 
is not lost sight of nor is the understanding of human 
. conduct that determines aýmerciful sense of justice. In 
his criticism of Blackstone, ' Bentham as well as Johnson 
understands this problem in the attempt to find an answer 
in the principle 'of'utility: 
It: is the principle of utility, accurately 
apprehended and steadily applied, that 
affords the only clue to guide a man through 
34. Kings 80, pp. 6-7. 
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these straits. It is for that, if any, and 
for that alone to furnish a decision which 
neither party shall dare in theory to disavow. 
It-is something to reconcile men even in 
theory. -They are at least, something nearer 
to an effecutal union, than w en at variance 
as well in respect of theory as of practice. 
35 
While Bentham's response differs slightly from the 
36 
approach of Johnson, they both appreciate the problems 
inherent in the conflicts between the revealed natural 
law and the positive law of man. This enlightened view- 
point reflects the complexity of Johnson's political and 
37 
sociological thinking. 
Johnson's position in this debate on the validity 
38 
and relevance of concepts of natural law theory rests 
on his ability to evade religious-bound ideology and to 
concentrate on demands made by changing social and 
philosophical ideas. This is not to say that Johnson 
did not use aspects of natural law theory to evaluate or 
determine a rational standard from which the law can 
operate, but he utilized the many doctrines associated 
with the natural law to derive workable legal theory and 
procedure. Johnson treads an ambiguous path between the 
35. Jeremy Bentham, A Fra ent'on'Government, ed. F. C. 
Montague, (1891, rpt. Oxford: Lowe & Brydone, Ltd., 
1951), XX, p. 214. 
36. Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson the Moralist, (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press., 1961), pp. 68-69: Te import- 
ance of Bentham lies in his use of utility and the 
way Johnson's thinking fits into the development of 
this concept. 
37. Greene, The Politics ' of' 'Samuel' Johnson, p. 195. 
38. Gay, ' The -Enlightenment: ; /-N Interpretation, vol 2 The 
'Science of Freedom, pp. 455-461; for a discussion of 
the debate on the natural law raging among Enlighten- 
ment figures. 
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natural law revealed by a Superior Being and the natural 
law created by the repository of common ideals articula- 
ted by wise men. In this way Johnson, the strict adher- 
ent of Christian principles, is able to accommodate' 
Bentham to utilitarianism with those substantive princi- 
ples of the natural law that he deems relevant and reason- 
able. In essence, Johnson offers a continual reconstruc- 
tion of natural law principles and terminology along the 
lines set down by Grotius,. yet is content to adapt 
method and language to sustain the 'traditional goals of 
natural law theory. 
Debate between natural law and positivist law con- 
cepts constituteSthe substance of this introduction. 
Johnson's language provides a subtle loophole through 
which many may exercise control: 
Law if taken in its largest Sense, for 
any kind of Rule or Canon whereby Actions 
are directed, is common to man with that 
Being who hath created and governs all 
things, not arbitrarily, not according to 
his Will only but according to the counsel 
of his Will, according to that Rule of 
acting which unlimited Wisdom hath pre- 
scribed to unlimited Power 39 
it is by making use of this loophole that society is able 
to adapt and prosper. Johnson recognizes the need for a 
sense of justice that is not rigid. In this way Johnson 
reflects Grotius' thought that "the assertion that com- 
40 
mand is not the essence of law". This maxim on the nature 
39. Kings 80, p. 7. 
40. A. P. D'Entreves, ' Natural Law: ' Ani Historical' Survey, 
(1951; rpt., New Yor : Harper and Row, , p. . 
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I 
of natural law indicates a Johnsonian theme that runs 
through the lectures. But most important the wisdom of 
41 
this maxim underscores Johnson's affection for Grotius 
and enables him to embrace natural law concepts that are 
consistent with non-Catholic thought. "The Nominalist 
doctrine that the will of God is the ultimate source of 
morality had played a prominent part in Protestant The- 
ology and ethics. Grotius was a Protestant, but as a 
follower of Arminius, he rejects the extreme Calvinist 
view of the absolute sovereignty of God. But he was 
also a jurist, and his vindication of natural law was 
further devised to meet the 'new and dangerous challenge 
42 
of the absolute sovereignty of the State". In this 
tradition of Grotius, Johnson advances a secular natural 
law theory whose function is based on reason and avoids 
internecine ecclesiastical controversy or interference. 
At the beginning of the lectures it is proper to 
question the ramifications of the natural law and to set 
out a position for evaluation. The terms and scope of 
the enquiry in this area Johnson frames in a way that 
echoes Aquinas: 
........ the Laws then with which we have 
any concern, and which indeed are most 
properly termed .. 'Laws, are those only that flow either expressly or by influence from 
the Will of a Superior. 43 
41. Life II, p. 430. 
42. D'Entreves, p. 71. 
43. Kings 80, p. 8. 
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Johnson begins to probe the question about the essence of 
the law. "The old discussion about'the nature of ius - 
whether ius quia iustum or ius quia iussum was more than 
44 
an etymological quibble". The discussion which pays 
attention and obliquely homage to the presence of a 
Supreme Being is at the foundation of. the legitimacy of 
the natural law. Nature functions as a guiding power 
that allows man to navigate among the demands of society 
and the sometime troublesome requirements of theology. 
In his discussion of natural-law Bryce sums up the ess- 
ence of this concept in a way similar to that which John- 
son accepts: 
Being the work of Nature, they are not only 
wider in their area, but also of earlier 
origin than any other rules or customs. They 
are essentially anterior in thought as well 
as in date to the laws each community makes 
for itself, for they belong to the human race 
as a"whole. Hence they are also deemed to be 
higher in moral authority than the laws 
which are peculiar to particular communities, 
for these may be enacted today and repealed 
tomorrow, and have force only within-certain 
local limits. 45 
The ethical force which Johnson believes to be the power 
behind the law must have its direction understood in the 
action of men. Imperfection in man requires the guidance 
of God as Johnson suggests: 
By the Laws of his Creator howsoever promul- 
gated, man as a created Being is naturally 
and necessarily bound, and as an Imperfect 
44. D'Entreves, p. 64. 
45. James Bryce, ' Studies" in' History' and Jurisprudence, 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press American Branch, 1901), 
pp. 564-565. 
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Being he is the proper Subject of their 
Direction. For to say nothing of the Cor- 
ruption of human nature by the Fall of our 
first Parents, every Man, I believe, is 
conscious that he is not what he might be and 
would wish to be, that he is, to speak with 
the Schoolmen, Potentially more perfect and 
more happy-than he is in Reality. And since 
Perfection and happiness are unquestionably 
most desirable, he who believes God to be 
the Authour and Giver of these, Cannot but 
wish to Know his will, and unless seduced by 
sensual Appetites or inordinate Desires, Can- 
not but choose to follow it. The will of God 
cannot be known but9 
but by Revelation or by the flight of Reason. 
'; r 46 
In this way Johnson is able to acknowledge God, yet util- 
47 
ize a free will that requires man-made laws for society 
to operate. 
In this period the question of natural law was an 
important and controversial one. Lloyd in his discussion 
of legal ideas writes: 
This new age, far from leading to the rejection 
of natural law, may be regarded as the Golden 
Age of natural law, and endured until the end 
of the eighteenth century. The whole emphasis 
now was placed on the rational character of 
natural law. It may be, in the remote sense 
that God created the world and everything in 
it,, that natural law was God-given, but even 
this was not essential, for Grotius, one of 
the leading exponents of the law of nature 
and the founder of international law on a 
natural-Law basis, argued that natural law 
would still apply even if God did not exist. 
This was because the unique quality of man 
lay in his reason and this rational element 
is shared by all mankind. Hence reason dic- 
tated a rational order in human affairs, an 
order which could be elicited by reasoning 
46. Kings 80, pp. 9-10; 
47. ' Life II, pp. 82,104. 
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alone, and which, at any rate in broad 
outline should operate everywhere. 48 
Johnson as the Schoolmen would say is a man in transition 
since he supports the power of'reason yet maintains an 
49 
equally strong belief*in God. It can be'said that in 
the area of natural law, Johnson-sees an evolution of 
legal reasoning from an arch-determinism toward a realism 
that qualifies the terms on which the natural law func- 
tions. 
Since 'this important philosophical tension is review- 
ed in terms of the medieval schdolmen's notion of "Poten- 
(p.. 9) 
-tially more perfect and more happy than he is in Reality", 
Johnson' respects the need for a legal system that emanates 
from the framework of a divin ej'y ordered vision. It is 
the precise inability to discern God's expressed Will yet 
requires one to act in accordance with it that forms the 
basis of the philosophical problem present in natural law 
theory. The argument Johnson advances is loyal to the 
tradition'of Aquinas: 
48. Dennis Lloyd, The Idea'of Law, (Harmondsworth, Middle- 
sex: Penguin Books Lt ., 1973), p. 82. 
49. cf. James Gray, 'Johnson's' Sermons: ' A Study, (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1972); 
Paul Alkon, Samuel' Johnson and Moral Discipline, 
(Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967); 
Chester F. Chapin, 'The Religious Thought of Samuel 
*Johnson, (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 
Leopold Damrosch, " Samuel' Johnson; and the' Tragic 
Sense, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972); 
Maurice J. Quinlan, Samuel' Johnson: ' A Layman's 
Religion, (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 
1964); for studies on the nature of Johnson's 
religious thinking. 
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Cum omnia, quas divinae providentiae sub- 
duntur, a_ lege aeterna regu entur et mensur- 
entur, ut ex dictis patet; manifestem est 
quod omnia part ici pant aliqualiter egem 
aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impre lone 
eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus 
et fines. Inter =cetera autem rationalis 
creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae 
providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsafit 
providentiae particeps, Bibi ipsi et alii s 
providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur 
ratio aeterna, per quam habet natura em 
inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. 
Et talis participatio legis aeternae 




The significant aspect of Johnson's position is that he 
assumes a substantial investment in'the moral component 
of the law. While this nay appear obvious in light of 
Johnson's character and religious writings, it will be 
seen in his comments on positive law that this thread 
runs through all facets of his legal thinking. And this 
thread is not peculiar to these lectures, but it is also 
present in varying strengths when Johnson assumes the 
50. St. Thomas Aquinas, Swnma'Theologica, Questio XCI. - 
De Diversitate Legum, Art. 2: Utrum sit in nobis 
aliqua lex naturalis: 
Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine 
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal 
law, as was stated above (A. I. ); it is evident 
that all things partake somewhat of the eternal 
law, insofar as, namely, from its being imprinted 
on them, they derive their respective inclinations 
to their proper acts and ends. Now among all 
others, the rational creature is subject to 
Divine providence in the most excellent way, 
insofar as it partakes of a share of providence, 
by being provident both for itself and for others. 
Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, 
whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper 
act and end: and this participation of the eternal 





Cicero offers a line of argument for law and right 
reason that is also followed in this lecture. When in 
De'Re Publica Cicero writes: 
...... 'est uidem vera 
lex recta ratio 
naturae. congruens, diffusa in omnes, 
constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad 
officium 'iubendo, vetando a fraude 
deterrent-- 52 
he articulates the guiding terms on which the natural law 
operates.. And it is this principle that seems to lie 
behind Johnson's writing on and understanding of natural 
law theory. While concepts of natural law were contro- 
53 
versial in the eighteenth century, some important as- 
pects of natural law theory was accepted. What is strik- 
ing is the extent to which'Johnson utilizes principles 
of the natural law and weaves them into the texture of 
all the lectures. The substance of which comes primarily 
from the intrinsic value of-moral virtues and less from 
external commands. It is the-ethical component of the 
theory of law that appeals to Johnson. However, this 
does not mean that Johnson advocates a theocratic style 
54 
for the laws that operate in the secular society. But 
51. cf. ap ssim chapter on Boswell, where Johnson is most 
clearly seen in the advocate's role. 
52. Cicero, De ' Re' Publ'ica, Bk., III,, XXII. 
53. cf. footnote 38. 
54. Greene, ' The' Pol'it'ics' of, Samuel Johnson, p. 246,215; 
In writing that "Johnson's conception of the state 
as a purely secular and rational institution", Greene 
not only suggests Hobbes but also implies the inva- 
lidity of theocratic based natural law. 
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what Johnson does advance is a utilitarian aspect neces- 
sary to legal enforcement that requires an. ethical founda- 
ti n for any legal, system to be effective. "He does this 
by not denying the value or importance of a God-head but 
by emphasizing reason and history: 
..... And though human minds thus poorly instructed might, and did, fall into gross 
Errors concerning the Nature and Attri- 
butes of the Deity, and into shocking 
Abominations in their Religious worship, 
yet History will tell us that they (ancient 
people) had no incompetent knowledge of 
Right and Wrong, of the Will of Heaven so 
far as it regards the conduct of individuals 
towards each other. This knowledge, like 
that of all other general and abstract truth 
must have been acquired either, first, by 
Investigation of the Causes why certain 
Actions (are) 11 
are good and others evil, or secondly, by 
observing their consequences and conclud- 
ing, a posteriori, those actions to be good, 
the effects of which are good, and those £ffec -6abc, 
c3n+;. & Whtc h öll nVvNa Ar? ý tý_ikCOU ->'rhe, -62rmw- +h as, 
r ilex ref ýº- uý ry J.; &nA SLI an Acquaintance with 
the divine Attributes, such a-Fhorough aný 
clear conception of the Relations in w'`" 
creatures stand to their Creator, and of 
those that subsist between the Creatures 
themselves, as belongs to few even of the 
most enlightened Reasoners in the most 
enlighten'd Ages, It was by means of the 
latter kind of Argumentation therefore that 
we must suppose the principal and most 
important Rules of Natural Law were first 
learnt, or perhaps we ought rather(to) 12, 
To.. say, have been without Interruption 
'acknowledged, by those who were unacquainted 
with an--y-Heavenly Instructor. 
55 
In this way Johnson certainly pays attention to a divine 
element in natural law theory but suggests an ethical. 
55. Kings 80, pp. 11-13. 
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component is not dependent on the quality of relationship 
between an and deity. Under the cloak of. this religious 
element lies-utility as*a major determinant'in the ethi- 
cal quality of a man in his society. 
Voitle raises-the question of this relationship 
between natural-law and human nature: 
Of course, much depends upon how natural law 
is defined. If, for instance, it is thought 
of as some'complex body of abstract principles 
which govern the behavior of men in society, 
Johnson could hardly have any faith in it 
and at the same time be so pragmatic and 
utilitarian in his approach to political 
and social problems. On the other hand, if 
nature means human nature, as it did to the 
t inkeers who most pro 'oundly influenced John- 
son, and natural law, accordingly, signifies 
certain very simple principles of behavior 
towards others, present, but not dominant, 
in the human psyche, tendencies which mankind 
will more or less uniformly concede to be 
correct and beneficial, because, as Johnson 
always insists, the essential nature of man- 
kind is everywhere the same; then, there need 
be no conflict. 
56 
It. is, of course, evident that Johnson's utilization re- 
quires the blend of the practical with the theoretical; 
however, this does not obviate'theological speculation on 
the natural law as a foundation to the principles covered 
in the'lectures. Johnson's theoretical speculation'on 
natural law principles does conform to the current eigh- 
teenth-century view that fundamental rights were protect- 
ed by the natural law. Lloyd maintains that Locke's 
theory of social contract is based on: 
This view of natural rights cleat% 
I/ 
56. Voitle, pp. 70-71. 
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depended upon belief in the existence of 
natural law, for such rights could only be 
valid and binding by reason of the law of 
nature. - None the less, a distinct change 
of emphasis emerged, for in the past 
. natural law was largely conceived as impos- ing duties and prohibitions where as now 
it was looked to as the source of funda- 
mental democratic rights restricting the 
freedom of rulers, hitherto treated as 
enjoying virtually absolute authority. 
57 
It is in this tradition that Johnson's ideas on the natu- 
ral'lIw flourish. These lectures utilize a God-given 
reason to encourage the drive for happiness to be justly 
achieved: 
Indeed so manifest is the tendency of 
Justice, and other social virtues to pro- 
mote the Happiness of the whole, and of 
every Individual, that no one however 
ignorant, can help assenting to the 
Position that Principles which are pro- 
ductive of such effects, must be bene- 
ficial to mankind in general, and there- 
fore pleasing to God: .......... 
Here then we see the Foundation of 
Natural Law, or as some Writers call it, 
The Law of Reason, which, as I have en- 
deavoured to show,. may be considered-as 13 (the) 
The Will of the Creator, manifested by its 
Conformity to Reason, aºid by its utility to 
his Creatures. 
58 
Arguing from this theoretical base, Johnson evolves a 
concept of natural law thinking whose liberality is im- 
59 
pressive. He is able to suggest an opportunity for 
broad freedoms to be present within the confines of a 
57. Lloyd, p. 84. 
58. Kings 80, pp. 13-14. 
59. Alkon, pp. 85-108. 
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usually conservative system. Essentially, Johnson is 
interested in a*type of internal morality for the law 
which must take its initial force from a Supreme Being. 
Thus, it is necessary for this first lecture to set out 
terms which show this to be true. 
Johnson's emphasis on 'happiness' as a basic quality 
for legal determinations is a theme that runs through 
much of his writing. Not only does this idea of happi- 
60 
ness have its corollary in utilitarianism but for 
Johnson it provides a key to an understanding of his 
general jurisprudential thinking. For example, in Rasse- 
las Johnson's analysis reflects the desire for happiness 
as well as the societal constraints that impede its 
achievement. It is this tension that the law must guide, 
control, and arbitrate. By describing man in general and 
his pursuit of happiness, Johnson sets a course where the 
joys of Eden must navigate among the treacheries of human 
endeavours. Observing the Nature of things, the char- 
acters in Rasselas use their reason to discover natural 
laws and the way in which'they operate. Imlac points out 
that: 
To know anything......, we must know its 
effects; to-see men we must see their 
works, that we may learn what reason has 
dictated, or'passion has incited, and find 
what are the most powerful motives of 
action. To judge rightly of the present 
60. cf. Jeremy Bentham, 'An''Introduction'to'the Principles 
of ' Moral's' and Legislation, for a discussion of his 
princip e,, regtest happiness and its reflection in 
its utility. 
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we must oppose it to the past; for all 
judgment is comparative, and of the future 
nothing can be known. 61 
The implication is that not only does reason play a part 
in the formulation of natural law but that inevitability, 
the inconsistency in law and behaviour, indicate the 
recourse to a concept of God. It is this theme of illu- 
sive happiness in Rasselas that provides justification for. 
the reconciliation of. happiness and utility which gives 
validity to natural law. 
Johnson's understanding of the "Revealed Law of God" 
is not that of a theological dogmatist or ardent apolo- 
62 
gist. He permits this revelation to continue through- 
out his work on a path of right reason that is somewhat 
optimistic. Moreover, in arriving at his position John- 
son first discerns the variances in intention within 
other recognized positions: 
The sole object of Natural Law is the 
Happiness of man in this life, the prin- 
cipal aim of Religion is to teach him the 
way to Eternal Felicity, and as the Per- 
formance of moral Duties conduces to both 
those Ends, they are strongly enjoin'd by 
the precepts of each; though with this 
remarkah/e Difference, that where God him- 
self has condescended by express Revela- 
tion to direct the conduct of men, his 
Canmaids thus notified, (being)14 
being in themselves likewise such as the 
mind cannot but approve, have certainly a 
higher claim to obedience than the mere 
61. Rasselas, ed. J. P. Hardy, pp. 73; ° it" 
62. Chester F. Chapin, The Religious Thought'of Samuel 
Johnson, (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1968). 
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Dictates of Reason, 'just'in the same Pro- 
portiön as the accumulated Evidence for the 
Truih of Scripture, joined to the internal 
Proofs arising from the Fitness of the Rules 
themselves, produce a strong"conviction of 
their divine origin and Authority than 
Arguments drawn from that fitness alone. 63 
In his argument Johnson puts an emphasis on a concept of 
happiness that manifests itself in reasonable human rela- 
tionships. Johnson's juridical vision develops empiric- 
ally as he works from the nature'of man to the activity 
of individuals in society on the basis of ethical judge- 
ments. In other words, in this extract Johnson seeks a 
limited freedom from an external authority in the exer- 
cise of moral choice. However, he does not predicate 
this argument on an absence'of a Supreme Being but allows 
a sense of a religious authority to stimulate man in his 
choice of moral action. 
Grotius understood that: 
ius naturale est dictatum rectae rationis, 
indicans actui alicui', ex ejus convenientia 
aut disconvenient cai um ipsa natura ration'aIi 
ac-sociali, finesse uroralem turpitudinem, auf 
necessitatem uroralem, ac consequenter a 
auctore naturae Deo talem embim auf vetari, 
auf praecipi. 64 
Working from this statement of Grotius, Johnson in his 
introductory lecture posits a strong sense of a religious 
authority for the foundation of the natural law. And 
from this position he develops a thesis for civil govern- 
63. Kings 80, pp. 14-15. 
64. Hugo Grotius, ' De' Jure' Belli: et' Pacis, ed. William 
Whewell, (Cambri ge: At the Univ. Press, 1853), vol. 
I, Chap. 1, X, p. 10. 
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ment. The imprecise nature of historical antecedents 
allows speculation on the motive, need; and evolution of 
civil authority. Here Johnson is able to adopt the skills 
and methods of an anthropologist in his investigation into 
the origin and structure of varied societal groupings. 
The upshot of his conjectures is the concise statement of 
two principles: 
............ But by whatever means 
Politi- 
cal Bodies were first framed, they. are 
clearly supported by these two Foundations, 
1. A Desire of social life, to which both 
Reason and Instinct, (If I may be allow'd 
the Expression) incline Men, and 2. a cer- 
tain Rule of obedience established in every 
State, to which every member of it chooses 
rather silently to submit, than to exchange 
the Protection and Pleasures of society) 17 
Society for the Solitude and Horrors of a 
desert. 
65 
Johnson maintains that the desire for happiness is a 
prime factor in establishing order for society. This 
thesis for happiness provides the underlying foundation 
for the co-operation required to have a legal system 
function. Individual rights as well as duties owed to 
society form the fundamental issues to be resolved in 
any legal system. From his acute understanding of human 
nature, Johnson is able to present the dilemma: 
............ To the Happiness of the 
whole, it will be frequently necessary 
to sacrifice the Happiness of a Part, 
and as no man is naturally willing that 
his Happiness should be diminished to 
65. Kings 80, pp. 17-18. 
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encrease another's, or that the Profit 
should be divided among many, when the 
Labour or the Danger is all his own, it 
is-apparent that some publick Authority 
must be necessary to over-rule single 
Opinion, or private Interest. Nothing 
is more evident from daily Experience, 
than that in every undertaking, in which 
many (are) 18 
are employed there must be one presiding 
superintendant Mind. 
66 
This-view of happiness embodies an organizing principle 
in*the'nature of society that must balance individual 
aspirations with group interest. This essentially utili- 
tarian argument has its antecedents in the ideas of Aris- 
totle: 
Now all the various pronouncements of the 
law aim either at the common interest of 
all, or at the interest of a ruling class 
determined either by excellence or in some 
other similar way; so that in one of its 
senses the term 'just' is applied to any- 
thing that produces and preserves the hap- 
piness, or the component parts of the hap- 
piness, of the political community. 67 
To understand Johnson's use of Aristotle in this lecture, 
it is necessary to review the way in which he develops 
the concept of happiness in Rasselas. 
Both in this lecture and in Rasselas, Johnson's line 
of reasoning advances along the nebulous path of the 
desire for happiness which is explored by the actions of 
his characters. in Rasselas the desire and need for hap- 
piness becomes the predominant value for society. In this 
66. Kings 80, pp. 18-19. 
67. Aristotle, Nicomachean'Ethics, ed. H. Rackhamt (Cam- 
bridge: Harvar iv. Press, --Loeb Classical Library, 
1939), v, i, 13 p. 259. 
215 
way a theological argument is avoided and a secular 
thrust is permitted to break through. There exists a 
Hobbesian element that contradicts Johnson's usual atti- 
68 
tude to Hobbes. This element is evident in the suppo- 
sition concerning a government among fallen men and 
69 
that the sovereign exists to maintain peace". However, 
Johnson does'not completely succumb to this Hobbesian 
70 
thought in his desire to promulgate an objective good. 
As usual, Johnson's ideas are an amalgam of bits and 
pieces taken from the theory of others. Yet Johnson's 
R 
eclectic approach firmly follows the Christian tradition 
which encourages rulers to promote the aspiration for 
happiness in their subjects. 
in Leviathan Hobbes formulates aNdefinition of 
Natural taw: 
A Law of Nature, ' (Lex Nat'ralis) is a Pre- 
cept, or general Rule, oun out by Reason, 
by which a man is forbidden to do. that, 
'ýý 
68. of. 'Sheffield' in Lives of the English Poets, ed. 
G. B. Hill, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 190 II 174.: 
"[Sheffield's] character is not to be proposed as 
worthy of imitation. His religion he may be supposed 
to have learned from Hobbes, and his morality was such 
as naturally proceeds from loose opinions. " 
---- -- ------ -- - -- -- -- -- -.. _. _.. ý--------- -t., ý.. 
69. M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes-'s Science of Politics, (New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, , p. 1779 
70. Voitle, p. 67. . 
0 
216 
which is destructive of his life, or take+k 
away the means of preserving the same; and 
to omit,, that, by which he thinketh it may be 
best preserved. 
71 
While Johnson does not' completely accept this formulation, 
he does not reject'it entirely. This is not to say that 
there is an assensio mentium between Johnson and. Hobbes; 
yet,,, one must pay close attention to the truth of the 
maxim animus hominis est: anima scripti. The process of 
legal reasoning behind Johnson's response to thisdefini- 
. 72 tion is explained more fully earlier. What he does 
scrutinize is the relationship between justice and hap- 
piness. Since Johnson advances a position imitative of 
Hobbes, he is essentially in the mainstream of legal 
thöught-in this period. Harris points out that: 
In this way the eighteenth century modified 
the doctrine of Hobbes. The motive force 
of human action was indeed 'that man should 
pursue his own happiness' but that pursuit 
was not contrary to the well-being of 
society, and indeed could be achieved only 
in the social context. 
. 73 
Because Johnson understood Blackstone's idea of 'corrupt 
74 
reason' in man, he must develop a position that relates 
the evolution of natural law to the need for positive 
71. Thomas Hobbes, ' Leviathan,:, Or the Matter, Forme and 
Power' of' a Co=onwealt ' Ecc esiastica and Civil, 
e d. Michael Oa es ott, (London: Collier Macmillaii 
Publishers, 1975), Chap. 14, p. 103. 
72. cf. footnote 49. 
73. R. W. Harris, ' Reason and Nature, in' 18th' Centur 
-Thought, (London: B an or Press, , p. 66. 
74. * Bl'. ' Comm., Bk. Is, p. 41. 
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law and institutions. 
The transition to positive institutions and the laws 
required for a society to operate is swiftly established 
by Johnson. Succinctly and with an air of intellectual 
defiance, he directs attention to the human conflict in 
rude society that requires the mediation of a 'superin- 
tending force'. Johnson's solid common sense derived from 
observation and experience provides the impetus to his 
words on the need for such governing control: 
There is-therefore a necessity of some 
governing Power, by which those who are 
inclinttýdL to be happy at the cost of 
others may be compelled to their part of 
the general task, -and of a publick wisdom, 
by which private judgement shall be directed 
and contro%, ded. Those to whom this Power 
is entrusted, and this wisdom is imputed, 
are the Governours of Society: the first 
care therefore of every new Society must be 
to select and establish Governours, and 
it's first Law must constitute the Power 
by which future Laws are to be made. 
75 
Historically, this indicates the rudiments on which a 
constitutional structure can be'fashioned. From the 
human need to settle disputes or reconcile conflicting 
interests, Johnson derives the incipient legislative 
process. 
0 
Having established this basic idea of a constitu- 
tional state, Johnson calls all the forms and manifesta- 
tions emanating from it the "Politick Law" (p. 20). He 
defines the control-inherent in the 'Politick Law' as 
well as its function: 
75. Kings 80, p. 19. 
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The Legislative Power thus establish'd 
is hereafter to be exerted in the Security 
of its Constituents from all those evils 
which men can bring upon one another, or 
which the Care and Labour of Men, whence 
soever they proceed, can divert or remove, 
we never hurt each other but by Error or 
by Malice(to) 20 
To the Errors of individual Legislative 
Wisdom is opposed, and to their Malice 
Legis al tive Power. From our-Endeavours to 
secure 'Happiness against Error, arise all 
the formsof conveying and securing Prop- 
erty; which-all in the society are supposed 
to know, ......... 76 
Again, Johnson suggests that concepts of happiness form 
the basis for a contract of which'the prime constituent 
is a well developed sense'of property. An emphasis on 
77 ' 
the utilitarian character in the 'publick law' yields 
an organizing principle for society. The composition of 
this is determined by the set of-legal relations and at- 
titudes involved in property. In this focus on property, 
Johnson in the same way as does Blackstone, sees the 
structure of law and the regulation of society governed 
. 78 
and guided by its protection. Indeed, Johnson sees an 
79 
intricate relationship between law and economic concerns. 
76. Kings 80, pp. 20-21. 
77. William Whewell, ' Lectures* on, the' History of Moral 
'Philosophy in England, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1852). 
78. ' Bl. ' Comm., Bk II, p. 400. 
79. John H. Middendorf, 'Johnson on Wealth and Commerce', 
in Johnson, 'Boswell''and Their_Circle_: Essays Presented 
-to'Lawrence Fitzroy Powell in Honour of his Eighty- 
-Fourth Birthday, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 
pp. 47-64. 
cf. " Adventurer 119; Vditle, ' p. 97. 
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This connection is at the heart of civil society and the 
implication is underscored continually in this discussion 
of natural law and positive'law. 
In his dissertation on Blackstone's Coimnentaries, 
Boorstin writes: 
Thus, whatever confusion there may at 
first seem to have been in saying at once 
that property had been commanded by Nature 
and had been created by the. state, Black- 
stone actually made the two ideas comple- 
mentary. The law of nature had. made-prop- 
erty possible and necessary, but the laws 
of England had fulfilled the possibility, 
and had shown new aspects. of ownership 
which nature herself had not dreamed of. By 
attributing property to this double source, 
the Commentaries had strengthened its 
sanctions. Every right of property which 
was protected by the law of England in Black- 
stone's day thus had ultimately the protection 
of Nature and of Nature's God. 
80 
Since these lectures of Chambers followed Blackstone's 
work, it is easy to understand the tradition in which 
Johnson is working. Throughout the lectures Johnson 
endeavours to refine and articulate the need for security 
of both real and personal property. This desire is not 
only expressed philosophically but is also scrutinized in 
the actual workings of the legal process. The protection 
and security of property is an important current running 
81 
in Johnson's general political consciousness as well. 
80. Boorstin, p. 180. 
81. Greene, 'Johnsonian Critics', 'Essays'in'Criticism, 
Oct. 1960. 
cf. Larkin, ' Property in the ' Eighteenth' Centur , pp. 112-124, for a discussion of the Political aspects 
of Locke's theory on property which provides back- 
ground understanding for Johnson's thinking. 
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After introducing the idea of property, Johnson must 
refine his conceptions of the 'Politick Law'. The con- 
stituents of the publick law are outlined in detail: 
............... that law of Government by which the Supreme Power in a state regu- 
lates its own Conduct and that of its sub- 
ordinate officers, which constitutes the 
Existence, and modifies the Operations of 
the Supreme Legislative Magistrates, which 
directs & limits (where it is limited) the 
Agency of the Supreme Executive, which 
prescribes the mode of Delegation and the 
Authority delegated to all interior publick 
officers, and Consequently comprises all 
the rules relating to the Publick(property) 
22 
Property and Revenue, to councils of State 
and Commerce, to Publick Messengers, Courts 
of Justice, inferior territorial Magistrates, 
the Civil state of Men with their various 
Ranks and Privileges, the different Rights 
of Aliens and Native subjects, the terri- 
tory whose Inhabitants constitute the State 
and such subordinate Governments and Soci- 
eties as are either contained in the State 
or dependent upon it. 
82 
While this abstract of political law is more descriptive 
than analytical, it, nevertheless, suggests broad philo- 
sophical implications. Though casting himself as an 
historian, Johnson suggests by the texture of these 
remarks that he is more the scholarly theoretic»n. The 
diction is. free from legal jargon and exhibits a thought- 
ful stylized idiom that effectively conveys both histori-. 
83 
cal and ideological viewpoints. This catalogue of ele- 
ments indicates Johnson's understanding of the range of 
82. Kings 80, pp. 22-23. 
83. cf. William Vesterman, The Stylistic Life of Samuel 
Johnson, (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1977). 
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political law. The scope of these remarks reflects, once 
again, his sophisticated understanding of law and how it 
-guides society. 
In this definition Johnson sets out a structure for 
political law that-is based on a law-giving God-head. 
Thee 'regulatory" powers ceded to the 'state and the individ'- 
uals in it are able to be perfected within the terms per- 
mitted by the'Supreme'Power. This legislative contract 
eclipses the position of a Supreme Being and replaces it 
with a dominating social structure. ' From this grant of 
power, Johnson sees the evolution o. institutions that 
must consider the various demands made by society. Dele- 
gated authority requires the'establishinent of the machin- 
ery for the civilization to function. Here, Johnson does 
not provide *the 'specific provisions in which 'this machinQ, 'y 
operates but suggests the rules that confer legislative 
powers. Johnson's list of the salient features of public 
law illuminates the tenuous balance inherent in dealing 
with ' the' conflicting interests present in a legal system. 
After this need for'public law has been established, 
the'sanctions that ' require' the development of a criminal 
law are'quickly apprehended. It is society's need for 
both regulation and protection' that encourages the crimi- 
nal law to. grow. in the 'guise *of an historian, Johnson 
narrates the function of the criminal law: 
The End of Criminal Law is to prevent 
those mischiefs which the Depravity of 
the human Heart unaned & unrestrained 
would frequently occasion. its' subjects 
therefore must be the general and special (nature) 
24 
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nature *of crimes whether against the Laws 
of God, the Law of Nations, or the Munici- 
pal Laws of the State, ' the different Degrees 
of. guilt,. the Means of Prevention and the 
Degrees as well as modes of Punishment, 
...................:.......... Crimes are 
considered as more'publick in their nature 
and as offences principally against him 
who is either the supreme magistrate in 
the State, or has the Local Jurisdiction 
over that spot in which the peace of the 
Society has been infringed. Every Publick 
Crime) 
Crime'is indeed a private Injury and Some- 
wha't-more, Murder, Robbery and Maihem 
(for' instance) are at the same time very 
great injuries-to him whose natural & civil 
rights are thereby invaded, and very 
atrocious offences against the Peace'& 
good order of' the Commonwealth. I have 
therefore chosen in my general Distribution 
of Law, to consider. this as a distinct part 
both 'from the Publick' Law of Government, 
and that Private Law By which the particular 
Rights of Subjects are protected. 
84 
This presentation is conclusive in its arrangement of the 
contingencies that form the demand for the criminal law. 
In the criminal law the desire for order and protection 
85 
of the individual finds its regulation and order. Stein 
suggests that "the first aim of legal rules is to ensure 
that members of the community are safeguarded in their 
persons and property. so that their energies'are not ex- 
86 
hausted by the business of self-protection". It is 
this objective that requires the'society to develop an 
effective system to regulate behavior. In this lecture 
84. Kings 80, pp. 24-26. 
85. cf. Jerome Hall, ' Theft',, Law and ' Societ , pp. 34-79 for a discussion of the growth of te criminal law 
in the eighteenth century. 
86. Peter. Stein, John Shand, Legal Values in Western 
Societ , (Edinburgh: Edin. Univ. Press, 19741, p. 31. 
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Johnson understands that it is incumbent upon the chosen 
structure'of government to ensure peace and security. 
And it is with this in mind that he offers his descrip- 
tion of the criminal law as separate from the basic ele- 
ments of public law. 
In suggesting a distinction between 'Publick Law' 
and VPrivate Law', Johnson is working in the tradition of 
87 
Roman law. This Roman law influence shadows much of 
his thought on the development of natural and positive 
88 
law concepts. By employing this distinction'in his 
analysis, Johnson provides a framework which will enable 
him to concentrate his discussion on the multitudinous 
aspects of the private'law. The numerous and intricate 
problems, of the private law have their moral and criminal 
aspects. In later lectures Johnson scrutinizes he Con- 
sideration of this Species' (80, p. 27). But in this 
introductory lecture Johnson's attention is directed to 
the general principles of'moral behavior that determine 
rights and wrongs. Returning the discussion to concepts 
of moral behavior allows-Johnson to affirm his theme of 
the pursuit of human happiness. 
In this regard there develops a connection between 
individuals and the state with'a fused idea of the law of 
nations, 4reason, and nature. ' Johhson*writes: 
87. ibid., p. 33. 
88. cf. W. W. Buckland, Arnold McNair, Roman'Law and Com- 
mon Law, '2nd. ed. revised by F. H. Lawson, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965), - a treatise that reviews 
essential rules and institutions of Roman and Common 
law and offers a comparative treatment. of legal methods. 
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............. '.. But whilst the subjects 
of each _state 'are governed by these its 
positive Institutions, as. the Rule of 
their Civil'Conduct, and owe an Obedience 
to the laws of Go and of Nature, Cas) 
27 
as the Rille' 'of' their Moral* Behavior. 
EHF State itse considered as a 'single 
Person is bound to observe a certain Rule 
of' Political Conduct (if I may so spec s- 
calle the Law of Nations, which may be 
defined to be so muc of the Law of 
Reason (or `shthe same thing. the Law of 
Nature) as Nations have perceived and 
acknowledge they have perceived, with 
the Addition of so much positive Institu- 
tion as may ascertain and modify the 
Exercise'of Natural Rights. 
89 
Johnson'. s thinking here is reminiscent of Pufendorf's 
90 
idea of a rational system of natural law, and leads to 
Grotius' system based on scientific legal principles. 
The influence of'these natural law thinkers is evident 
in the assertion'that the corpus of the natural law can 
be ascertained through man's exercise of his powers of 
reason. This becomes clearer when the language Johnson 
chooses becomes less expository and more advocatory. 
In a carefully phrased and concise abstract, John- 
son outlines his understanding of the compact that forms 
the law of nations: 
.............. For since all Men are Sub- ject to the Laws of Nature, and since as 
I have just observed their Union in Civil 
Society does not free them from that sub- 
jection; an entire State, whose common 
will is only the united wills of a Number 
of men, must likewise be 
89. Kings 80, pp. 27-28; Johnson reflects 17th century 
formulation rather than a Roman one. 
90. Samuel Pufendorf, De lure Naturae et' Gentium, (1672). 
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Subject to those Laws, and obliged to 
Observe them in its Dealings with others. 
The first, original and necessary Law of 
Nations therefore, is no other than the 
'Law of-Nature' "applied to transactions 
between independent states", which is 
therefore called by. -some writers the Natural-. Law- of- Nat'ions, - and by Grotius 
the interval Law of Nations; 
91 
Careful consideration is drawn to the relationship be- 
tween natural justice'and public policy. What Johnson 
suggests is a working premise that involves a contract 
among men, among men to form a civil society, and at the 
top of the political pyramid, the relations among nations. 
The terms of this contract are not specifically deline- 
ated; however, the philosöphical implications are substan- 
tially present. 
Johnson does not claim that a Hobbesian 'law is a 
command' is operating here, ' but sets up the independent 
authority from which the law does take its power. Within 
this context Johnson*is able to suggest the presence of 
an important rule that acts as a determinant for the con- 
tract. This rule is described as: 
that Rule 'of Action which depends on the 
express Agreement is called the Conventional 
Law of Nations, that which 'is founded on 
ustoni is called the Customary Law. 
1 92 
Since he is working within natural law theory and pri- 
marily concerned with a law of nations, Johnson's discus- 
sion embraces a natural form of government for a people 
91. Kings 80, pp. 28-29. 




that is best suited for them. 
93 For Johnson. also writes: 
......... There 'are 'undoubtedly -many Rules, depending on positive Institution 
merely, which 'nations are obliged to 
observe 'in their conduct towards each 
other, the subject matter by which is 
left indifferent by the natural law, 
and can only be right or wrong, lawful 
or unlawful, by virtue either of express 
compacts, or of certain' customs consecra- 
te by long use an . Acquiescence, which imply. a.. kind of tacit compact in those 
who acquiesce . 94 
The implication here is an order based not on any exter- 
nal coercion but on a complex set of duties developed 
through. tacit and expressed exchanges of rights. An 
adequacy of ' accozYmnodation qualifies the power and limita- 
tions that regulate the varied exchanges between persons 
and nations. The actual formulations are left to the 
parties involved as Johnson suggests in his citing of 
military examples. In stating that: 
the Customary differs from the natural 
Law of Nations as depending more on choice 
and less on necessity, that which partakes 
more of necessity must be more general, 
that which partakes more of choice must be 
more con-iin ed ; 
95 
Johnson allows for flexibility in the conditions of com- 
93. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book I, 
Chap. 3,, "Of Positive Law". 
cf. Fletcher, Montesquieu and English Politics (1750- 
1800), for a discussion of the-influence Montesquieu 
exerted on politics and legal theory in Scotland and 
England. 
94. Kings 80, p. 30. 
95. Kings 80, p. 32. 
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pacts and indicates it is*often necessary to modify con- 
tract terms. In doing this Johnson. realizes that nations 
as well as people have changing aspirations and therefore 
require laws to, adapt to both 'capacities and capabilities. 
When in the realm of international relations it is 
necessary to alter relationships among nations, the 
required negotiations are'carried on by an ambassador. 
96 
And this is the method Johnson uses to introduce the dip- 
lomatic vehicle and its attendant rights,. privileges,. and 
function's: 
that law by which the Person of an Embas- 
sadour is secured from violation we find 
observed amidst the fiercest Hostility by 
all nations in the least acquainted with 
social Duties; it is universally observed, 
because Universal Reason has demonstrated 
that of war there could be no End unless 
some men might safely propound terms of 
Peace, and that of mutual wants there could 
be no supply (unless) 
32 
unless some men might safely offer Articles 
df commerce. 
97 
Johnson's discussion of the rights, duties, and privileges 
of an Ambassador range from a reasonable man's understand- 
ing of the function of an envoy to the statutory descrip- 
tion contained in '7th: Anne C. 12' (p. 33). Since mili- 
tary conflict is the most dramatic act that can occur be- 
tween nations, this discussion of the role of an Ambassa- 
96. Kings 85, pp. 2-39. Lect: XIII "Of the Rights of Em- 
bassadours", Chambers provides historical background 
for the rights and privileges ambassadors enjoy. 
97. Kings 80, pp. 32-33. 
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dor provides the transition to his important. disquisition 
on the conduct and nature of war. 
, In time of war and the subsequent process of peace, 
diplomatic exchange among conflicting parties is ritual- 
ized and elaborate. Proceeding from this idea, Johnson 
98 
writes unrealistically on the way in which war is regu- 
! lted: 
............... men incited 
by injuries 
and heated by opposition if resigned to 
the violence of their Passions without 
regard to compacts or to Precedents, would 
think only by what possible means they 
might destroy or injure one another. But 
there are laws by which the Rage of War is 
mitigated, where Civility prevails. Thus 
it is forborn on either side to destroy a 
General by the treachery of his Followers. 
The use of Poison is universally forborn. 
It is generally agreed on both sides to do 
no injury to those who are not in Arms. 
And those who in the field of Battle were 
Yesterday pointing their swords at one 
another, are today Friends and Companions in 
a neutral City. 
99 
Johnson is not writing of war as a legal remedy but on 
its conduct according to his understanding of the terms 
of natural law theory. Moreover, as Fussell points out, 
a discussion of this type gives Johnson an opportunity 
to combine several interests: 
Of all the Augustan humanists, Johnson is. 
undoubtedly the most learned in the exact 
technical materials of warfare, just as 
98. Ranyard West, Conscience and Society: A Study of the 
Psychological Prerequisites of Law and Or er, Lon on: 
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1942), pp. 186-187. 
99. Kings 80, p. 34. 
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he seems the most ready to exploit them 
in ethical images. 
1100 
This discussion on the legal and moral values in-the con- 
duct of war encourages Johnson not only to indulge his 
interest in military affairs but to speculate about human 
drives and those sanctions which develop to control them. 
The salient points in the list of prohibitions John- 
son mentions come directly from Grotius' De Jure Belli et 
Pacis. These concerns are addressed by Grotius in Book 
Iii of his treatise: 
An vero'hostem interficere immisso per- 
cussore der -jus gentium liceat, uaeri 
soßet. Sed omnino discrimen adhi e dum 
est inter percussores,. qui fidem expressam 
vet' tacitam vio ant, ut sub iý ti in regem, 
vasalli in seniorem, milites in eum cui 
militant, 
101 
at jus gentium, si non omnium, certe 
melIorum, jam oh m est, ne hostem veneno 
inter iicere liceat 
102 
100. Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World 'of Augustan Human- 
i'sm: ' Ethics 'an Imagery from Swift to Burke, Ox or : 
O. U. P. paperback, 1969), -p. 147. 
101. Grotius, ed. Whewell, Book III, Chap. 4,18.1, pp. 88-89: 
The question is frequently discussed whether, 
according to the law of nations, it is permis- 
sible to kill an enemy by sending an assassin 
against him. But a distinction must be made 
between assassins who violate an express or tacit 
obligation of good faith, as subjects resorting 
to violence against a king, vassals against a 
lord, soldiers against him whom they serve. 
102. ''Ibid. 3.4.15.1, p. 86. 
Nevertheless from old times the law of nations, - if not of all nations, certainly of those of the 
better sort- has been that it is not permissible 
to kill an enemy by poison. 
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Interfici ergo possunt impune in sole 
proprio, in solo ostili, in so ö nuTllus, 
ja mari. I territorio autem acato, quod 
eos interficere auf violare non licet, id 
bus non ex ipsorum venit persona, sed ex 
lure e-ius uci ibi Imperium habet. Nam 
civiles societates constituere otuerunt 
in eos qui in aliguo sunt territorio nihil 
per vim agj,, nisi judicio tentato: 
103 
As indicated Johnson adopts the viewpoint espoused by 
Grotius, and it is significant that when Johnson recog- 
nizes the conditions that warrant war, he advocates that 
its conduct must be properly regulated. Johnson permits 
the waging of war as a prerogative power of a state, but 
writes in"The Vanity of Human Wishes": "Yet Reason frowns 
104 
on War's unequal game". With his penetrating common 
sense, Johnson must accept the idea of military conflict 
as a possible and valid remedy in international relations, 
but he is not blind to its folly. 
Johnson does not fully accept Vattel's concept of a 
103. -Ibid. 3.4.8.2, p. 79. 
Such persons (deserters, enemies) therefore may be 
slain with impunity in their own land, in the land 
of an enemy, on land under the jurisdiction of no 
one, or on the sea. The fact that it is not per- 
missible to slay or injure such persons in territory 
which is in a state of peace is based on a right 
derived not from their persons but from the right 
of him who exercises sovereignty there. For politi- 
cal societies were able to agree that no violent 
measures should be taken against persons who are 
in territory at peace except by recourse to legal 
proceedings: 
104. Samuel Johnson, The-Poems of Samuel Johnson, ed 
David Nichol Smith and Edward L. McA am, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1941 rpt. 1968), p. 39, line 185. 
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voluntary law105 of Nations (80 p. 36) stipulated in time 
of war. *-Johnson suggests that the relationship among 
belligerents is determined by, natural justice'and practi- 
cal considerations. Johnson's refutation of Vattel's con- 
cept is assertive and definitive. Johnson declares that: 
The impartiality of neutral states being 
founded on natural Justice, and the Forbear- 
ance of hostile powers on Self-Preservation; 
We are. not entitled by natural Justice to 
make ourselves the Universal Arbiters of 
Mankind, to punish those who have never 
injured us, and for whose conduct we are 
not responsible; to (vindicate) 
36 
vindicate Law which we never gave, or to 
guard the Boundaries which we did not fix. 
The Mildness of Hostility proceeds only 
from the Fear of establishing a Precedent 
which may in time become fatal to ourselves. 
106 
Johnson uses a most utilitarian argument-in advancing an 
important principle governing behavior between nations. 
Again Johnson shows his rigorous common sense in his 
105. E. de Vattel, The Law of'Nations on the Principles 
of Natural Law: Applied to the conduct and to Te 
affairs of nations and of sovereigns, translated 
1758 ed. by Charles G. Fenwick, (Washington: Car- 
negie Institution of Washington, 1916), Book I, 
Chapter XVI, p. IIa: 
The necessar law of nations and the voluntar law 
have therefore both been established by nature, but 
each in its own way: the former as a sacred law to 
be respected and obeyed by nations and sovereigns 
in all their actions; the latter as a rule of con- 
duct which the common good and welfare obliged 
them to accept in their mutual intercourse. The 
necessary law is derived immediately from nature; 
while this common mother of men merely recommends 
the observance of the voluntary law of nations in 
view of the circumstances in ich nations happen 
to find themselves, and to their common good. 
106. Kings 80, pp. 36-37. 
!, 
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position that a police function for a nation is inappro- 
priate and has the potential for'severe or uncontrolled 
problems. This indicates Johnson's utilitarian notion 
expressed in a self-conscious and rational desire to 
107 
conserve society. The sentiment is'not a moralizing 
one but illustrates a cautious approach to international 
affairs. 
This discussion continues to stress the vested inter- 
ests governments have in maintaining the 'status quo. To 
refrain from uninvited police action is a providential course 
for a nation to follow: 
.................. And since the Vicissitude of human Affairs puts every 
Nation in Danger of feeling some time the 
Miseries of unsuccessful-War, every Nation 
has an interest in providing that those 
miseries may be mitigated and sof+ened. 
As all Government is the Power of few over 
the many, all Government subsists upon 
Opinion, it is therefore the Interest of 
the Supreme Power (to) 
37 
to preserve some Degree of Reverence for 
all Powers equally Supreme; and to treat 
those who act under Sovereign Authority 
as performing a lawful Duty, though they 
are sent to execute Commands oppressive 
and unjust. This practice is therefore 
not voluntary but necessary, so necessary 
that its neglect would make the world -a. OcsnrJj 
and the Nation, that should violate it first, 
would probably be extirpated by a general 
confederacy of mankind against it. 
108 
107. ? Ernest Albee, 'The Beginnings of English Util'itari- 
'anism, Diss. Cornell (Boston: Ginn & o., Te 
Athenaeum Press, 1897), p. 3. 
108. Kings 80, pp. 37-38. 
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This commentary. was a clear disservice'to those enlighten- 
109 
ed principles that questioned a repressive order. How- 
ever, Johnson is essentially deferring to the idea of 
authority. which he deems necessary for a society to have 
110 
if it is to function. The question Johnson neglects 
to analyze is what determines the nature and legitimacy 
of that authority. 
Since these-lectures were written in the unsettled 
time of the 1760's and 1770's, Johnson's stress on the 
need for a clear concept of authority is understandable. 
This is the period when Johnson penned his two major 
political tracts, The False Alarm and Taxation No 
Tyranny. Both Johnson's personal and political need for 
stability and authority is evident'in the pamphlet -Taxa- 
tion No Tyranny: 
Liberty is the birthright of man, and where 
obedience is compelled, -there is no liberty. 
The answer is equally simple. Government is 
necessary to man, and where obedience is not 
compelled,. there is no government. if the 
subject refuses to obey, it is the duty of 
authority to use compulsion. Society cannot 
subsist but by the power, first of making laws, 
and then of enforcing them. ill 
109. cf. The John Wilkes Affair of 1763 where his publi- 
cation of North'Briton 45 created a political, legal, 
and social explosion. 
Rex v. ' Wilkes, 2 Wils K. B. 151; 4 Bro. P. C. 360; 
19 How St. Tr.: 1075; 4 Burr, 2527; (Easter Term 3 
Geo III, 1763) ' Wilkes' v. ' Wood, 98, Eng. Rept. 489 
(Michaelmas Term, 3 Geo. =, 763, C. B. ); Sir. Wil- 
liam Holdsworth, Some ' Makers of English Law, (Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge U. Press, . George Rude, Wilkes, and Liberty: * A' Social Study 1763-1774. 
(Oxfor : Caren on Press, 1962). 
110. - *Sermon 24, pp. 250-251. 
11.1. "Taxation No Tyranny",, Samuel Johnson Political Wri- 
-tings ed. Donald J. Greene, Yale E itjon Vol X, IN-e-w-Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977), p. 448. 
r. 
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This plea for a rigid adherence 'to authority and strong 
government complements the type of practical politics 
Johnson advocates to ensure harmonious international 
relations. Concerning this problem of subordination and 
independence, Bronson writes: 
His (Johnson`s) political attitude from 
this time forward can be fixed with compar- 
ative distinctness. Order and stability 
are the ends to be sought, because they best 
promote the good of the whole society. 
Abuses on the part of the governors, indi- 
vidual injustices, are inevitable. They 
are insignificant-and partial evils compared 
to the ills of a society which is not 
anchored to a supreme, undhallengeable 
authority. 
112 
The nexus of this argument is revealed in this remark to 
Boswell: 
"Sir, I am a friend to subordination, as 
most conducive to the happiness of society. 
There is a reciprocal pleasure in governing 
and being governed". 
113 
Johnson shows that he has less real interest in the rights 
of man than in the maintenance of international order 
based on. natural law theory. Whatever ambiguity may 
exist in the consequences of his attitude, Johnson com- 
mits himself to the principle of total support for the 
114 
public order and co=non welfare. In this regard John- 
son is embracing the major tenets of Richard Cumberland's 
112. Bertrand H. Bronson, 'Johnson Agonistes'and Other 
Essays, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of Ca i- 
Press, 1965), p. 20. 
113. ' Life I, p. 408. 
114. Albee, p. 17. 
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ethical system which supports this conservative outlooil5 
Johnson ends his introductory lecture with a discus- 
sion of the distinctions between the law of nations and 
the law of nature. To refute those who refuse to dis- 
tinguish these laws, Johnson cites Justinian: 
ý ..................... they should have 
remembered that in the very next Paragraph 
(Inst: 1,2,2) the Emperour adds the follow- 
ing. observation ""ius autem gentium omni 
huniano 
39 
"humano generi- commune- est, - nam usu' exigente 
humanis necessitate us, Gentes humana aura 
'qua am sibi constituerunt". By which he 
p ain y intimates the Existence of that Law 
which by Civilians is called the Secondary 
and by writers on general jurispru ence,. t e 
Positive Law of Nations; 
116 
The idea is that there is an internal validity in inter- 
national law expressed for all mankind. Johnson explores 
the lack of qualification in the presence and substance 
of natural law, in the law of nations. This points up the 
need for an expressed positive law which whether recog- 
nized or not is intricately involved with aspects of the 
natural law. Johnson suggests that the elements of this 
dispute are essentially semantic. For he claims that 
those who deny that it is substantially a law "allow it 
the force of a tacit compact" (p. 41). In this way-he 
introduces elements of contract that determine its legal 
standing. Johnson attacks Barbeyrac and seeks support by 
115. Voitle, pp. 58-93; cf. Richard Cumberland, 'De Legi- 
. bus Naturae, trans. John Maxwell, JLondon, 1727). 
116. Kings 80, pp. 39-E3c1. 
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citing Vattel, . Burlamaque, 
Grotius, and Puf. ; ndorf . 
117 
In this connection Johnson fashions another encomium 
on Grotius: 
......... 
in whose Commendation it ought 
to be observed that when he does err, (and 
on such subjects every writer must some- 
times err) it is on the side of Virtue and 
Piety, whereas some of the more Modern 
Authovrc are not only desirous to show how 
near a man may approach to vice without 
being vicious, but even allow in some cases 
such an Approximation to it, as is-at least 
dangerous if not positively-immoral. 
118 
The texture of this comment enables Johnson to re- 
establish his own moral presence and authority. Concepts 
of natural law are developed on moral considerations in 
this lecture, and Johnson does not want this point to be 
neglected. The association of legal and political prin- 
ciples that form the doctrine of natural law qualifies 
and defines legal morality. "The enterprise of subject- 
ing human conduct to the governance of rules" 
119 
is the 
problem in reasoning out what exactly constitutes the 
natural law. Assumptions of the morality that underlie 
the various relationships in society and those among 
nations are the issues that concern Johnson. The deter- 
mination of these issues occupy Johnson throughout these 
117. Johnson cites-these writings on natural law theory 
to strengthen his argument. 
118. Kings 80, p. 40. 
119. Lon L. Fuller, The'Morality of Law, Storrs Lectures 
on Jurisprudence Ya e Law School, 1963, (New Haven 
and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1964, revised 1969)p. 96. 
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lectures in his discussion' of both'the natural and the 
positive law. 
In this introductory lecture, Johnson gives: 
a short account of the origin 
of those general Principles of 
which either are or ought to be 
all strata, 






principles is characteristic of Johnson's moral writing 
and preoccupation. His enquiry-into the experiences of 
human nature and human institutions gives an understand- 
ing of the law and the way in which it functions. John- 
son's grasp of the basic principles of natural law 
theory is presented with severe authority. In this 
first and most important of Johnson's lectures, the 
juridical aspects are expressed in his usual carefully 
crafted and precise language. The structure of this 
lecture is replete with a technical confidence that is 
sustained only in those passages of the other lectures 
that are undoubtedly Johnson's. Johnson's manner is 
appropriate' for an informative and appealing introduction 
to a series of lectures on jurisprudence and legal history. 
---- ii ---- 
After the first lecture, this next lecture the 
"Origin of Anglo-Saxon Government Lect: II of the Origin 
of Feudal Government, and of the Anglo-Saxon Government 
and Laws" is the most complete of Johnson's contributions 
120. Kings 80, p. 4a. 
239 
to the Chambers's series. Johnson functions primarily 
121 
as a legal historian and antiquary in this lecture 
which I believe to be written almost entirely by him. 
While the initial lecture dealt with various principles 
of jurisprudence, in this lecture the subject is legal 
history. Immediately, Johnson'states the purpose of this 
lecture: 
I proceed now to investigate the sources 
of our own peculiar positive Institutions, 
by. examining those systems from which they 
have been borrowed, and tracing back, as 
far as they can be traced, the Rudiments 
of our Civil Polity. 
122 
The principal focus of this lecture is on pre-conquest 
legal history and tradition which in itself is highly 
speculative and somewhat obscure. Johnson's investiga- 
tion is not free from dogma and his interpretations be- 
123 
tray his generally conservative outlook. it must be 
acknowledged, however, that his history is masterful with- 
in the limits of eighteenth-century sources and method- 
ology. 
124 
121. cf. ' Life I, p. 454, for Johnson's observations on 
history and the role of an historian. 
122. Kings 80, p. 4; '1.. 
123. T. F. T. Plücknett', 'Early English Legal Literature, 
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958)_, pp. -6; 
Plucknett writes about the tendency of legal histor- 
ians to color their work according to their tempera- 
ment and period. This is a vice from which Johnson 
was not immune. 
124. cf. J. G. A. Pocock. The ' Ancient' Constitution and the 
Feudal'Law: A Study of English Historical TholighT-1-n 
t He Seventeenth Century, (Cambridge: At the Univ. 
Press, 1957), pp. 1-29; for a discussion of histori- 
cal methods though established in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries also intruded into the eight- 
eenth century. 
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Johnson does not accept that the-"customary Law of 
England is in great measure derived" (p. 44) from the 
early Britons: 
For besides the testimony of Roman Histo- 
rians and Poets who speak of the inhabitants 
of this country as' Latia sub ' le e Britannos 
(Selden on Fortescue Cap. 17) and that of a 
Passage in Dio Cassius (ap: Selden: in Diss: 
ad Fletam cap: 4 
Fletam (ap: 4) which shews that Papinian 
himself the greatest of Roman Lawyers, pre- 
sided in Britain As Prefect, I think it may 
be inferred from the constant operations of 
conquest and subjection, that in a country 
which was subject to the government of Rome 
for near four centuries, the Imperial Law 
must have taken deep Root, and have expelled 
in some measure the antient legal usages. 
It is therefore, I think most reasonable to 
believe that the Laws, as well as other 
Learning of the Druids were lost at the time 
when all Me most venerable and learned 
sages of that order, who led a refined and 
collegiate life in the Isle of Anglesea, 
were massacred by Suetonius. 
125 
Having established in this lecture-his historical view of 
the extirpation of pre-Roman'intellectual life, Johnson 
writes of the pervasive influence of Roman law on the very 
early foundation of English law. In his view of pre-Saxon 
Britain, Johnson admits no romantic ideas as to the sub- 
stance of any lasting legal contribution these early Brit- 
ons might have made. Rigorous logic reminiscent of the 
125. Kings 80, pp. 43-4y. Although there is no reference 
in text for these suppositions on the Druids, specu- 
lation on the Druids was part of the eighteenth 
century interest on history and antiquary. cf: 
Aidan Lloyd Owen, The Famous'Druids: A Survey of 
Three Centuries of English Literature on te Druids, 
(Oxon: Clarendon Press, , and Stuart Piggott, 
The'Druids, (1968, rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Bco ks, 
1977); William Stukeley: An Eighteenth-Century Anti- 
quary, Oxfor : At the Clarendon Press, pp. 92-135. 
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style of his remarks on the Ossian controversyl26 is ap- 
plied to produce Johnson's argument that Druidical learn- 
ing was wiped out by the Romans. However, "For Hale, the 
irrelevance of positive inquiry into remote times, and 
hence of the errors begotten on its tenuousness was the 
127. 
vital point to establish". But Johnson was never one 
to fear rendering an opinion on even the most slender 
128 
evidence. For the strength of Johnson's own logic 
tells him that the barbaric state of pre-Saxon Britain 
could not maintain anything approaching a comprehensive 
system of law. Indeed, the tone and texture of Johnson's 
remarks ön this type of speculation is hard, incisive, and 
borders on the polemical. 
However, modern commentators point out that Johnson 
was not quite correct in some of these historical assess- 
129 
ments: Pollock and Maitland dissent from Johnson's 
viewpoint on the extent of this early Roman influence 
especially when they consider-the conditions in the last 
130 
two centuries of the empire. ' On the other hand, Schultz 
126. 'Life II, pp. 296-297. 
127. Sir Matthem Hale, The History of the Common Law of 
'England, ed. Charles M. Gray, (Chicago and London: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971), p. XXViii. 
128. cf. Chapter on the Boswell cases where Johnson 
clearly functions as an advocate who often dictates 
his brief with little knowledge or preparation on 
the specifics of the case. ' 
129. Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland, 
'TheýHistory of 'En lish Law: Before the Time of Ed- 
ward I, 2 volumes, ri ge: At the University 
Press, 1923), vol I, p. 2. 
130. Fritz Schultz, History of Roman Legal'' Science, 
(1946; rpt. Oxfor : At the Clarendon Press -, p. 263. 
241' 
suggests that a metamorphosis occurred in the nature of 
Roman law which encouraged the development of a bureau- 
cratic system that remained viable and was able to exert 
a considerable influence even in the provinces. Yet, 
131 
Maitland in an earlier work-established his opinion 
that principles of Roman law were not operating to this 
132 
extent. Plucknett rejects Johnson's assertion that 
aspects of the Roman law were absorbed or were able to 
survive in any atavistic form. Nevertheless, Reeves's 
133 
earlier though highly technical treatise (1784-85) 
concurs with*Johnson's supposition that the Roman law 
dominated the formulation of early English legal institu- 
tions and maintains 
., a continual 
influence' existed by a 
process of gradual absorption in the development of the 
Saxon system. What they all eventually accept, however, 
is that there is discernible evidence of Roman legal 
principles introduced into Britain by way of the Christ- 
ian church. Since this section of the lecture deals 
extensively with legal history', it is important to set 
Johnson's thinking against that of professional legal 
historians. What this process reveals is that-Johnson's 
131: Frederick William Maitland, The Constitutional 
History of England, (Cambridge: At the University 
Press, 1913). 
132. Theodore F. T. Plucknett, ' A Concise' 'History of the 
Common Law, Fifth ed., (Boston, Little, Brown & Co,, 
133. J. Reeves, * History of, the* English Law: from the Time 
of the, Romans to te En -. o the Rei n of Elizabeth, 
e. W. F. Finlason, A New American Edition, 5 Vol-s-,, 
(Philadelphia: Murphy, 1880), vol I, pp. XX, -LXXVII. 
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view of history is limited by the state of the art as 
. 
as 
well his own prejudices and assumptions. 
After having buried the early Britons, Johnson does 
the same to the last-vestiges of Imperial Rome. Moreover, 
Johnson must modify his discussion of the pervasiveness 
of the Roman influence when he writes of the Saxon inva- 
sion and settlement: 
But by what laws soever the Britons 
were governed before the arrival of these- 
German tribes whom we generally call by 
the'conmon name of Saxons, the subsequent 
expulsion of the Britons themselves by 
those Northern invaders must undoubtedly 
have been attended with the expulsion 
of their Laws. Hardly any conquest was 
ever followed by such fateful Consequences 
to the conquered, or any change so total 
ever produced as those which were effected 
by that ferocious (people) 4(a 
People 
134 
His discussion of these barbarians lacks no censure on 
moral grounds and expresses dismay at the violence of 
their customs and habits. Johnson refers to the barbar- 
ians' migration which caused them to: 
rise as a single man and thousands and n -ads daue, -m., 
c3cthar to ßu4 thekr ha bitat iah; and rose sýýcros to ahavºdarý kmo, DA 
and certain means of Life; and transport 
themselves, their wives & their children 
into countries, in that state of universal 
Ignorance, utterly unknown; where whenever 
they settled they must obtain their settle- 
ment by violence, (after) 
41 
after a contest with nations of whose 
Numbers of Disposition they had never 
134. Kings 80, pp. 46-47. 
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been informed. 
It was natural 'to suppose that' an 
Event so contrary to All moral Principles 
and civil Institutions, could only be the 
effect of physical necessity; .......... But this cause has always appeared to me 
to be assumed without proof, only because 
no other could be found. 
135 
In making this judgment Johnson suggests that "It may be 
suspected with great probability that the Nations who 
burst upon the South and West of Europe, fled, before 
some Nation fiercer than themselves" (p. 50) and "we must 
however suppose mankind to be differently disposed from 
the present Race" (p. 50). His recitation of the movement 
of European tribes is classical (Plutarch, p. 51) and is 
also based on Johnson's historical view of the place of 
agriculture and the desire for safety. While Johnson 
displays some sympathy for the motivation behind this 
migration, he strongly suggests the harm it caused. 
Furthermore, Johnson intelligently utilizes this discus- 
sion of the invasion to dismiss the early Britons and 
Romans, and to lay the foundation for the introduction 
of Saxon government. 
By virtue not only of conquest but also eventual 
colonization, the Saxons and other German tribes (pp. 57- 
58) were able to redefine and restructure the constitu- 
tions of most of the territories they entered. Writing 
of the results of this process, Johnson says: 
........... these are facts within 
our own knowledge which might serve to 
135. Kings 80, p. 47-ya. 
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confirm it and to convince us that the 
Saxons did not, could not, borrow their 
civil institutions from the Britons -Z 
mention only a fei,; i, 6f 7-he-%; -rAe tccA"v, cz. 
-j'e'-M& 0-C t/. e(cýý 
) 58 
Law, are either Saxon or Norman, none of 
them British, nor any of them I think 
Roman but such as have evidently been 
introduced in later Ages. 
136 
The essential point is that England is indebted to the 
Saxons for "the first Rudiments of our Civil Polity" 
(p.. 59). Such a statement seems to conflict with his 
earlier emphasis on the strength of the Roman influence, 
but this refers mostly to pre-Saxon England. What may be 
suggested, however, is that a fundamental yet untraceable 
groundwork had been laid by earlier contact with Roman 
137 
institutions. It must be remembered that in this dis- 
cussion of that debt, Johnson relies heavily on Tacitus 
136. Kings 80, pp. 5-53. 
137. cf. William Stubbs, Select' Characters and Other Il- 
lustrations of English Constitutional History from 
. the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the irst, 
ninth e d. revise By H. W. C. Davis, (Oxford: aren- 
don Press, 1951), pp. 5-6; contra: "Between the 
age of Tacitus and Ptolemy and that of Bede we have 
very few distinct data.... that during the period 
the name of Saxon was extended to a great aggrega- 
tiaon of North German tribes, which retained their 
independence of Rome, their ancient religion and 
seats, and very much of their antient barbarism. 
... it is 
certain that whatever progress was made 
was free from Roman elements: it is probable that 
the Saxons were behind the rest of the Germans in 
the distinctness of polity which belongs to the 
tribes with which the Romans were better acquainted. " 
But Johnson's suggestion is that elements of Roman 
influence were absorbed by the Saxons in their con- 
tact with other tribes who had some associations 
with 'Rome. 
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from138 whom he reconstructs the evolution of Princeps 
as a military commander to the status of a'king. By do- 
ing this Johnson is able to conduct his lecture quickly 
to the subject of the early Kentish Kings and. begin to 
point out features that are related to English legal 
institutions. 
139 
The discussion of the origin of kingship permits 
Johnson to study the-continuity in constitutional devel- 
opment. The hereditary rights and duties existing between 
king and nobles whose fluctuations, at times, allowed the 
people to bargain for themselves is the beginning of the 
modern constitution: 
................ thus whoever was in danger, whether King or Nobles, the (People) 
6jß 
People were sure to sell their Assist- 
ance at a higher price as they were more 
needed. This we may fairly consider as 
the Origin of that Constitution that 
hath been preserved though under differ- 
ent appearances, and with various and 
great mutations, even to the present 
Time. What were the Customs of those 
our Pagan Forefathers concerning Civil 
138. Although Johnson relies heavily on Tacitus, he 
cites Caesar De Bello Gallico; Lambard, Archaionomia 
(1568) probably teWe oc edition (Cantab. 1644) 
on page 65; Wilkins, Leges Anglo-Saxonicae (1721) 
also found on page 65; Spelman's works (entry 218 
in the Greene annotated catalogue of his library), 
Bede,. Whelock ed. (Greene 348. ), Hume's History of 
England p. 65. 
139. cf. Fritz Kern, ' Kingship and Law in the, Middle Aces: 
The Divine Right--of Kings and the Right of Resist- 
ance in t e'early Mi le Ages, II. Law an Constitu- 
'tion in tT the Middle Ages, trans. by S. B. Crimes, 
rpt. New Yor : Harper and Row, Inc., 1970). 
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and Criminal Questions, - since they had 
no writtenLaws, we cannot say with any 
precision. 140 
This bargaining process is the first shadow of a politi- 
cal consciousness. Johnson points out that introduction 
of rudimentary 'compromise' shows the development of 
sophisticated political activity. Johnson sees the 
motives behind granting support to either King or Nobles 
as those. of pure self-interest devoid of any suggestion 
for the greater good. This extreme personal interest in 
Saxon times appears at its rawest in the criminal law. 
Writing on the nature of the criminal law in this 
society, Johnson shows a clear understanding of its rela- 




Crime rather as the objects of Private 
Vengeance than of Publick Justice; a Notion 
that gave rise to those compensations for 
offences of which subsequent Anglo-Saxon 
Laws are) 
6 a. 
are full; a notion which it was so diffi- 
cult entirely to eradicate, that even 
Christian Legislators were obliged to 
comply with it, so that as late as the 
Reign of Edmond, we find a law enacted 
which expressly subjects. a Murderer that 
could not raise money enough to pay the 
settled price of impunity to the deadly 
:: vengeance of those who had lost their 
kinsmen, and only exempts his Relations 
from it on condition that they do not 
harbour him nor furnish him with bread. 
" 141 
140. Kings 80, pp. 6t-63. 
141. Kings 80, pp. 6- 63. 
This severe form-of liability'is characteristic of an 
underdeveloped society which had, at best, the most rude 
. system 
of criminal procedure.. Writing of early criminal 
procedure, Stephen says: 
.......... it should be'remembered that in early times the really efficient check 
upon crimes of violence was the fear of 
private vengeance, which rapidly degener- 
ated into private war, blood feuds, and 
anarchy. The institution of the fier in 
itself implies this. I have described it 
in connection with the subject of punish- 
ment, but it belongs properly to a period 
when the idea of public punishment for 
crimes had not yet become familiar; a peri- 
od when a crime was still regarded to a 
great extent as an act of war, and in which 
the object of the law-maker was rather to 
reconcile antagonists upon established 
terms than to put down crimes by the 
establishment of a system of criminal law, 
as we understand the term. 
142 
At this point in the lecture Johnson does not offer any 
other sense of procedure until the. palliative forces of 
Christianity emerge. 
The introduction of a written body of law is credit- 
ed to "Ethelberth, ' who was the king of Kent about the 
year 560, and who was the first Christian Prince among 
the Saxons" (p. 64). However, Johnson does not complete- 
ly accept this accreditation "for there is Reason to 
believe that the first Laws of the Burgundians, Visigoths 
and others, whom I shall mention in my next Lecture, were 
compiled before the Time of Ethelberth" (p. 65). Further- 
142. Sir James Fitzjaines Stephen, A History of'the Crimi- 
nal'Law of England, 3 vols., London: Macmillan and 
Company, n83), vol. I, pp. 59-609 
248 
more, Johnson143 attributes these written laws to the 
influence of the clergy: 
............. But the'learning of Savage Nations newly converted must 
necessarily for a long time reside among 
the Clergy. And that the Clergy were 
the first-Authours of the Saxon Laws we 
have'Reason to believe, because we find 
them chiefly formed for the Re ulation of 
Ecclesiastical Discipline which would be 
the first Consideration amongst the Clergy, 
whose chief care must be the Establishment 
of proper subordination(amongst)6r 
amongst themselves; and for the Punishment 
of crimes, which would claim the second 
attention of those who were to reform and 
superintend the Manner of the People. The 
modifications and adjustment of Civil 
Property, in which they had less interest 
and less skill, were deferred to an Age 
in which by the diffusion of knowledge 
those who were possessed of Riches and 
Power became able to think and write for 
themselves, to discover the causes of their 
own Distresses, and the means by which they 
might be prevented or removed. That the 
first Precedents of our Religion were like- 
wise the first Authours of our Laws, is 
yet further evident because our Laws and 
our Religion are drawn alike from the 
Volumes of Revelation; 144 
Johnson's brief comment on Aethelberht stresses the power 
and status of the clergy. His remarks imply that they 
143. cf. H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, 'Law and Legis- 
' lat'ion': ' 'from Aethelberht to Magna Cartat 
(Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1966): 
"On the contrary, the evidence, in our view, points 
in the opposite direction, Aethelberht's legisla- 
tion was in no sense Christian but, if an offensive 
word may be used inoffensively, pagan. " (p. 1). 
"We must make it clear that there is no evidence 
that Roman law had any direct influence upon Eng- 
lish law before the reign of Henry II. " (p. 71). 
144. Kings 80, pp. 641^66. 
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had a fine grasp of the hierarchical nature of society 
and were able to utilize their talents to make their own 
position more secure. Moreöver, modern scholarship deter- 
mines that these special laws for the clergy were made 
because "the foreign clergy, venturing into a 
. 
rough and 
pagan society, had to be given an appropriate' status and 
protection for the property they would Acquire from noble 
145 
patrons". However, Johnson's language seems to indi- 
cate that general learning was not encouraged despite 
laws written in English in order to guard the mystery of 
knowledge and to strengthen this early form of the rela- 
tionship between church and state. 
Johnson feels it is necessary within the scope of 
this lecture to comment on the laws of Alfred. In his 
review of Alfred, Johnson writes of distinctions between 
intention and effect: 
Of the Laws which have given so much 
renown to the name of Alfred, it will 
naturally be expected that something should 
be said. So far as we can judge of his 
code by the Fragments which time had left 
us, it seems to be the Effort of benevolent 
Power endeavouring to rescue a People yet 
unformed from the insecurity and unhappi- 
ness of Savage license. He seems to have 
it more in his thoughts to avert Evil than 
to procure good) 67 
Good. His institutions are such as the 
sense of present inconvenience would natu- 
rally dictate, but the Nation had not then 
experience or knowledge sufficient to open 
Prospects into remote Futurity, to f1 x'ýhý- zx s 
Ctv'ýi k%54ts, dr ri3uWe w`r-1n lcedhVsivntM ýnQ. Dýstrýbýlýaý5, 
145. Harding, p. 13. 
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of Property and Evolutions of succes- 
sion# 146 
It is not surprising that Johnson's analysis of Alfred 
relies on practical politics and moral imperatives. Both 
concepts-- appeal to Johnson's historical and cultural bias. 
This analysis illustrates McAdam's observation that "the 
introduction of Christianity and consequent spread of 
147 
learning were subjects irresistible to Johnson". Be- 
cause as a moral philosopher Johnson's curiosity would 
certainly be aroused by the way in which ethics were 
first introduced into the early Saxon state, he focuses 
on the relationship between learning and morals in Al- 
fred's prologue. Johnson's point that the "first forty- 
nine laws in the Code of Alfred are transcribed from the 
Mosaic institution" (p. 67) suggests the acceptance of 
divine revelation. This point is especially important 
for Johnson since *it implies that divine wisdom rather 
than human thought alone marks the significant beginning 
of what he eventually considers to be the philosophical 
foundation to modern English law. 
The substance of this comment is the degree of puri- 
ty which Johnson attaches to Christian revelation. Chapin 
points out: 
In general, the great value of revelation 
for Johnson, so far as its bearing on 
146. Kings 80, pp. 67-68. 
147. 'Life IV, p. 124, Johnson'on original sin, punishment, 
moral law, and precepts of purity. 
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morality is concerned, is not that 
it brings into the world an ethic wholly 
unknown before, nor an ethic sharply in 
oppos-j±ion to non-Christian ethical sys- 
tems, but rather that it strengthens men 
in the practice of virtues already known. 
. 148 
This Law Code of Alfred is significant because it attempts 
to inculcate certain Christian values such as the promo- 
tion of"a moral structure, " dealing with the problems of 
evil, and suggesting a sense of the divine, within the 
system of the Kings' peace. - Although "it. is noteworthy 
that in Alfred's Dooms the' protection. (borg) of the King's 
Majesty had a higher value than that of the head of the 
149 
Christian Church", the point is that this alliance 
between. King and Church, nevertheless, tried to develop 
moral precepts under the auspices of the Christian relig- 
ion. In this code Johnson recognized the political nature 
of the Church which under the guise of promoting good act- 
ually proves itself adept at securing its own postition. 
This is a point Johnson realizes but does not too closely- 
investigate lest he harm the perception of the Church as 
an agent for good. 
The next section of this lecture which deals with 
the "usurpation of the Danes" (p. 69) must be attributed 
to Chambers. The style differs markedly from those pas- 
sages clearly written by Johnson. Not only is this sec- 
tion highly technical but the language is convoluted and 
mannered. McAdam writes: 
148. Chapin, 'The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson, p. 94. 
149. Stephenson and Marples, Law in the Light of History: 
Book II England in the Mid eA es, London; Williams 
and Norgate, LTD., , p. 32. 
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Chambers concludes the lecture with a 
few paragraphs on the Code of Edward the 
Confessor and the coming of the Normans. 
The-proportion of Johnson's contributions 
to Chambers' is about the same (two-fifths) 
as in the first lecture, and again we see 
Johnson choosing general and historical 
topics on which to elaborate, and leaving 
more technical matters to Chambers. 
150 
While McAdam is essentially correct in ascribing the sec- 
tions on the Code of Edward and the Norman influence to 
Chambers, the completeness of-this assertion is vulner- 
able to criticism. Both. on stylistic and on philosophi- 
cal evidence it can be maintained that Johnson wrote the 
concluding remarks on the extent of the Norman debt to 
the Saxons. Not only does this become clear when the 
summation is examined but also when Johnson's talents 
of synopsis and organization are recalled. 
In this summing up Johnson writes: 
.......... So much of your Private Law 
therefore as depends on general an im- 
memorial usage, must be acknowledged to be 
in great measure Norman; the great outlines 
however of our'Publick Law, like the bulk 
of our people, are manifestly of Saxon 
origin; the Executive Power of the Crown 
and Legislative Authority of the King and 
Great Council, the Civil Division of Eng- 
land in Counties, Hundreds and Townships, 
with the Courts incident to them, as well 
as the general Form of its Ecclesiastical 
Division, the whole subordination of our 
Civil Magistracy, the Establishment of 
Manors, our usual form of Trial -by Jury, 
as well as that by Combat, which though now 
disused has not been formally abolished, 
are all derived 7y 
derived to us from that Source, though 
150. McAdam, p. 89. 
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varied polished and improved by the 
Wisdom of Successive Ages. 
151 
An examination of the diction and sentence structure in- 
dicates a pattern of expression characteristic of Johnson. 
Unlike the verbal entanglements Common in Chambers' writ- 
ing, Johnson's description of these legal institutions is 
simple and without ornament. Here as in the other quoted 
passages, Johnson's phrasing is distinguished by his 
knowledge and authority. Important points in the text 
are arranged with a balance and parallelism that is indic- 
ative of Johnson's philosophical style of expression and 
152 
writing. An equality of emphasis is evident in his 
placement of ideas to create a forceful yet concise posi- 
tion. The texture of Johnson's language and the substance 
of his remarks reflect his interest in the Saxon contri- 
butions to British legal institutions. His stress on 
these public institutions which came to dominate the 
basic political structure attracts Johnson's interest in 
understanding the composition of, society. Government and 
society which have their modern origin in these Saxon 
innovations provides the necessary tools to analyze the 
operation of moral precepts. Johnson who had studied on 
153 
Alfred's will demonstrates the range of his understand- 
151. Kings 80, pp. 7V-7S--. 
152. W. K. Wiensatt, jr., Philoso hicaL Words: A' Study of 
and Meaning in'the R5=er and Dictionary of Samuel 
Jo nson, pp. 
153. * Life IV, p. 133: "Your (Thomas Astle)' notes on Alfred 
appear to me very judicious and accurate, but they 
are 'too few. " 
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ing of the Saxon times in this lecture. 
The passages in this lecture that are clearly John- 
son's are polished and elegant. Not only do these pass- 
ages show Johnson's grasp of the available knowledge of 
the period, but they also reveal an ability to shape 
language and suggest his own interests. This is a talent 
which Chambers does not possess. Chambers' writing is 
heavy and lacks the subtlety needed to fashion effective 
nuances and positioning. There is a sense of rhythm in 
Johnson's language and this contrasts sharply with Cham- 
bers' stolidity. Within the context of the lecture for- 
mat, Johnson's contributions are distinguished not only 
by his learning but by a style suitable for effectively 
expressing his positions. In this lecture Johnson reveals 
traces of cultural and political bias, yet is able to 
weave his prejudices into an historical subject that 
produces an impressive and forceful discussion of early 
legal history. In his usual masterful way Johnson writes 
with an aura of authority that distracts attention from 
his occasional inaccuracies, and distinguishes an element 
of what he in other circumstances might have stigmatized 
as 'cant'. 
- ---iii---- 
The third of this important series of introductory 
lectures is entitled: "Of the Feudal Law Lect: III of 
the Feudal Law Strictly so Called, and of the Effects of 
that Law on our Constitution & Government". In this lec- 
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tare there 'are flashes of'Johnsonian prose and only some 
short sections not written by Chambers. This is an ass- 
154 
essment with which McAdam and I for the most part agree. 
However, it is necessary to review those passages either 
written by Johnson or influenced by him to-see how they 
fit into the pattern of his jurisprudential thinking. 
Johnson's ability to ccumnent, organize, and articu- 
late the underlying propositions of different, legal sys- 
tems is illustrated in this lecture. After Chambers's 
presentation and discussion of the primary elements of 
feudal law found in several continental systems, it is 
Johnson who clearly sets out their general nature: 
Their general character is this, that 
being formed for nations in which private 
quiet was more endangered by violence than 
subtlety, they have chiefly endeavoured to 
restrain crimes, and have made very few 
provisions for ascertaining property or 
deciding disputes. It may be supposed that 
when they first occupied the lands of con- 
quered nations, according to a distribution 
publickly made, while every man's title was 
recent, it was undisputed; and that for some 
time whoever desired more than he had, 
found it easier to take it from an old in- 
habitant than a fellow soldier. By degrees, 
however, military violence began to subside, 
and the strangers coalesced into one sys- 
tem of government with the original people. 
At this time, or rather as this time was 
advancing, it became necessary to protect 
the Romans 
from the outrages of their conquerors and 
therefore-many laws were made ne fortior 
omnia, posset. By degrees, as they a no 
enemies to oppose, they would naturally 
form claims upon one another; and as inter- 
marriages diffused relation, the order of 
154. McAdam, p. 89; of the excerpts from Johnson's contributions 
cited in the rest of this chapter, I accept McAdam's 
-designations of what is most important. 
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inheritance would be more perplexed` 
y; e may then reasonably suppose that the 
rules of descent, which had been-preser- 
ved. hitherto by custom and tradition, 
were first deduced into regular subord- 
ination; and in the decrees of emperors, 
registered in the later laws of the 
Lombards, may plainly be discovered the 
first rudiments of feudal tenures. 
155 
This excerpt not only indicates Johnson's ability in 
synthesizing and formulating general impressions, but con- 
tinues to suggest several sociological ideas that can be 
derived-from the early development of feudal laws. 
Both the law of society and the law of progress 
develop concepts of self-preservation, the demands of the 
larger society, the maintenance of accomplishment, and 
the movement toward progress. By stressing the needs of 
156 
individuals and the origin of their formation into groups, 
Johnson shows how a rude social organization moves toward 
a more complex one. This process of forming an integrated 
society requires violence to be controlled and eventually 
ritualized. Johnson suggests that this is accomplished 
by developing a legal system and social structure that 
channels dispute into an accepted framework for resolution., 
With the diminution of external threat, internal discord 
becomes prominent and such unease must be resolved within 
a system that is, at least, perceived to be regular. Thus, 
society develops both laws and structures which not only 
155. Kings 80, pp. 89-91. 
156. Adam Ferguson, An' Essay on, the' History 'of Civil Soci- 
'ety C L767), ed. Duncan For es, (Edinburgh: University 
Press, 1966), pp. 1-17. 
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provide stability but direction as well. As Johnson un- 
derstands from his history, it-is this need for society 
to function that requires man-to fashion some sense of a 
civil society. 
This civil society finds its base in the institution 
of feudal tenures. It is Chambers's task to define the 
"Ages of Feudal-law" (p. 92). Chambers analyzes three of 
these periods: 1. "the Lands given to soldiers which were 
not yet called Feuds and perhaps had no general denomina- 
tion, were held by the mere will and pleasure of the Lord 
(p. 92); 2. "some regard was had to descent" (p. 93); 3. 
"those possessions which'while they were granted only for 
Life, or at most with very strict limitations, had been 
termed Beneficia; began to be made'indefinitely inherit- 
able and took the name of Feuds (pp. 95-96). However, it 
is Johnson who summarizes these periods and names the 
fourth: 
The three periods of the Feudal Law which 
have been mentioned are called its Infancy, 
Childhood and Youth. Now begins its Fourth 
Age or its Maturity; the Order of Descent 
was now settled, collateral Relations were 
admitted to Inheritance, the reciprocal 
obligations by Lord and Tenant were fully 
understood, and some Princes, the first of 
whom was the Emperour Conrad, and published 
edicts in writing far regulating feudal 
successions (Giannonci Hist: of nia/, B: 0 
C. l. S. ) but no Code of feudal law had yet 
been digested, by which any deviation from 
Right might be rectified, as to which 
either Lord (or) 
99 
or tenant could appeal. in this period 
happened that great Revolution commonly 
called the Norman Conquest, soon after 
which the Feudal Law was established amongst 
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Us with'compleat Prevalence. 
"157 
This grouping of the ages of feudal law illustrates the 
way in which Johnson and Chambers work together. in this 
partnership Chambers provides technical information and 
Johnson puts together its summary. 
Throughout this lecture there are several short, 
though incisive contributions made by Johnson. Of these 
the most' characteristic is this comment on the power and 
authority of the king, 
The king was maintained in times of 
peace, not by taxes or imposts, but by 
the profits of his own lands, which in 
reigns of luxury and negligence were 
'diminished by wanton grants, or profuse 
alienations, and in times of contest or 
tyranny, were increased by seizures and 
forfeitures. As he subsisted upon his 
own revenues, he had very little dependence 
on his people. But in time of war, whether 
impelled by ambition or enforced by neces- 
sity, he was compelled to summon his feud- 
atory Lords, whose greatness was such that 
when they combined against him he had 
scarcely power to compel their attendance. 
In later times, it was found necessary to 
levy subsidies for the payment of the army, 
" and as subsidies could not regularly be 
levied but by concurrence of the Great Men, 
these were the times at which they stipu- 
lated for redress of grievances and refor- 
mation of government. 
158 
This paragraph allows Johnson to comment on two of his 
159 160 
main interests: economics and kingship. Moreover, 
157. Kings 80, pp. 99-100. 
158. Kings 80, pp. 114-115. 
159. cf. Greene, Politics, p. 280; Middendorf, 'Johnson 
on Wealth and ommerce', pp. 47-64. 
160. Sf. footnotes 139 and 140. 
I 
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it also permits Johnson to explore the relationship be- 
tween obligation and power. Although set in an histori- 
cal context, these remarks reflect his views on the poli- 
161 
tical position 'a king occupies and suggests the re- 
straints imposed by practical politics and legal develop- 
ment. For Johnson sees the constraints operating on a 
king, at this time, to be primarily determined by finance. 
This emphasis on finance is important because from this 
evolves the power struggles that force political conces- 
sions. Certainly, Johnson appropriates some of the cause 
to regal profligacy yet intimates that loyalty is a some- 
what elastic concept. From his experience and observation 
of human nature, Johnson realizes that power relationships 
are fashioned by necessity and opportunity. And in this 
excerpt, he suggests how politicaL-compromise contributes' 
to change and transformation in the development of feudal 
rights and duties. 
This lecture which focused on the feudal law has, as 
I have said, few important contributions by Johnson. What 
may be gleaned, however, is a clear understanding of the 
way in which the Johnson-Chambers collaboration works. 
The general organizational plan and the periodic summaries 
of the ideas covered are Johnson's. The technical legal 
information and laborious detail make up Chamber's con- 
tribution. While most of this lecture is assuredly writ- 
ten by Chambers, Johnson's remarks punctuate the text and 
161. 'Life I, pp. 423-424; 'Life III, pp. 155-156. 
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give it its flashes of life. Mostly Johnson writes on 
those themes that have either great personal interest 
for him or are able to be expanded along general lines of 
thought. Moreover, this lecture may be seen as a para- 
digm for the way in which *Johnson* functions in most of 
the remaining lectures. * 
"Division of the Laws of England: Lect IV. on The 
General Division of the Laws of England" is the fourth 
and final lecture of the important introductory series. 
Although'Johnson's written contribution is quite small, 
as McAdam points out, his structural help must have been 
162 
considerable. This lecture discusses some of the dif- 
ferences between common and statutory law. And it is 
further subdivided into a detailed look by Chambers at 
civil, canon, and maritime law. While these subjects may 
have had some interest to Johnson, the style, the treat- 
anent, and the broad review of early legal authorities in- 
dicate this to be the work of Chambers. 
However, the introductory remarks which set out the 
scheme followed in'the lecture and some preliminary com- 
ment on the common law have the hallmark of Johnson. Cer- 
tainly, this opening is written by Johnson: 
The two most obvious Ways of dividing 
any System of Laws are with respect to 
their Form, or with Relation to their 
Subject Matter. 
The Law of England with Regard to its 
Form may be considered as general or 
Particular. 1. The General Law is again 
162. McAdam, p. 91. 
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divided into 1st the Common Law, oi 
Law unwritten and 2ndly Statutes or 
Law written.. 
1. The Unwritten or Common* Law, being 
begun by Necessity, -amidst the Dark- 
ness of barbarous Ages and the Tumults 
of fluctuating Dominion, when we have 
pursued it as far as History-will guide 
our search, ends, like the Nation that 
received it, in Fable and Uncertainty 
(some) 12 0 
Some Sources may however be discovered 
from which it may with great Probability 
be derived. 
163 
Johnson amplifies his remarks on the nature of.: 
, The common Law, 
in its strict Accep- 
tation, which consists o Customs 
derived from immemorial Tradition, and 
of Maxims established by immemorial 
Practice. * Of these whether they were 
derived from the Saxons or the Normans, 
or were common to both Nations, it is for 
the most part vain to enquire. Where 
there is a Resemblance in the great 
Principles of Government, it may be sup- 
posed that there was some Likeness in 
subordinate Institutions, and that 
therefore 123 
the Norman and Saxon Law easily 
coalesced. But of their Resemblances 
and Differences, if much is known, 
much likewise is forgotten. 
164 
In this assessment of the common law, Johnson suggests an 
element of cultural mysticism which somehow accounts for 
the origin of this law. By following this approach to 
the origin of the common law, Johnson is essentially cor- 
rect. As Hogue points out: 
163. Kings 80, pp. 120-121. 
164. Kings 80, pp. 123-124; cf. B1 Comm. I., 3, pp. 45-46. 
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Social change and legal change are more 
easily discerned than accounted for, and 
the process by which legal changes are 
made is often far from clear. The mystery 
surrounding many legal changes may be 
particularly baffling when we deal with a 
system of judge-made law. 
165, ' 
This judge-made law is actually determined by the rela- 
tionships present in any community. For when Johnson 
writes that the common law is derived from custom and 
practice, he is correctly suggesting that because of 
changing social relations the law must adapt and respond. 
In this way he recognizes that the demands made by social 
interaction require the law toreact in an understanding 
manner. it is this unwritten or common law which origi- 
nally had the necessary fLexibility. Although the origin 
of certain legal principles may be discerned, it is by 
judicial interpretation that the common law is made. In 
his brief remarks on the common law, Johnson raises the 
question of history but focuses on the important relation- 
ship between law and society that governs the common law 
and the way in which'it functions. 
I have concentrated on this introductory series of 
lectures because'this is where Johnson was most needed 
and exerted the most influence. These four lectures give 
the clearest picture of the way in which the Johnson- 
ChAmbers collaboration works. Johnson has been-seen in 
this series as the one who set out their general plan and 
organization. Topics that have either personal interest 
165. Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law, (Blooming- 
ton and London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1966)-, p. 4. 
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or complement his political ideas are the ones where he 
supplies the. actual text. He discusses the general set- 
tings and broad impressions created by the way the law 
operated in its historical context and how it now functions. 
At the same time, Johnson avoids detailed analysis or his- 
166 
tory, but develops the underlying suppositions that 
accompany their presentation. These early lectures show 
Johnson in the role of a catalyst and guide. There is a 
strain of sturdy common sense: running throughout this 
series that cuts through the legal jargon and endows these 
lectures with a substantial core. * Naturally, Chambers, 
who was both lawyer and judge, writes the greater part of 
the text but his prose lacks the decision and strength of 
Johnson's style of presentation. 
---- iy ---- 
"Part I. Containing the Publick Law of England Lec- 
ýº ý 
166. cf. Life II, p. 195; pp. 365-366 for Johnson's com- 
ments on history; Also in--the lectures he warns: "of 
the small information that laws and historians afford 
us, the dubiousness and darkness is sufficiently 
proved by remaking that they have been advanced in 
defense of opposite opinions, and that those who 
write in contradiction to each other can make a 
specious use of the same authority" (Kings 81, p. ll); 
It may not be improper in this place to caution 
young inquirers into the origin of our government 
against too great confidence in systematical writers 
or modern historians, of whom it may justly be sus- 
pected that they often deceive themselves and their 
readers when they attempt to explain by reason that 
which happened by chance, when they search for pro- 
found policy and subtle refinement in temporary ex- 
pedients, capricious propositions, and stipulations 
offered with violence and admitted by compulsion and 
therefore broken and disregarded when that violence 
ceased by which they were enforced. (Kings 81, pp. 22-23). 
26I 
tures 1st', 2d', 3 
d', 
and 4 
th'" is the next series of lec- 
tures. The topics covered in this -series are: Lecture I: - 
"Of the origin and Different Forms of Parliament" (Kings 
81, pp. 1-32); Lecture II: "Of the Present. Constitution 
of Parliaments" (Kings 81, pp. 33-69); Lecture III: "of 
the King and First of his Coronation Oath" (Kings 81, pp. 
70-93)'; -Lecture IV: " "Of the Kings Prerogative and First of 
his Prerogative of Power and Exemption" (Kings 81, pp. 94- 
127). in this series Johnson's most distinguished contri- 
butions concern economics and kingship. Concepts of eco- 
nomics and kingship exerted great influence on the devel- 
opment and operation of the law. In his comments on eco- 
nomics and his examination of kingship, Johnson reveals 
important keys to the understanding of his legal thinking. 
In his discussion of the coronation oath Johnson 
works from an earlier appreciation of the Saxon oath (cf. 
Seiden: tit. 1-4e-1 1 part 1st C. 8. Sect 2) to the present, 
more elaborate formulary. His'approach is anthropological 
as he 'understands the compensations derived especially by 
primitive people from ceremony: 
It will be found by observation that when 
countries emerge from barbarity, the first 
approaches to elegance and civility are 
made (by) 84 
by public celebrities and formal magnifi- 
cence. While men are gross and ignorant, 
unskilled in the arts of reasoning, and 
enjoying few opportunities of information 
and instruction, they are much influenced by 
unusual and splendid ceremonies which strongly 
affect the imagination and leave deep im- 
pressions on the memory. Nations as well as 
individuals have their childhood, and the 
mind, unformed by reflection and unoccupied 
265: 
by knowledge, must receive its whole 
intelligence immediately from the senses. 
When coronations therefore were first 
contrived they were probably of great 
use. As they procured veneration to the 
person of the king, they at least con- 
firmed-his authority though they did 
not give it. 
167 
By suggesting the difference between confirming authority 
and giving it, Johnson raises an important legal and pol- 
itical distinction. The question left somewhat unanswer- 
ed is what determines legitimacy. Johnson implies that 
while people may recognize power or authority, it will be 
an ecclesiastical source that anoints. 
The psychological and political significance of this 
effective consecration is not lost on Johnson. He is 
aware that in rude society the closeness of the church- 
state relationship is a powerful one; 
In that Age of prejudice. and ignorance, 
when the civil institutions were yet 
few, and the securities of legal obliga- 
tion were very weak, both offences against 
the law were often unpunished and because 
the (law) 86 
law itself could be but little known, it 
was necessary to invest the king with 
something of a sacred character that might 
secure obedience by reverence and more 
effec". ally preserve his person from danger 
of violation. For this reason it was neces- 
sary to interpose the clerical authority, 
that the crown being imposed by a holy 
hand might communicate some sanctity to 
him that wore it. And, accordingly, the 
inauguration of a King is by our antient 
historians termed consecration; and the 
writings, both fabulous and historical, 
of the middle Ages connect with royalty 
167. Kings 81, pp. 84-85. 
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some' supernatural privileges and 
powers. 
168 
Johnson also realizes that this sacerdotal intervention 
in the political process has grave constitutional raiii- 
fications. For Johnson realizes that: 
Such an oath could be required by no 
civil power because all civil power 
was subordinate to the king. But, in 
the opinion of our superstitious 
ancestors, the ecclesiastics(might)' 
89 
might impose it by the rights of the. 
priesthood which Kings do not-give and 
cannot take away. 
169 
in his understanding of this history, Johnson pointed out 
not only the potential development of church'influenced 
170 
constitutional law but also lessons that may be ap- 
171 
plied to the Jacobean controversy. However, the main 
issues that arise from this situation are how contemporary 
legal maxims or principles are to be evaluated. 
Although these lectures concern the historical ori- 
gins of Kingship, there is muchdiscussion of certain le- 
168. Kings 81, pp. 86-87. 
169. Kings 81, pp. 89-90. 
170. Kern, p. 40; Writing of the political significance 
of royal consecration, Kern corroborates the point 
Johnson is making: "Because of the sacerdotal char- 
acter which consecration conferred upon the king, 
its mystical effects were reflected in the law of 
the Church, and in consequence of the close bonds 
between Church and State, church law could hardly 
have failed in any circumstances to influence con- 
stitutional law". 
171. cf . Johnson's com¢nents on the 
Stuarts,, Life II, p. 
27-29. 
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gal principles that-for Johnson are still viable or ap- 
172 
plicable. Of particular interest is the treatment 
given the maxim: 'the king can do no wrong' (Co Litt: 
198 B. ). Of this maxim Johnson says: 
That this maxim may be morally and 
physically false, it is not difficult 
to discover. But in the legal sense it 
is generally true, for the king cannot 
be supposed to do much but by previous 
advice and subsequent 
117 
" ministration, and the peace'of 
the world is sufficiently secured by 
the power which the law always retains 
of vindicating itself from violation by 
thepunishment of evil counsellors and 
evil ministers. Of this maxim, so 
magnificent in sound, the true sense 
is only this: that when wrong is done 
it is not to be charged to the King, 
who being the original of all criminal 
jurisdiction cannot be supposed 
accountable to himself. The blame 
must therefore be thrown where punish- 
ment can be inflicted, and falls, not 
only legally but justly, upon those 
who if not the original authors must, 
almost in all cases where wrong is 
done, be the immediate agents. 
173 
In this position Johnson reflects a philosophical atti- 
174 
tude similar to Locke,. but carefully suggests the ques- 
172. 'Life I, pp. 423-424; where Johnson and Goldsmith dis- 
cuss this legal maxim. 
173. Kings 81, pp. 117-118. 
174. John Locke, 'The Second Treatise of'Government, ed. 
Thomas P. Pear on, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merril 
Co., Inc., 1952), Chap. VII., 94, p. 54: "No man in 
civil society can be exempted from the laws of it; 
for it any man may do what he thinks fit, and there 
be no appeal on earth for redress or security 
against any harm he shall do, I ask whether he be 
not perfectly still in the state of nature, and 
so can be no part or member of that civil society; 
unless any one'will say the state of nature and 
civil society are one and the same thing, which I 
have never yet found any one so great a patron of 
anarchy as to affirm. " 
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tion of state immunity and the concurrent obligations 
under which a king must operate.. By distinguishing the 
role of a king, Johnson, on the one hand, is able to 
maintain a recognition of the king's legal status, and, 
on the other hand, *the perception-that some element of 
responsibility still exists. The issue of agency is 
raised in such 'a way as to limit the potential political 
damage to the monarchy. However, since the source itself 
is not liable to sanction, the law must be seen to be 
inadequate and undone. 
Much*of Johnson's thinking is colored-by his experi- 
175 
ence'of poverty and the desire for security. From 
these concerns spring Johnson's deep interest in economic 
thought and commercial history. In this fourth lecture 
on the King's prerogative, he takes the opportunity to 
write 'of the -history of trade : 
In the present age when every village 
is stored with shops, and every road 
encumbered with carriages, and all the 
necessaries and luxuries of life solicit 
us to purchase them at our own doors, we 
do not readily comprehend the great import- 
ance of fairs and markets. To know, there- 
fore, how much they contributed to plenty 
and convenience, we must place ourselves 
in an age when there was no post by which 
one man could make his wants known at a 
distance, to*another; when by the want of 
intercourse the state of few men's fortune 
110 
was known, and therefore. very little credit 
could be given; when there was not money 
sufficient:. to fill up by its circulation 
all the wants of life, and a great part 
of the nation lived upon the immediate pro- 
duce of the earth,. fixed, either by physi- 
175. Bate, ' The' Achievement' of'Samuel Johnson, pp. 74-128. 
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cal or legal necessity, to the turf on which 
they labored ..................... ill 
The modes of common life when they are once 
changed are easily forgotten, for no man records 
that which when records it is already known to 
all mankind. We have, therefore, no distinct 
view of the methods by which the internal com- 
merce of the country was transacted, and a 
distribution made of manufactures and commodi- 
ties. It is believed that when a fair was 
held at any seaport or large town, the petty 
traders from smaller places gathered up the 
horses of the country and purchased commodities 
at the fair for their respective shops, in such 
quantities as they expected to be sufficient 
till the same opportunities of purchase should 
return. They 112 
were probably accommodated on their journey at 
religious houses, for as men in those days 
travelled but little, few inns could be main- 
tained. 176 
Johnson's placement of these remarks in the context of 
this lecture is not surprising. Throughout the lectures 
economic and conmercial concerns are woven into the pat- 
terns of his legal thinking. Johnson understands the re- 
lationships among economics, power, and politics that de- 
177 
. velop 
laws. Adding these concerns with his interest in 
176. Kings 81, pp. 110-113. 
177, cf. Kings 82, pp. 117-118; In lecture VII "of the 
House of Commons", Johnson writes on the changing 
nature of money and the difficulty in ascertaining 
the true value of quit-rents which determine politi- 
cal representation: "It is one of the defects of 
civil knowledge that property is yet only estimated 
by denominations of money, which have not the same 
ultimate meaning in two places or in two years. Money 
is in some sense only the shadow of property and is, 
like the shadow, always varying its proportion to the 
substance. By this mode of computation quit-rents 
are almost annihilated, and ecclesiastical revenues 
are very much impaired. The time will perhaps come 
when the law that qualifies candidates shall depart 
as far from the original intention as that which now 
qualifies electors. But to compute by pecuniary no- 
tation is most easy and most intelligible at the 
present time; every age provides for itself, and is 
content to leave the same obligation on posterity. " 
Here, ''Johnson points out the , 
inherent weakness in 
determining the. qualification for electors who are 
subject to 'ma]ggant operations' and are constituents by some financial standard. Essentially, Johnson is 
writing about the intricate relation between money and politics in a very practical manner. 
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law and moral philosophy; Johnson is working within the 
main stream of enlightenment thinking. His interest in 
mixing sociology, economics and, legal history is charact- 
eristic of the. way Johnson defines his jurisprudential 
thinking in these lectures. 
----V---- 
In the remaining twelve lectures. of "Part I Contain- 
ing the Publick Law of England", Johnson's most important 
contributions are found in:. *Lecture V: "Of the King's 
Preogative'o£ Possession or his antient and established 
Revenue" (Kings 82, pp. 2-37); Lecture IX: "0f Courts of 
Justice, and First of General Courts of Common Law and 
Equity" (Kings 83, pp. 45-76); Lectute XII: "Of'Civil 
Rank, Order and Precedence" (Kings 84, pp. 86-118); Lec- 
ture XV: "Of the Government of Ireland and the American 
Provinces" (Kings 86, pp. 2-42). In these lectures John- 
son explores themes of estate. forfeiture, aspects of 
equity, status and precedence, and the position of the 
American colonies. On all these topics Johnson writes in 
a general manner but betrays a hard conservatism. 
This attitude 'is best seen in Johnson's discussion 
of estates forfeited to the crown because of treason. He 
seems to feel that the sins of the father may be visited 
on the son: 





to many hard, and to 
Le, that the son should be 
the father's crimes, which 
32 
nor'approved. But no man 
271 
ought-rashly to censure this 'regulation, 
till he has considered the multifarious 
relations of civil life, the different 
modes by. which artificial property is 
acquired, and the different principles 
upon which it is possessed. It must be 
remembered that, though a man may have 
some natural claim to possession, yet he 
has no natural right to be protected in 
the exercise of those claims, or vindicated 
from their violation, that the obligation 
of one man to defend another arises merely 
from mutual compact, that a compact implies 
conditions, and that of the conditions 
on which any society shall unite, 
that society must be judge. Different 
societies, indeed, judge differently, 
and. we may therefore suppose some of them 
to judge amiss. But'if we consider how 
many ages and nations, ages in which 
knowledge has been most diffused 33 
and nations in which legislation has been 
most cultivated, have concurred in appoint- 
ing this punishment of treason, we shall 
be inclined to believe these securities 
of public peace salutary to mankind; and 
as rebellions and civil wars are the 
greatest evils that can happen to a people, 
will think that people most happy in which 
as they are most severely punished they 
are 'most effectt'ally prevented. 
178 
In this harsh view of the way in which the social compact 
179 
operates, Johnson reflects the hardness of Hobbes. 
Moreover, the idea of punishment expressed in this ex- 
cerpt runs counter to the general enlightened view of 
178. Kings 82, pp. 32-34. 
179. Goldsmith, `pp. 116-177; "The science of politics 
indicates what powers are necessary to a state, and 
perhaps even what sorts of actions will make it 
strongest; it indicates the necessary limits of 
those powers and the duties of the sovereign. Hobbes 
regarded the function of government as the preserva- 
tion of order or peace, the conditions necessary for 
the existence of human beings. He does not incline 
to Locke's view that men are naturally peaceable, 
and therefore that government is necessary only be- 




proportion in determining punishment. Johnson does not 
address the question of social utility or propriety in 
the exercise of such authority. He does, however, indi- 
cate his abhorrence of social and political unrest. Since 
this forfeiture is the product of treason, Johnson is con- 
sistent when he permits such severity because treason 
undermines the 'established state. 
In the ninth lecture' Johnson makes his first substan- 
tial comments on equity. Writing on the general quality 
of equity, he says: 
It ha's appeared to some a question dif- 
ficult of decision what is the use of a 
court of equity if our laws are right, and 
what is the use of laws if they are wrong. 
This question supposes in human institutions 
a degree of excellence which they have never 
attained. No human law was ever perfect; it 
has always equity for its object, but it 
sometimes misses of its end. The imper- 
fections of our criminal law are therefore 
remedied by the mercy of the king, and those 
of our civil institutions by the equity of 
the chancery. Yet law is not unnecessary; 
by laws against crimes wickedness is restrain- 
ed, by laws relating to property commerce is 
regulated and possession is secured. The 
subject has, in the law, a rule of action 
always safe, and commonly right; and where 
it happens to be wrong 
59 
a remedy is provided. 
181 
This fallibility in human institutions which requires some 
compensating force. provides the reason behind concepts of 
180. Maestro, Voltaire' and'Beccaria as' Reformers of Crim- 
' final' Law, pp. 38,62,118. 
181. Kings 83, pp. 59-60. 
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equity. Equity which departs from the formal law because 
it helps decide cases on their individual merit reflects 
a strong moral component. There is a problem inherent-in 
182 
equity between justice and law which Aristotle addresses 
and Johnson attempts to reconcile. The fundamental ques- 
tion rests with the distinction between ! what the law is' 
and 'what the law should be'. Johnson points out the 
position of equity in terms of natural justice and its 
appropriateness as a remedy. 
in this effort, Johnson- assimilates the basic ideas 
183 
of his friend Henry Ballow. in his treatise on equity 
Hallow writes: 
Equity therefore, as it stands for the whole 
of natural Justice, is more excellent than 
any human institution; Neither are positive 
Laws, even in matters seemingly indifferent,, 
any-further binding, than they are agreeable 
with the Law of God and Nature, But the 
Precepts of the Natural Law, 'when enforced 
by the Laws of Man, are so far from losing 
any thing äE their former excellence, that 
they receive an additional strength and 
sanction. Yet as the rules of the Municipal 
law are finite, and the Subject is infinite, 
there will often fall out cases, which cannot 
be determined by them; for there can be no 
finite Rule of an infinite matter, perfect, 
so that there will be a necessity of having 
182. Aristotle, Nicomachean'Ethics, Bk 5, c. 10 "For 
equity, while superior to one sort, of justice,, is 
itself just: it is not superior to justice as being 
generically different from it. Justice and equity 
are therefore the same thing, and both are good, 
though equity is the better. The source of the 
difficulty is that equity, though just, is not legal 
justice, but a rectification of legal justice. The 
reason for this is that law is always a general 
statement, yet there are cases which it is not pos- 
sible to cover in a general statement. "* 
183. "Life III, 22; 472-473. 
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recourse to the Natural principles; that 
what was wanting to the 'finite, nay be 
" supplied out of that which is infinite. 
And this is what is properly called Equity 
in-opposition*to Strict Law; and seems to 
bear something of the same proportion to 
it in the Moral, as Art does to Nature in 
the material world. For as the universal 
law of matter would in my instances prove 
harmful to Particulars, if Art were not 
to interpose and direct them aright; so 
the general precepts of the Municipal .' Law would often not be able to attain their 
end, if Equity did not come in aid of them. 
184 
Working within this framework of natural law theory, Bal- 
low advances a philosophical justification for equity. 
In Johnson's remarks, he reflects the same philosophical 
understanding, but focuses on its application' 
Johnson does this by examining the practical need for 
equity when civil laws have been legislated. It is the 
imperfectibility of man and his institutions that inter- 
ests Johnson. In Sermon'24 Johnson writes: "all institu- 
tions are defective by their nature; and all rulers have 
185 
their imperfections". In order to rectify this insuf- 
184. Henry Ballow, "A Treatise of Equity, (London: E. and 
R. Nutt, and R. Gosling, assigns of Edward Sayer, 
esq., for D. Browne, at the Black Swan without Temple- 
Bär; and J. Shuckburgh, at the Sun next the Inner 
Temple Gate in Fleetstreet, 1737), pp. 2-3. 
185. Sermon 24, p. 259 (Yale ed. ), cf. p. 256: "Human laws, 
owev r onestly instituted, or however vigorously 
enforced, must be limited in their effect, partly by our ignorance, and partly by our weakness. Daily experi- 
ence may convince us, that all the avenues by which injury and oppression may break in upon life, cannot be guarded by positive prohibitions. Every man sees, 
and may feel, evils, which no law can punish. And 
not only will there always remain possibilities of 
guilt, which legislative foresight cannot discover, 
but the laws will be often violated by wicked men, 
whose subtlety eludes detection, and whom therefore 
vindictive justice cannot bring within the reach of 
punishment. These deficiencies in civil life can be 
supplied only by religion. " It is from this relig- ious base that Ballow and Johnson derive the moral 
precepts that help to form the natural law and the 
principles of equity of which it is a part. 
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ficiency in the law, Johnson relies on'equity to provide 
balance and justice. Certainly,, as Johnson points out 
equity itself is not sufficient and there is need for 
positive laws. But equity which has its origin in the 
moral principles that are part of the natural law can be 
the best arbitrator. On the one hand, Johnson seems to 
respect the maxim; ' Bonfis jude., *secundum aequum et bonum 
- 'judicat', ' et' 'aequitatem 'strictc juri praefert (Co. Litt. 24) , 
and on the other, stresses the legitimacy of action and 
remedy provided by the positive law. 
4 
___.. vi---- 
It is certainly correct that as Greene points out 
"Johnson believed in rank, to be sure; but there is no 
evidence that he believed in class, which in later senses 
186 
of the word, is an entirely different matter. " In the 
twelfth lecture of this series, Johnson gives some reasons 
for his respect and acceptance of the propriety of rank. 
Writing of both his understanding of political society 
and the place rank holds in it for orderly growth, John- 
son says: 
Political society is that state of an 
in wh`ich*some govern and others are 
governed; it therefore necessarily 
implies subordination, and ranks those 
of which it is composed In different 
degrees. In a speculative system of 
government the mind may satisfy 86 
186. Greene, * Politic's' o'f' Samuel Johnson, p. 234; cf., Life 
is pp. 443,447-448; Li e III, pp. 55,353. 
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itself'with. temporary subordination 
.. and suppose 
that part to be governed at 
one time which governs at another. But 
as experience immediately shaws that but 
a very small number-of any society are 
qualified to regulate manners or super- 
intend the interest of the rest, and that 
these qualifications must be. the'effect 
of study and enquiry not easily made 
consistent with manual labor or the con- 
stant solicitudes of husbandry or trade, 
almost every civilized nation has dis-. 
tributed its inhabitants into different 
orders and, by conferring established 
precedence and Ii rýe"ditary hono(*; $AFj has in 
some sense designated from the birth a 
certain number to public cares and 
87 
liberal employments. 
Riches long continued in a family 
constitute a kind of nobility without 
any positive designation, and where 
the rank of nobles is established by an 
edict of the sovereign authority riches 
have always been considered as a" motive 
to preference. 
Of all kinds of superiority that of riches 
is most notorious and least disputable. 
it has been alleged by modern politicians, 
and alleged with reason, that rich men 
ought to be more trusted than others by 
the public because they have more to lose 
by bad administration. We are not, however, 
too readily. to imagine that the institutions 
of our savage ancestors were founded in deep 
research or refined ratiocination. Riches 
always obtained 88 
honour, because riches always comprized the 
power of benefaction. Those who had less 
than they wanted adhered naturally to those 
who had more. But there is likewise another 
reason; wealth is the only 'superiority that 
can be successively transmitted. The son 
of a rich man will be rich, but the son of 
a wise man will not always be wise. Wealth 
is therefore perhaps the only ground of 
hereditary greatness. 
187 
187. Kings 84, pp. 86-89. 
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Within this historical context Johnson makes observations 
on order and precedence 'that reflect his usual inconsist- 
ency. He does not want to see political society as 
exclusive, but neither does he want to lose sight of the 
need for continuity. 
This attitude becomes clearer when Johnson remarks 
on the effect of precedence for his own generation: 
The doctrine of precedence is in our 
time very little "studied. in a 
country of co=erce and an age of 
action, every man is more diligent 
to press on those that go before him, 
than to turn back and stop the en- 
croachments of those that follow him. 
And. precedence, or, what is of more 
importance, that respect which prece- 
dence is intended to imply, will be 
proportioned to every man's riches or 
usefulness, to his acknowledged power 
of benefitting others or his supposed 
abilities 
115 
to acquire it. 
188 
Although these remarks reflect primarily sociological con- 
cerns, th189have legal implications for both property and 
politics. In his apprehension of this relationship, 
Johnson agrees with Adam Smith's thesis that property is 
190 
a determinant for law and civil society. The distri- 
188. Kings 84, pp. 115-116. 
189. cf. B1'. ' Comm. I. C. 2. p. 157-159. 
190. Adam Smith, ' Wealth of Nations, Cannan ed. Bk. V, pt 
2, p. 670: "Civil government supposed a certain sub- 
ordination. But as the necessity of civil govern- 
ment gradually grows up with the acquisition of 
valuable property, so the principal causes which 
naturally introduce subordination gradually grow up 
with the growth of that valuable property. " 
als 
bution of property controls the political process and the 
framing and execution of its laws.. Johnson appreciates 
191 
the importance of rank and social order on political 
society. His intellectual indecis; -vies is the result of 
conflicting moral hopes and social. reality, but it is com- 
mon sense and observation' that leads Johnson to respect 
rank and the power it wields. 
192 
The antecedents to his pamphlet Taxation No Tyranny 
are found in Johnson's contribution to"Lecture XV"on the 
American provinces. Writing on the moral and legal status 
of political representation by colonists, Johnson points 
out: 
................ But a question has been lately raised and agitated, for some reason 
or other, with uncoimnon warmth, whether our 
colonies. are bound by the statutes of tax- 
ation, or whether any part of the public 
expense shall be required from them. The 
'moral part of this question is in my opinion 
191. cf. John Millar, Observations Concerning the Distinc- 
tion, of Ranks in Society 7; William e ann, 
" Jon Millar of Glasgow 1735-1801: His Life and 
Thought and his Contributions to sociological Analy- 
sis (Cambridge: At the Univ. 'Press, 1960). 
Despite a Whiggish'comple: ->cion, Millar's thinking 
and method parallel that of Johnson's. Both function 
as 'philosophical historians', show deep concern for 
the poor, have a strong, underlying moral texture, 
abhor slavery yet respect the traditions of rank in 
civilized society. However, this does not mean that 
Millar accepted subordination, but that he sought 
the enlightened use of any vestigial prerogatives. 
Moreover, Millar's analysis of property and his 
appreciation of power relationships in society, 
thdugh'somewhat different from Johnson's, reflect a 
sociological understanding of the way society oper- 
ates. 
192. cf. Political' writing (Yale ed. ) ed. Greene, pp. 401- 
455; all quotations from this pamphlet taken from 
Yale ed. 
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easily decided; no man has a right to any 
good without partaking of the evil by which 
that good is necessarily produced; no an 
has a right to security by another's danger, 
nor to plenty by another's labour, but as he 
gives something of his own which he who meets 
the danger undergoes the labour considers 
as equivalent; No man has a right to the 
36 
security of government without bearing his . share"of its inconveniences. Those who 
encrease the expenses of the public ought 
to supply their proportion of the expenses 
encrýaSeýQ, 
193 
Johnson explores a legal argument against the colonists' 
abnegation of their political responsibility to the 
Crown. Government works in a compact of rights and 
duties, and it is the perception of how these function 
that frames the issue involved in this dispute. Moreover, 
194 
Johnson, who sees a moral component in government, ex- 
amines the relationship between crown and colony in an 
effott to set out the applicability of authority and the 
limits of sovereignty. Here, ' it is the'question of tax- 
ation and what determines its legitimate imposition that 
is the focus of the dispute. 
In his examination of these issues, Johnson attacks 
the supposition that the colonies cannot be legally taxed 
because it is not done by the consent of their represent- ", 
195 
atives. Johnson pöints out the inaccuracy of this 
193. Kings 86, pp. 36-37. 
194. cf. Sermon'23 and Sermon, 24, for the way Johnson 
develops a moral an re igious texture for his 
understanding of government. 
195. cf.: 'Taxation No'Tyranny pp. 433-434; Johnson sets 
out the current manner of choosing representatives' 
in Britain. 
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assert(an: ', f-f 
The 'whole difficulty, therefore, of'this 
question must arise from positive institu- 
tions; and it has been objected that our 
colonies cannot legally be taxed, because 
every subject of this kingdom is taxed by 
the consent of his representative. That the 
British Empire in general is represented 
by the British Parliament, the law uniformly 
supposes, but if we attempt to subdivide this 
representation and consider what proportion 
the 'representing powers bear to the numbers 
represented, we shall 
38 
find nothing but-deficiency, vacuity, and con- 
-fusion -- small villages with two representa 
tives, the greatest city in. the world, with 
only four, and many large and opulent towns 
to which, having risen since the original 
regulation, no representatives have ever 
been granted. Our House of Commons, therefore, 
with whatever observance of proportion it was 
instituted at first, can now be considered 
only as a body of men summoned to consult 
the general interest of the community with 
very little or no reference of particular 
men to particular places. 
196 
ýf 
Johnson advances the line of reasoning that Parliament 
has not had actual proportional representation for cent- 
uries. it does have representation by interests, and 
should have representation by both virtue and wisdom act- 
ing for the common good. In this way he suggests that 
colonists enjoy the same degree of-representation as the 
197 
majority of British citizens. However, the cogency 
of his argument is undermined by the specious claim that 
"it cannot be charged as injustice that we do not for our 
colonies what we do not for ourselves, that we content 
196. Kings 86, pp. 38-39. 
197. ' Taxation' No Tyranny, p. 431: Johnson discusses the 
so-called in erita e right as elector. 
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ourselves with the ancient mode 'Of election, notwithstand- 
ing the changes that have been made. amongst us by commerce 
198 
and by time. " The changing nature of property and its 
assessment for voting purposes is mentioned by Johnson, 
but is seemingly dismissed as insignificant in terms of 
quality of. parliamentary representation. 
Nevertheless, since this point is raised by the 
colonists, Johnson'must argue against it. He says that: 
If it be argued that on these principles 
the colonists may be taxed without due 
attention or full knowledge of their abil- 
ities, the same argument 
40 
might be used by the trading companies. 
if it shall be said that they may be taxed 
wantonly, because the legislators pay no 
part of the taxes imposed upon them, it 
must be considered that if they are useful 
and beneficial to their mother country it 
can never be our interest to diminish their 
usefulness or obstruct the benefits that 
we receive ourselves. 
199 
By contrasting the argument of the colonists with the po- 
'200 
sition of trading companies, Johnson chooses an exam- 
'ple that deals with'the property qualification as well as 
the direct issue of representation. While this is a 
clever precedent to cite, there is'a fundamental weakness 
in its applicability. The equation made between company 
and colony implies that both enjoy the same legal status 
198. Kings 86, pp. 39-40. 
199. Kings 86, pp. 40-41. 
200. cf. Taxation'No'Tyranny, pp. 423-425,432; where 
Johnson exp ores respective charters of colonies and 
corporations. 
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and relation in usefulness to the crown. Since both have 
their origin in charter, the *suggestion in Johnson's argu- 
ment is that colonies have 'the 'same type of sovereignty' 
. 201 .. 
as the East India Company. However, this ignores the 
rights of citizenship the British colonists have not 
renounced. And it is the definition of citizenship and 
concomitant rights that distinguishes their respective 
legal status. 
Johnson endows the government with both. discretion 
and sapience in prescribing laws and determining levels 
of taxation; 
We 'shall be restrained from oppression 
by that great principle which holds 
all empires together, 'that the hap- 
piness of the whole is the happiness 
of its parts'. It appears, therefore, 
reasonable'to conclude that all colon- 
i2. s may be taxed by that state on which 
they depend for support, and to which 
they fly for protection, and that 
41 
English-'colonies may . (whenever it shall 
be found necessary or expedient) be 
taxed by the English legislature, on 
principles equally reasonable and just 
with those on which the publick expenses 
are'levied on the greater part of their 
fellow subjects. 
202 
In essence, Johnson maintains that by claiming the rights 
201. Letters, 187.2,197.3 (Chapman Edition, pp. 193-194). 
202. Kings 86, pp. 41-42. 
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of Englishmen203 and-the protection of England, the col- 
onists must accept the 'responsibility of those rights and 
the burden of their cost. And it is the authority inher- 
ent in sovereignty that apportions the benefits of these 
rights and the definition of these duties. Both benevo- 
lence'and understanding are required on the part of 
government in its effort to perpetuate the happiness of 
the governed. When Johnson adopts this government knows 
best attitude, he reflects an extreme utilitarian stand- 
204 
and for the rule of law fashioned according to the 
government's interpretation. 
These lectures are'an appropriate forum for Johnson 
to discuss the legal arguments --raging over the American 
colonies. Not only are the political issues pertinent to 
the development of the law, but a legal context may offer 
203. cf. Julius S. Waterman, 'Thomas Jefferson and Black- 
stone's Commentaries', in Essays in the History of 
Early American Law, ed. Fla erty, pp. 451-4b7, for a 
survey ot He wor of those scholars who accept the 
thesis that Blackstone's Commentaries provided the 
cornerstone of 18t C. American legal theory. An 
understanding of these rights is gained from Black-. 
stone. Gary Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's 
Declaration of Independence (NY: Doubleday and o. 
Inc., IM), for a detailed examination of the legal 
and political theory behind Jefferson's concept of 
the 'rights of Englishmen '. Wills' textual analy- 
sis provides contemporary information on the coloni- 
al perception of these rights and the English under- 
standing of the corresponding duties. 
204. cf. Cicero, ' De' Legibus, Bk I, XV: y; -' XVI -45, pp. 
344-347; 
Grotius, * De Jure' Belli' et' Pacis, Prolegomena 16-18, 
pp. xlix- i, were Johnson's use of such extreme 
utility is repudiated and where-the place of utility 
is distinguished in relations between communities. 
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the most effective mode for persuasion. 
205 
In his remarks 
Johnson writes from his concern for-the potential disin- 
tegration of society and the breakdown of the rule of law. 
His enquiry into the'nature"of a colony and its relation 
to the mother country rests not on principles derived 
from Locke on the-power of taxation, but on the precedent 
of English political institutions. Moreover it is self- 
evident to Johnson that consent has its reciprocal com- 
ponent. Since the colonists claim the rights of English- 
men, they must accept the responsibilities of British 
citizenship. Within the structure of British government, 
the power to tax rests with Parliament. it is Parliament 
that sets the level and type of taxation, or can delegate 
aspects of its taxing authority. Johnson, therefore, 
asserts that Parliament enjoys jurisdiction over the col- 
onists and by the nature'of colonial charters has the 
legal status to decide 'their management. Johnson's dis- 
cussion is neither flamboyant nor inflammatory As in 
Taxation No Tyranny. Instead, he offers a dignified rea- 
205. cf. Edmund Burke, 'Speech on Conciliation with the 
Colonies', ed. Bate, pp. 126-129; Writing of the 
agitation in the colonies which he calls 'this un- 
tractable spirit', Burke says: "I mean their educa- 
tion. In no country, perhaps, in the world is the 
law so general a study. ... I hear that they have 
sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in 
America as in England.... This study arers 
men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, 
ready in defence, full of resources. In other coun- 
tries, the people, more simple, and of a less mercur- 
ial cast, judge of an ill principle in government 
only by an acute grievance; here they anticipate the 
evil, and judge of the pressure of the grievance by 
the badness of-the principle. They augur mis- 
government at a distance, and snuff the approach of 
tyranny in every tainted breeze. " 
i 
soned legal presentation that displays his skills of 
legal writing and advocacy. 
-_-_yii ---- 
Johnson's contributions to Part II: "Concerning the 
206 
Criminal Law of England" reveal his understanding of the 
social and political history that helps to formulate the 
criminal law. in these lectures Johnson explores an 
early principle of penal laws, mentions the clergy as 
guardians of'learning,, explains the contravention of cur- 
rency regulations, and analyzes the crime of forgery. All 
of these themes are treated in a way which helps to define 
the pattern of Johnson's legal thinking. Johnson reviews 
these subjects in relation to their history and reflects 
the impact of contemporary legal theory. From his treat- 
ment of these elements of the criminal law, Johnson de- 
rives his political position and shows how this affects 
his jurisprudential thinking. ' 
In the'first lecture'on the nature of punishment, 
Johnson sets forth a view of man as a . 
fallen creature with 
207 
a deeply ingrained tendency to evil. There is a Hobbesian 
206. Lecture I: "Of Criminal Law and First of the General 
Nature of Punishments" (Kings 87, pp. 5,6,18,19); 
Lecture IV: "Of the Benefits of Clergy" (Kings 88, 
pp. 11,12); Lecture VII: "Of Felonies and Inferiour 
Offences immediately against the Government" (Kings 
88, pp. 132-133); Lecture X: "Of Offences against 
Property and first of Arson, Burglary, Mal'i'cious 
'Mischief and Forgery" (Kings 89, pp. 79-80). 
207. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. 14, p. 103; Chap. 15, pp. 113-114; 
Hobbes describes the fundamental law of nature and mu- 
tual trust as a constituent of justice and propriety 
in the formation of the common wealth. Hobbes' fa- 
mous aphorism: "The fear of punishment maketh men just: ' 
285 
286 
quality about Johnson's observations: 
Every man desires to retain his own-in 
proportion as he desires to seize what is 
another's, and no man can be allowed to 
rob, where none are willing to be robbed; 
We, ' therefore, mutually agree to protect 
and be protected, and every invader of 
property is . apposed by the whole connnun- ity, at least that part of it which has 
anything to lose. 
9 
The same account may be given of the 
means by which the irascible passions are 
restrained. r, ')v\ wo at sair nýzýLL Injto 
hurt another but that he is afraid of 
being hurt himself. 
Thus we permit anger and revenge to be 
restrained by law, because if they were 
once let loose upon mankind one mis- 
chief would forever beget another, and 
he'thät had been oftenest conqueror would 
at least be conquered. 
208 
r 
In this view criminal laws develop because of the need 
for security and out of fear. The' distinctive feature of 
this opinion is that for the nature of man to be governed, 
an idea of authority zaust be established. Legal author- 
ity has its origin in the desire to direct these passions 
and in doing this elucidates those coercive orders which 
tobe effective must have an element of sanction with 
them. Characteristically, Johnson focuses on the place 
of coercion and morality in his description of early pun- 
ishment. 
Johnson combines his thinking on coercion and moral- 
ity with principles of pleasure and pain. He introduces 
a religious sense in the conflict between good and evil 
208. Kings 87, pp. 9-10. 
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when he writes: 
The. great strength 'of human laws arises 
from the constitution of things ordained by 
Providence, by which man is so formed and 
disposed that he'can suffer more than he can 
enjoy. if the evil of pena; ty could not 
exceed the advantage of wickedness, the 
mind, so far as it is influenced merely 
by the laws of man, could never pass beyond 
an equipose of passion, and the nearer good 
would generally outweigh the remoter evil. 
But such is the frame of man that the dread 
of evil may be always made more powerful 
than the appetite of. good ............... 
Even the Lex Talionis has upon this princi- 
ple. 'a very powerful operation, for no. man 
can have as much-pleasure in pulling out 
the eyes of another as he will suffer pain 
from the pulling out of his own .......... 
To this principle, which is easily discov- 
ered, society owes all its power over 
individuals. It was soon found that pain 
would be too powerful for pleasure, and the 
question then remaining was, on what occa- 




In this excerpt Johnson reflects the thinking of Grotius 
211 
more than that of Beccaria. While he is not actually 
calling for harsh retaliation, Johnson does not emphasize 
reformation in this view of punishment as deterrent. He 
does, however, consider the'object of the first principle 
of penal laws to be*a deliberate attempt to secure happi- 
ness for the greatest number. And to Johnson it is self- 
209. Kings 87, pp. 1$--19: cf. footnote 141 on-Lex Talionis 
in Saxon times. 
210. Grotius, De , Jure' Belli et' Pacis, Bk. II, chap. 20. xi, 
p. 240: "Est autem poena genera i significatu Malum 
12as-sionis, quod infligitur ob ma um actionis. 
211. *Beccaria, On Crimes'and. Punishments, @1 "of the Right 
to Punish" w . ere i is argued that punishment should be more corrective and deterrent than vindictive. 
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evident that man in his first search for happiness requires 
the perception, at least, of a safe environment. A mayor 
consideration of such' protection is the rule of law. But 
for the law to be effective'it must have sanctions, and 
as society develops, the nature of these'sanctions must 
change. Johnson recognizes that-for punishment to be just, 
it must be applied in proportion to the enormity of the 
212 
evil committed. in this lecture Johnson discusses the 
evolution of society's attitude for punishment and the 
laws initially framed from this realization. 
in the*fourth'lecture on the benefit of clergy, John- 
son's contribution is the section on preservation. His 
comments here may be. seen as addenda or expansion of his 
213 
earlier remarks on the palliative forces of Christianity. 
Writing of the'clergy as guardians of learning, Johnson 
points out: 
The clergy were chiefly employed in all 
cases where a cultivated understanding 
was required, because all learning was 
confined to the clerical order. The 
learning here intended is not restrained 
to difficult speculations, for the 
clergy were necessarily called if there 
was a record to be read or a contract to 
be written, because the clergy were almost 
the only men that in those days could read 
and write. 
The accounts occasionally-transmitted to 
us of the grossness and ignorance of the 
feudal ages make it evident that, without 
some order of men devoted to literature, 
the business of life could scarce have 
212. cf., my discussion of Rambler 114, chapter 
Pp. 40-51. 
213, cf. pp. 246-249. 
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been transacted; and perhaps-in the 
long continuance of that state of 
violenee. this 1 c-a, ýy order ýouýa sCä, rce(c{ 
hav svbýýs4e& wltQu i-rn 5tcu-r 4-, j of 
r0i chi cýus M\)Q_ f'LnCP_. 214 
As an historian Johnson wants to stress the vital role 
the clergy filled in feudal society. Without these men 
there would be ho records of legal decisions or few writ- 
ten texts of legal thinkers. The clergy were worthy 
enough'to be scribes or to be privy to private affairs. 
In underscoring this function of the clergy, Johnson wants 
to indicate how some. of the benefits the clergy enjoyed 
were deserved. 
The clergy "whose character restrained them at least 
from open violence and avowed contempt of reason and of 
X15 
justice" were'seen as impartial and were perceived by 
the conununity as arbitrators. Because of the respect they 
f 
had, Johnson makes this historical judgment: 
The priest was naturally a lover of 
peace because he suffered many of the 
calamities of war and had no hope of 
plunder or of honor. He was by his 
celibacy much disengaged from the 
prejudices of alliance, which are 
known to be in feudal countries the 
great sources of corruption and in- 
justice. As he held his estate only 
for life, his power and riches, what- 
ever they were, regarded with less 
jealousy; and his ý_srsö tr_n being con- 
sidered as inviolable, he was in less 
danger of revenge from those whom his 
decision might disappoint and offend. 
216 
214. Kings 88, pp. 11-12. 
215. Kings 88, p. 11. 
216. Kings 88, p. 11. 
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On account of their ecclesiastical status and position 
in the community, certain legal benefits accrued to the 
clergy. But it is Chambers who writes on the technical' 
aspects of ecclesiastical courts, the types of cases it 
tried, and the limits of its jurisdiction. Johnson does 
not deal with the questions of dual sovereignty which the 
existence of a separate church structure implies, but he 
is content to comment in this general. fashion on the 
priest as arbitrator and guardian. 
Since Middendorf remarks that "illustrations of John- 
son's considering economic questions theoretically are not 
. 217 
frequent", it is instructive to review his comments on 
218 
currency in"Lecture VII. ' Here, Johnson points out how 
human nature subverts currency regulations: 
Laws to retain the precious metals where 
they once come into possession/are made 
in almost every country and are in all 
countries ineffectual. An offence which 
being only political does not much alarm 
the conscience, and which requiring little 
participation or confidence is not capable 
of detection, will be always committed 
when it is excited by the hope of profit. 
That which the merchant is sure of selling 
to large profit, if he cannot buy it with 
commodities he will buy with money, and 
with money of his own country if no other 
can easily be had. To this practice it 
must be imputed that crown pieces have almost 
vanished from among us, and that half crowns 
seem to follow them. The oath required at 
the exportation of silver is a restraint 
intended indeed to operate in secret, but 
long experience has too well informed us 
that the contest is unequal between oaths 
217. Middendorf, p. 57. 
218. 'L'ife IV, pp. 104-105; Johnson and Wilkes discuss the circulation of coin; Johnson cites Locke. 
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and interest, ' and that they vitiate 
morals without regulating trade. 
219 
Merchants have in specie a method of payment that offers 
them the freedom to trade with 'whomever they can make 
arrangements. In this age of economic acitivity the 
circulation of money and the attractions of commerce en- 
courage. *the contravention of mere political restraints. 
By his experience and observation Johnson appreciates 
that the 'desire for money will frustrate 'any artificial 
restraints imposed by the state. 
in the " tenth' lecture of this section on the criminal 
law, Johnson expounds on forgery and its deleterious ef- 
220 
fect on. commercial relations. The crime of forgery with 
its intent to defraud permeates-much of Johnson's think- 
221 
ing on morals and the law. In this lecture Johnson 
writes on the way in which forgery subverts the structure 
of society and impedes its orderly progress. in his des- 
cription of the effects of this crime, Johnson-emphasizes 
the violence done to the social contract on which commun- 
ities are based and how the distribution of property is 
disrupted. Johnson maintains that the very fabric of 
society is stretched by the enormity of evil in fraud. 
He points out: 
219. Kings 88, pp. 132-133. 
220. cf. Bl. 'Comm. IV 245-247; calls forgery one of the 
principal infringements on the rights of property. 
221. cf. remarks on. Dodd in chap. 1;. Sermon' 17; Sermon 18 
where 'Johnson closely analyzes the moral implications 
of fraud and applies this discussion to its legal con- 
text. 
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Forgery is one of-the most dangerous 
and extensive evils to. which men are sub- 
jected by the combinations of society and 
the regulations of civil life. 
222 
Johnson implies that the more complex the society, the 
greater the opportunity for fraud to exist. While he does 
not criticize this complication which is an outgrowth of 
progress, Johnson doe's suggest an exponential rise in the 
corresponding evil forgery accomplishes. 
To Johnson there exists a natural right to honest 
records, and the presumption to or reliance on'accurate 
reporting that lies behind commercial and legal relations. 
Johnson argues that: 
One of the great advantages of a common 
weal is that every man lives under the pro- 
tection of all the rest, that every claim is 
publickly decided, and every considerable 
transaction publickly attested. But if 
records and testimonies be forged or falsi- 
fied the whole power of society is turned 
against the right. If there were no written 
testimonies, truth would stand at least 
upon equal ground with falsehood, but if 
there be any art by which falsehood can arm 
itself with the securities of truth, the 
invention of those securities would be an 
evil. 
223 
Because of the changing nature of conunercial relations, 
those obtaining property under false pretences developed 
ingenious stratagems and therefore society demanded that 
222. Kings 89, p. 79: 'Li'fe II, pp. 50-51: where Johnson 
argues that positive proof is not a necessary ele- 
ment of the crime. 
223. Kings 89, p. 79. 
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the rule of cayeat'emptor be diminished. 
224 
The require- 
that this rule becomes obsolete'suggests to Johnson the 
fundamental need for verifiable' records. It-is the abil- 
ity-to have reasonably accurate accounts for coirunercial 
transactions that leads to Johnson's major concern about 
the freedom to control the disposition of-one's property. 
Johnson sees the'damage forgery can do to the will- 
225 
making process. To him the greatest freedom lies in 
226 
the unfettered control of property, and notions of 
fraud undermine the exercise'of this basic right. in this 
lecture. Johnson articulates this feeling most strongly: 
........ it is one of the greatest 
advantages of a regular government 
that a man can leave his acquisitions 
by his will, to those whom he best loves 
224. Hall, ' Theft,, Law 'and Society, p. 70: "Yet the combin- 
ation of large-scale mar eting and the purchase of 
goods at a distance in reliance on representations 
of the seller, produced conditions which in due 
course could be seen to make safeguards against 
fraud necessary. Again, the transition from a sys- 
tem of cash on delivery transactions to a credit 
economy made the sale of goods on time a vital factor. 
Accordingly it became necessary to safeguard merchants 
against an extension of credit upon misrepresentations. 
Finally, the breakdown of primary groups by a succes- 
sion of enclosure movements concomitant with greatly 
increased mobility in population and the rise of 
-cities produced new alignments of persons unknown to 
one another--a condition of affairs which lent itself 
to fraud quite apart from commercial transactions. " 
225. cf. Life II, pp. 260-262; where Johnson and Chambers 
discuss will-making in Chambers' rooms in the Temple; 
Life IV, -402-405, for a revealing personal look at 
Johnson's own will. 
226. cf., Life II, pp. 251-252; property as a great princi- 




or to . whom 
he is most nearly related, 
but if wills were easily forged it were more 
happy that all property should descend by 
some settled rule or perhaps that it should 
be 'picked up, as derelict, by chance, for into 
what hands can it fall so bad as into those 
that are practiced in forgery? 
227 
It is in this way that Johnson feels forgery Attacks the 
heart of civilized society. For Johnson the control of 
property is an essential freedom and any illegitimate in- 
tervention subtends his values of civil society. 
The economic base of society relies on confidence in 
the mon, tary system and the just execution of the law. 
Both values are susceptible to the-machinations of the 
forger. Johnson stresses that forgery: 
... is a crime which the present state of the commercial world makes particularly 
dangerous. The greater part of all mova- 
ble property is now wandering in bills, 
round land and sea, and stands wholly upon the 
faith of paper. If this faith should by 
frequent and successful forgery become 
suspicious. and uncertain the traffic of man- 
kind must stop, and the wealth of thousands 
be annihilated. 
228 
in this aroused and somewhat virulent analysis of the ef- 
fects of forgery, Johnson'writes an extremely pessimistic 
scenario. Certainly, if forgery became so widespread as 
to completely subvert the world's economic system, the 
result would be chaos. Although Johnson was familiar with 
227. Kings. 89, pg -4x7-9e>- 
228. Kings 89, p. 80. 
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the economic collapse caused by the South Sea Bubble229 
his hyperbolic remarks of an economic crash caused by wide- 
spread forgery are ridiculous. Naturally, there would be 
extreme dislocation', but Johnson neglects both the resili- 
ency in economic systems and the ability of man to cope 
with 'the unexpected. This reduct'io ad' absurdum can be 
seen, however, as the product of Johnson's experiences 
230 231 
with poverty and his inordinate desire for stability. 
In his contributions to these lectures on the crimi- 
nal law, Johnson provides no detailed description of the 
elements of crimes. instead, he gives general historical 
appraisals that are replete with moral lessons. While it 
appears that many of Johnson's observations are obvious, 
the-audience to whom Johnson addressed these lectures must 
be kept in mind. Also, 'it zaust be recalled that these 
lectures area partnership between Johnson and Chambers. 
Nevertheless; Johnson chooses to fulfill his obligations 
229. cf. 'Life IV, p. 121; V. p. 60 n. 4; where Johnson is 
shown to have absorbed some of the lore associated 
with the South sea bubble; cf. Carswell, 'The' South Sea 
'Bubble for a treatment of the cause and effects of 
t ibis episode . 
230. cf. Bate, ' The' Achievement' of Samuel' Johnson. pp. 74-78; 
for a discussion o psychological effects of poverty 
of Johnson; Life-IV, p. 152: "Do not accuse yourself 
to consider debt only as an inconvenience; you will 
find it a calamity. Poverty takes away so many means 
of doing good, and produces so much inability to re- 
sist evil, both natural and moral, that it is by all 
virtuous means to be avoided. 
231. Bate, Samuel Johnson, p. 198: "Moreover, his intellec- 
tual conviction of the need for protective order and 
settlement is constantly being prodded-sometimes given 
passionate, even explosive, urgency-by his lifelong 
struggle to control his own rebellious nature, and to 
pull himself into clarity and balance. "" 
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by writing on the historical and moral aspects of the law. 
And it is from these portions that much of Johnson's jur- 
isprudential thinking emerges. As we have seen Johnson 
feels that the criminal law is necessary because of the 
232 
nature of man and the changing nature of society de- 
mands protection in order that it may function. He sug- 
gests that laws come into being to fulfill the general 
expectations of society and that the criminal law as an 
aspect of the civil law theory has. an underlying philo- 
sophical basis, in the natural law. Johnson does not 
analyze specific principles that make up the criminal law; 
he does examine the human conduct that results in the 
formation of positivist criminal laws. it is his view 
of the particular characteristics of the criminal law as 
distinguished by its ethical foundation that illuminates 
Johnson's thinking. 
Johnson makes few substantial contributions to the 
final section of these lectures in Part III; "Containing 
233 
the Private Law of Englands. In his remarks Johnson 
232. Life V, p. 211: "Lady M'Leod asked, if no man was 
naturally good? - Johnson. 'No Madam, no more than a 
wolf. '-Boswell. 'Nor no woman, sir? ' Johnson. 'No, 
Sir. '-Lady M'Leod started at this, saying in a low 
voice, 'This is worse than Swift. '" 
233. Johnson's most important contributions are found in 
91 Lect I: "Of Personal Rights, and the Injuries af- 
ecting them, considering Man merely as an Individ- 
ual" (pp. 58-61); Kings 94 Lect. XII: "Of Alienation 
by Common Assurance the Remaining Method of Trans- 
fering Real Property" (pp. 86-88); K95 Lect. XIV: "Of 
the 'Remaining Injuries to Real Property" (pp. 50-52); 
Kings 97: Lect. XIX: "Of Private Rights as Protected 
by Courts of Equity, and first of cases of Securi- 
ties for Money Lent" (pp. 9-12). 
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focuses on family law, alienation of real property, re- 
covery of property, and equity. His discussion is less 
historical than in the previous sections, but reveals a' 
general appreciation of the relative civil duties invol- 
ved in each'topic. His understanding. of legal distinc-" 
tions is rather unsophisticated as he more clearly re 
flects the prejudices and limitations of his age. John- 
son develops a censorial jurisprudence where comparative 
rights and duties are left mostly untreated. However, 
in these lectures Johnson's. thinking is formidable and 
his reasoning impressive. 
This contrast between his lack of understanding of 
legal distinctions and impressive reasoning is evident 
in his comments on divorce. Johnson, who thought mar- 
riage had little enjoyment and needed much endurance, 
writes an exceptional memorandum on divorce. Because the 
civil government has a legitimate interest in upholding 
234 
the institution of marriage, - Johnson considers this 
lecture'on family law an appropriate forum to argue 
against simple divorce. The attitude amplified is sur- 
prising since Johnson claims marriage to be an unnatural 
state for man. However, this may explain the negative 
tone 'of these remarks which point out that a harmonious 
marriage works best from an avoidance of unhappiness: 
234. ' Life II, p. 25; B1 Coimn I, (15, p. 423 "Our law con= 
steers marriage in no other light than as a civil 
contract. " 
235. ' Life II, p. 165. 
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All concord in the married state arises 
from the reflection that discord must 
produce unhappiness. In connubial con- 
tests the motive to compliance and recon- 
ciliation is that those who must live 
together will live'best iri ep ace. 
236, 
In this contorted view of marriage, matrimony-is seen as. a 
'contest' which once engaged, must be finished. Apparent- 
ly, Johnson feels that happiness can only be pursued suc- 
cessfully in marriage by following the path of least re- 
sistance. ' 
While 'a bill of particulars may contain valid items, 
Johnson contends that an action for the dissolution of 
marriage should be'difficult to lodge. To make this 
point, Johnson avers: 
In the present state of matrimonial life 
the parties are forced to agree because they 
know that they must live together, and duty 
is supported by-Interest; but if irrecon- 
cilable discord were allowed to be a suf- 
ficient cause of separation, whoever desired 
to be parted would very easily find a cause 
of discord; every slight provocation would' 
be'returned with unextinguishable resent- 
ment, every casual disgust would be indulged, 
sometimes injuries would be committed only 
to excite anger, and sometimes anger would 
be'excited when very small injuries afforded 
opportunity. 
237 
Moreover, as in`any effective legal presentation, Johnson 
anticipates the objection which is the issue of mutual 
assent. He responds: 
236. Kings 91, p. 58: cf. ' RusseIas Chap XXVIII-XXIV, For 
the debate on rnarriage. 
237. Kings 91, p. 58; S-9. 
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The nature. and merits of the question 
are not altered by saying that 'to 
justify separation the desire of separa- 
tion must be mutual; -' for if either 
desires to part and knows that by petu- 
lance and malignity this desire may be 
gratified, the power of giving offence 
is always at hand, and theyi`'ä? e weary of 
their partnersmay. soon make their part- 
ners weary of them. 
238 
In a style' reminiscent of the Boswell cases, Johnson 
adopts a manner of presentation thät attempts to fore- 
close disagreement. By his'treatment of the question of 
mutuality, Johnson reaffirms*his sour-view of fraud in 
" . 239 
domestic relations. His impugnment of motive does not 
allow for honest emotion or good faith. This attitude 
continues when Johnson discusses child rearing and fami- 
ly obligations. From "gusts of petulance or schemes of 
malice" Johnson sees the main threats to marriage. But 
it is from his own need for stability that these percep- 
tions come. 
In his summation Johnson says: 
For these reasons and probably for 'a 
thousand more which human wisdom will never 
fully discover, marriage is by our religion 
made indissoluble; and, therefore, Christ- 
ian nations have universally appointed it 
to be solemnized with such rites as shall 
nakeSit a contract, sacred as well as 
civil, and super- add to the legal obliga- 
238. Kings 91, p. a. 
239. cf. Rambler 18, --the-result of choosing the wrong 
woman; R ler '35,, 39, - 45,113'; ' 115', ' 119 and 167 all 
discuss the proposition 'marriage is generally un- 
h6ppy', but while reviewing both men and women, are 
not entirely pessimistic. 
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tion the sanction of a vow. 
240 
Johnson's view of divorce in this lecture relies on prin- 
241 
ciples taken from canon law. His uncomprömising stand 
242 
on divorce ha's a deep ethical and religious foundation. 
Johnson sees the sanctity of marriage as inviolate and 
his entire' discussion affirms that view. Certainly, John- 
son is inconsistent in much'of his more general writing 
on marriage; however, in the finality of divorce Johnson 
240. Kings 91, p. 61. 
241. ' B1. * Comm I, C. 15, pp. 440- 
thoro is when the marriage 
-tio, 'and therefore the law 
ibut, for some superveni 
proper or impossible for t 
her: as in the case of int 
adultery, in either of the 
law, which the common law 
deems so highly and with s 
of the nuptial tie, that i 
unloosed for any cause wha 
the union is made. And th 
the divine revealed law; t 
assigns incontinence as a 
only cause, why a man may 
another. The civil law, w 
origin, allows many causes 
141: "Divorce 'a menso' et 
is just and lawful a ini- 
is tender of dissolving 
: nt cause, it becomes im- 
ie parties to live toget- 
)lerable ill temper, or 
parties. For the canon 
Eollows in this case, 
ich mysterious reverence 
will not allow it to be 
: soever, that arises after 
is is said to be built on 
lough that expressly 
sause, and indeed the 
'ut away his wife and marry itch is partly of pagan 
of absolute divorce; and 
some of them pretty severe ones: (as if a wife goes 
to the theatre or the public games, without the 
knowledge and consent of the husband) but among them 
adultery is the principal, and with reason named the 
first. But with us in England adultery is only a 
cause of separation from bed and board: for which the 
best reason that'can be given, is, that if divorces 
were allowed to depend upon a matter within the power 
of either the parties, they would probably be ex- 
tremely frequent; as was the case when divorces were 
allowed for canonical disabilities, on the mere con- 
fession of the parties, which is now prohibited by 
the canons. However, divorces a vinculo matrimonii, 
for adultery, have of late years been frequently 
granted by act of parliament. " 
242., Sermon Is where Johnson makes a strong case for mar- 
rnagge and suggests that 'religion and marriage have 
the same enemies. ' 
301 
sees not only a threat to marriage but to the fabric of 
society. Both of these perceptions. and his moral struc- 
ture demand that Johnson oppose the concept of divorce. 
----viii ---- 
It is instructive to review Johnson's remarks on the 
general reasoning behind the early evasion of entails. 
243 
Writing on ' the' alienation of common assurances in the 
twelfth lecture, Johnson invokes the dangers in 'perpetui- 
t y-' which both hinder commercial growth and frustrate 
. 244 
the management of property. Recognizing this situation, 
Johnson points out that for medieval lawyers a method to 
regain control over property was necessary: 
In this age, and in the reign of Edward 
the Fourth, the judges, supposing that 
entails obstructed the public prosper- 
ity, found out or admitted that method 
of stopping-them-which is called recovery. 
243. cf. 'Bi'Comm. II, C 19, p. 294 writing on common ass- 
urance, Blackstone says: "A translation, or transfer 
of property being thus admitted by law, it became 
necessary that this transfer should be properly 
evidenced: in order to prevent disputes, either about 
the fact, as whether there was any transfer at all; 
or concerning the persons, by whom and to whom it 
was transferred; or with regard to the subject mat- 
ter, as what the thing transferred consisted of; or, 
lastly, with relation to the mode and quality of the 
transfer, as for what period of time (or, in other 
words, for what estate and interest) the conveyance 
was made. The legal evidences of this translation 
of property are called the common assurances of the 
kingdom;. whereby every man's estate is assured to 
him, and all controversies, doubts, and difficulties 
are either prevented or removed. " 
244. cf. Smith, , Wealth' of' Nations, Bk. II, C. II, pp. 362- 
363; ' where Smit argues that entails discourage agri- 
cultural and commercial growth. 
302 
What were the evils of entails which 
required and justified a remedy at once 
so laborious and so froodulent, we per- 
häps, do not at this distance suffi- 
ciently discern. 
245 
Ignoring the tangled web of' land law, Johnson does remark 
on the ability of these legal practitioners to formulate 
legal fictions and adapt the law to new contingencies. 
The demands of society require the 'development of 're- 
coveries' which complicate entails and succession. The 
complex issue of entails interested Johnson not only as 
legal history, but also in terms of its effect on the 
246 
structure of English society. 
Johnson appreciates the problems in freezing the 
ownership of land. He reasons that: 
it is however, apparent that if all land 
be 'devolved by entails through a settled and 
necessary succession, no land can be sold, 
and none'therefore can be bought; no new 
families therefore can be raised, the 
future proprietors of the country can only 
be'the heirs of the present. The great 
motive to adventure and industry would be 
taken away, few would have the hopes of 
growing rich, and those whom skill in trade 
or any other ability had enabled to accumu- 
late money would be tempted to remove their 
wealth to some other country where they 
might obtain possessions permanent and 
secure. 
247 
245. Kings 94,.. pp. 86;. Johnson'is thinking here of 
'Taltarum Case (1472). 
246. cf. chapter II, pp. 167-180 ny discussion of entails 
in the dispute between Boswell and his father where 
Johnson is called upon for advice. 
247. Kings 94, p. 8'6 -8 . 
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To Johnson this free . movement of property which is part 248 
of man's natural right promotes the economic system. 
Since the ownership of property 'is seen to be a primary 
freedom, the control over its distribti 'ion. is the first 
coreli. ary. One of society's chief advantages is the op- 
portunity to "acquire property, and the breaking up of 
entails-encourages this process. 
After having argued why a commercial nation would 
abhor perpetuities and thus, develop the 'artifice of 
recoveries', Johnson offers. a political analysis that is 
probably more'accurate. He'points out that: 
This nation had then little trade, and 
those who were not born to lands were sel- 
dom able to purchase them with money. It 
appears more probable that as the feudal 
combinations of interest began to be 
relaxed, and tranquillity, and safety gave 
the mind leisure to extend its views and 
multiply its desires, men grew weary of 
having estates which they (in effect) held 
only for life and which, being determined 
to a certain course of succession, gave them 
no power to raise hope or fear, nor enable 
them to reward kindness or to punish ne- 
glect. Every man naturally loves dominion 
and favors that scheme by which his power 
is advanced; those who at first were de- 
sirous to secure estates to their families 
248, Boorstin, p. 180: "whatever confusion there may at 
first seem to have been in saying at once that 
property had been commanded by Nature and had been 
created by the state, Blackstone actually made the 
two ideas complementary. The law of nature had made 
property possible and necessary, but the laws of 
England had fulfilled the possibility, and had shown 
new aspects of ownership which Nature herself had 
not dreamed of ........ Every right of property which 
was protected by the law of England in Blackstone's 
day thus had ultimately the protection of Nature and 
of Nature's God. " The unfettered movement of prop- 
erty reflected in Johnson's thinking subsumes both 
sanctions. 
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grew in timewilling to have them 
wholly to themselves. . - 249 
250'. 
Johnson, who had a favorable view of power, argues 
that disentangling entails gives landlords more power and 
control. However, he neglects to consider that this pro- 
251 
cess may eventually vest greater dominion in the monarchy. 
While' Johnson's idea' of the impact entails have on com- 
mercial relations is valid, his political thinking is 
muddled by his perception of motive. " The vacuum created 
by increased leisure time highlights feelings of frustra- 
tion and impotence. With external threats diminished, 
landlords can naturally focus on domestic concerns and 
petty interests. Since entails are seen to be a major 
contributor to these feelings, their break'. up is thought 
beneficial. The result of this process is that while some 
estates may consolidate, more will be split up. The total 
influence of landlords will lessen and ultimate power will 
devolve to the monarchy and a small power elite. in his 
analysis Johnson correctly sees power as the important 
concept, but misunderstands the way in which it functions 
because he neglects to consider the dangers in monopolis- 
tic powers that accrue to the king and the owners of 
249. Kings 94, p. 
250. ' Life II, p. 357. 
251. Harding, p. 92: "The judges may have encouraged the 
breaking of entails because they and the king were 
beginning to see' the political danger of huge blocks 
of property which could be built up and kept intact 
through the centuries. " 
305 
large estates. 
In the fourteenth 'lecture 'on injuries. to real prop- 
erty, Johnson makes a short comment on limitations of 
entries and actions. Writing on writs of recovery, John- 
son chooses to discuss general reasons why: 
It is necessary that these writs for the 
recovery of possession be brought within 
a certain and limited time, for the peace of 
society requires that there should be a 
period for which succession should be 
certain and property secure. In times of 
tumult and civil contentionsj(and in such 
times were most of our antient statutes 
enacted and all our common or customary law 
had its original), the memory of transactions 
between particular persons was quickly lost, 
conveyances were often oral and ceremonial 
(as by verbal fedffinent with livery of 
seiztn), of which the natural mortality of 
man in a short time destroyed the rememb- 
rance; ' and writings, when writings had inter- 
vened, were easily lost when houses were 
plundered, or their proprietors fled for 
their lives. At all times it must inevit- 
ably happen that evidence of things not 
influencing the general state of the world 
will grow weaker by time, and therefore 
there is in most countries a period fixed 
when presumption and prescription may sup- 
ply its place. 
252 
Again, Johnson's historical speculation relies on his own 
need for stability which colors his perception of civil 
society. This affects his legal thinking on what consti- 
tutes an effective remedy. For an action to be just, it 
must be understandable and definite. Therefore, in his 
advocacy of a statute of limitations, Johnson is able to 
indulge his psychological needs and, at the same time, 
-252. Kings 95, pp. 50-52. 
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offer an impressive argument on the origin of a legal 
procedure. This is characteristic of the way Johnson 
operates throughout these lectures. In these remarks on 
writs of recovery Johnson continues an historical approach 
to jurisprudence' that helps to define not only the habits 
also 
of his mind but,,, his view of past society. 
In the'nineteenth'lecture where his last major con- 
tribution may be-'discerned, Johnson uses this lecture on 
equity to focus his juridical thinking. He asserts that: 
The end of all law is suum cuique tri- 
buere, to give to every man that w Rc he 
may justly claim, and the design of all 
juridical maxims and institutions is 
to adjust and satisfy the various degrees 
of right which may arise in the devolutions 
of succession, the reciprocations of con- 
tracts, the terms or conditions of credit 
and of partnerships, and the various com- 
binations of accident or commerce. 
253 
This succinct appraisal which relies on one of Justinian's 
254 
fundamental maxims indicates that Johnson's thinking 
on equity provides a key to his general legal thinking. 
Equity, which tries to achieve just ends, helps to define 
social norms and the'laws relation to them. It is in this 
effort to reconcile'social order with. 'legal system where 
the flaws in the law are most apparent. There is a dif- 
ference between legal propositions determined by law and 
those derived from equity: 
The decisions of equity as contradis- 
253. Kings. 97, p. 9"-10, 
254'. Justinian, Institutes Bk. it tit. I@4. 
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tinguished from those of law are not 
contra legem but preter legem, they 
o. not ing which the law forbids; they 
do only what the'law desires but can- 
not perform. Equity supplies the 
deficiencies of law, but cannot cor- 
rect the errors of the legislator. 
255 
The merits of equity rest with its moral force and its 
treatment of precedent. Johnson suggests a concept of 
equity that allows for general reasoning and societal 
interest in determining its decisions. It is this gen- 
eral character in equity law that attracts Johnson be- 
cause of its wide'scope'and moral content. 
ix 
in his contributions to these lectures, Johnson es- 
tablishes no systematic approach to the characteristics 
of the law. He does, however, discuss the law's histori- 
cal development which provides a. framework for his re- 
marks. Johnson makes rational and coherent statements on 
the effects certain legal principles had on society. From 
his analysis of these principles, Johnson demonstrates 
the way the law grows and determines contemporary insti- 
tutions. in this process he defines the human values and 
moral imperatives that are at the law's foundation. Many 
of Johnson's historical perceptions reflect his own pre- 
255. Kings 97; p.: Lcrt%. 
308 
judices256 and indicate the ultimate moral values he 
wishes to teach. And it is these insights-into moral 
thinking that most clearly emerge from Johnson's histor- 
ical jurisprudence. 
These lectures encourage Johnson to indulge his wide- 
ranging intellectual interests and moral concerns. His 
treatment of legal rights and duties is both descriptive 
and censorial. As a student of society, Johnson tries to 
discover how legal institutions respond to the claims made 
on them by man. Throughout these lectures Johnson dis- 
tinguishes those passions in man that require them to be 
governed. Johnson makes his most trenchant comments on 
those ambiguous qualities in man that call for the appli- 
cation of law. Johnson uses comparisons with other legal 
systems, cites assorted authorities, and draws freely on 
256. cf., G , I: The Rise of Modern Paganism, p. 32, for 
the way Enlightenment thinkers mmanipu ated history 
to advance their own views of society. Gay writes: 
"The historical writings of the Enlightenment are 
more than special pleading; they are comprehensive, 
critical, often brilliant- they are true history. 
Reversing Tacitus' famous precept, the philosophes 
wrote history with rage and partisanship, and their 
very passion often allowed them to penetrate into 
regions hitherto inaccessible to historical explor- 
ers. Yet it also made them condescending and oddly 
parochial: their sense of the past merged all too 
readily with their sense of the present. ... they looked into the past as into a mirror and extracted 
from their history the past they could use. This 
limits the range of philosophic history but enchances 
its value as a clue: it permits us to look over the 
philosophes' shoulders to discover in their histori- 
cal portraits a portrait of themselves, and to read 
in their accounts of Seneca's her. cism or the ii'iquities 
of the Inquisition, the mind of the Enlightenment. " 
In his writing of legal history, Johnson functions 
in-the same'way because he constantly construes hist- 
ory by the limits of his own perceptions. cf. Chapter I, 
footnote 102, p. 51, for consideration of the word 
'prejudice'. 
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natural law thinkers to help formulate *his opinions. 
He displays familiarity with contemporary intellectual 
movements, and, despite reservations and inconsistency, 




Johnson has a distinct style in his writing as well 
as in his conversation. And in these lectures we have 
the unique' opportunity to examine a written text designed 
for oral presentation. Although poems and prayers share 
a strong verbal component, the lectures as a genre 
require the blend of expository writing with the attrac- 
tions needed for auditory comprehension. The'. demands of 
this form, however, neither dilute nor exaggerate John- 
son's peculiar stylistic manners. indeed, as his usual 
prose style and epigrammatic conversational form are 
readily apprehended, his lecture manner is also distinc- 
tive. While Johnson has been known to vary the general 
character of his prose, his vigorous style remains and 
is apparent in his contributions to the text. 
The style of Chambers can usually be recognized in 
these lectures. Prime characteristics of Chambers' style 
are; its general contorted nature, its jargon-filled dic- 
tion, and a proclivity for technical expression at the 
expense of simple elegance. An examination of Chambers' 
language indicates scant literary achievement. At best, 
his style reflects that of a learned but dull legal 
writer. Moreover, Chambers' writing is replete with un- 
intelligible and unnecessary legal obscura. Chambers' 
language lacks the flair and penetration of Johnson's as 
he seemingly plods along with neither wit nor decision. 
An unfortunate tendency towards periphrasis predominates 
in his discussion of and concentration on the minutiae 
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of legal processes. Chambers' style is appropriate for 
the writing of a legal treatise but-it is not properly 
attuned to the requirements of the lecture hall. 
A comparison between the following extracts will 
illustrate the recognizable "characteristics in the"styles 
of Johnson and Chambers. in these lectures Johnson's 
writing-is accomplished with ease and sophistication. 
There is an elegance in his handling of legal topics in 
a simple and general manner. Chambers, however, lacks 
the ability to express his admittedly-more complex terms 
with the same assuredness and comprehension. Both writ- 
ers deal with a specialized topic that must conform to 
the requirements of historical luge. Johnson's writing 
seems to absorb these considerations while Chambers' 
writing conforms in a dull, mechanical-way. In the main, 
Chambers' expression is judicial and prudent while John--, 
son's seems to be accomplished unfettered by obsessive 
legality. 
Of the examples I have 'selected, two are obvious in 
their stylistic variations. The third, however, demon- 
strates the problem when accurate differentiation is not 
entirely possible. The fourth is extracted from a legal 
treatise put together from lectures and notes by his an- 
cestor written by Chambers and serves as a control. This 
authorial problem could indicate: Johnson rewriting Cham- 
bers, Chambers absorbing aspects of Johnson, or Johnson 
employing the talents he developed years earlier as a 
Grub-street writer. It is Johnson's ability to 'ghost- 
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write' that, on. the one hand, evidences his understanding 
of language, and on the other hand, contributes to the 
confusion in determining what passages were actually writ- 
ten by him. 
An examination of the passages that are Johnson's 
reveals the prominence of certain stylistic devices which 
are typical of his writing. Among these literary devices 
are: his attention to diction where a Latinate flavour is 
set off by harsh, ' straightforward Anglo-Saxon words to 
emphasize and strengthen points. This language placement 
also contributes to the 'alignment of his reasoning which 
permits Johnson's idiosyncrasies to emerge. Elements of 
his neo-classical thought process set out by a Ciceronian 
balance and parallelism are highlights of this style. His 
stress on generality with specific ideas expressed-by the 
excessive useof the relative clause consistently works 
to develop a contra-p.,. rtaI_ quality in the text. John- 
son creates a tone by-his eccentric syntax and platitudi- 
nous choice of words and placement of ideas within the 
context of his jurisprudential thinking. Johnson's 
various styles of expression are evident in his recogni- 
tion of the philosophical demands inherent in juridical 
writings. For Johnson understands the need for accurate, 
precise use of certain legal terms which have been estab- 
lished by precedent. Nevertheless, while some jargon- 
filled contortions exist, Johnson's legal writing is 
lucid when compared with the writing of Chambers. 
One of Johnson's most telling sentences is indica- 
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tive257 of the quality of thought and style of language 
that marks his contributions to the lectures: 
When we consider in abstracted specu- 
lation the 'unequal distribution of the' 
pleasures of life, ' when we observe that pride, 
the most general of human passions, is grat- 
ified in one order of men only because it 
is ungratified in another and that the great 
pleasure of many possessions arises from 
the reflection that the possessor enjoys 
what multitudes desire, when it is apparent 
that many want the necessaries of nature, and 
many more the comforts and conveniences of 
life,, ' that the 'idle live at ease by the 
fatigues of the diligent and the luxurious 
are pampered with delicacies untasted by 
those who supply them, when to him that glit- 
ters with jewels and slumbers in a palace 
multitudes may say. -what was said to Pompey, 
Nostra miseriä tu es ma gnus, when the greater 
n er must always want-what the smaller 
are enjoying and squandering, enjoying with- 
out merit and squandering without use, it 
seems impossible to conceive that the peace 
of society can long subsist; it were natural 
to expect that no man would be left long in 
possession of superfluous enjoyments while 
such numbers are destitute of real necessar- 
ies, but that the wardrobe of Lucullus should 
be rifled by the naked and the dainties of 
Apicius dispersed among the hungry, that 
almost every man should attempt to regulate 
that distribution which he thinks injurious 
to himself and supply his wants from the 
common stock. 
258 
This well reasoned sentence persuades by a logical process 
that communicates its message with real grandeur. The way 
Johnson compares and contrasts in order to develop his 
ideas illustrates his approach'to juridical argument. 
The structure of this sentence shows how Johnson uses 
257. McAdam, p. 107; Greene, Politics, pp. 195-196. 
258. Kings 87, pp. 5-6. 
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rhetorical devices to make his points effectively. 
Moreover it is surprising that chambers' not Johnson's 
259 
language suggests a studied,. learned expression. While 
in these lectures Johnson's language is emphatic and dig- 
nified, it is neither ponderous nor erudite. 
In the following excerpt from A Treatise on Estates 
and Tenures, Chambers' language is neither vivacious nor 
virile. As a legal writer he- insists on authority to 
satisfy the rigors of legal thinking. He defines the 
concept of fee in preparation for a technical discussion: 
A feud or Fee is a free grant of some- 
thing immoveable, generally of lands, 
made to any person in such'a manner, 
that the Sovereign right over the thing 
granted still remains in the hands of 
the Donor; but the profits arising 
from it are so consigned to the grantee as 
to pass to him and from him for ever to 
his heirs, where heirs are mentioned: in 
consequence of which he and his heirs are 
bound to mention true fealty to the land, 
either by some service expressly particu- 
larised, as by the general duties of 
fidelity and allegiance. 
260 
259. Brader Matthews, ' Essays on English, (New York: 
Scribner's Sons,, p. 145: ... Maca, JJ&Y was 
not overstating the case when he declared that 
all Dr. Johnson's books 'are written in a learned 
language, in a language in which nobody hears from 
his mother or his nurse, in a*language in which 
nobody ever quarrels, or drives bargains, or makes 
love, in a language in which nobody even thinks. 
260. Sir Robert Chambers, knt., A Treatise on Estates and 
Tenures, ed. Sir Charles Harcourt Chambers, nt., 
(London: Joseph Butterworth'and Son, and Dublin: J. 
Cooke, 1824), p. 14. 
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This definition sets out the basic principles of fee in 
crafted legal language. Each significant term implies its 
position in relation-to an assumed background. Moreover, 
Chambers' usage is characterized by its attention to its 
own weight and self-importance. * 
This becomes clear when Chambers' letter to Bishop 
Percy is examined. In a letter concerning the authenti- 
city of some poems attributed to Rowley, the supposed 
Bristol poet, Chambers functions as Johnson did in the 
Ossian controversy: 
Of the authenticity of the few parch- 
ments that are in Mr. Barret's possess- 
ion, those must judge who have seen them, 
and who are, at the same time able to 
judge. If your Lordships had examined 
them and had determined any of them to 
be genuine, it would afford a ground 
for supposing that, among the old title 
deeds found in the church at Bristol, 
(of which you may remember that poor 
Goldsmith showed one or two to his 
friends) Chatterton might have found 
other poetical writings also, from which 
he might have taken the substance of 
some of the poems that he gave out as 
ancient; but then, as he has not pro- 
duced the originals, I should think 
myself obliged to believe that in copy- 
ing he had altered and added to them, 
whatever his fancy suggested, or his 
ear accustomed to modern versification 
required. 
261 
Chambers structures a legal argument where his diction 
reveals a reasoned legal presentation. He is neither ve- 
hement nor assertive but shows the assimilation of a John- 
261. Letter to Bishop Percy, Calcutta, 9 November 1789; 
BM 32329 f. 124. 
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sonian approach. While Chambers writes with authority, 
he does not reflect the finality of Johnson. Instead, he 
operates in a workman-like manner that is characteristic 
of one having formal legal training. 
While neither writes with brevity, they do suggest 
decision. Certainly, there is a divergence in tone, but 
sometimes this actually hinders the search for authorship: 
The first purpose of every political 
society is internal peace, for as no 
man would submit to any Polity if he 
were able by his own power to gratify 
his appetites and appease his Fears, 
so he has submitted in vain to the 
Diminution of his Natural liberty un- 
less he has obtained in return some 
additional stability of good and secur- 
ity from evil. 
262 
This excerpt indicates the presence of Johnson's thought 
process, but the expression is Chambers'. And it is this 
type of combination that makes complete differextLation 
impossible. Clearly, the collaborative effort is present 
here. In instances like these where Johnson's thinking 
dominates Chambers writing, and where the language also 
reveals a strong Johnsonian influence, one must be cau- 
tious because imitation declares Chambers to be the author. 
It is in these uncertain passages where Johnson determines, 
but Chambers writes. 
Although'it is true that-subject matter affects style, 
Chambers' writing, regardless of the subject, maintains 
its own distinctive qualities. in these examples from the 
262. Kings 87, p. 5. 
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lecture on high treason, Chambers' treatment is character- 
isticly laborious: 
Treason in the general and civil sense 
may be committed under any form of govern- 
ment. He that endeavours the Destruction 
of legal Authority, whatever be the mode 
of it's constitution, is what the Romans 
termed Perduellis and what we may call a 
Traitor. But in all Nations where Mon- 
archial Government prevails, Treason is 
an appellation given to those crimes which 
37 
immediately affect the Person or Rights 
of the Prince and in it's highest Degree 
in the Act of attempting, conspiring or 
imagining the Death of the King. 
263 
The superstition of barbarous Times pre- 
vails now no longer, but the Law has very 
diligently supplied by positive securities 
the deficiency of blind and irrational 
Veneration, by considering all attempts 
against the Life or Safety of the King as 
in the highest Degree criminal and calling 
all those Principals by whom such attempts 
are however remotely incited or abetted. 
264 
Both in expression and treatment Chambers over-works 
language and relies too much on background knowledge. He 
Writes a judicýaly, honed prose that trips up on its own 
careful attention to detail and phrasing. Moreover, this 
style creates its own monotony and complication. The 
effort needed to read his contributions to the lectures 
creates an undertone that hinders communication. Unlike 
the flair of Johnson's writing, Chambers' writing lacks 
general-appeal and easy comprehension. 
263. Kings 88, pp. 37-38. 
264. Kings 88, p. 40. 
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Appendix, 'II 
Kings 80 Lecture I: "Of the Law of Nature, The Revealed 
Law and The Law of Nations, The Primary Sources 
of the Law of England, pp. 2-41. 
Lecture II: "Of the Origin of Feudal Government, 
and the Anglo-Saxon Government and Laws, pp. 
42-76. 
Lecture III: ''Of the Feudal Law Strictly So 
Called, and of the Effects of That Law on our 
Constitution and Government, pp. 77-118. 
Lecture 'IV: On The General Division of the Law 
of England, pp. 119-155. 
Kings 81 "Part i. Containing the'Publick Law of England 
Lectures 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th" 
Part 2, Lecture"I "Of the Origin and Different 
Forms of ' Parliament" , pp. 1-32. 
Part I, Lecture II: "Of The'Present Constitution 
of Parliaments, pp. 33-69. 
Part I, Lecture III: "Of The King and First of 
his Coronation Oath", pp. 70-93. 
Part I, Lecture IV: "Of the King's prerogatives 
and first of his Prerogative of Power and Exemp- 
tion", pp. 94-127. 
Rings 82 "Part I. Containing the Publick Law of England, 
Lectures 5th, 6th, ' and 7th. ", vol. III. 
Part I, Lecture V: "Of The King's Prerogatives 
of Possession or his antient and established 
Revenue", pp. 2-37. 
Part I, Lecture VI: "Of The"Royal Family, and 
of The House of Lords", pp. 38-91. 
Part I, Lecture VII: "Of The House of Commons", 
pp. 92-130. 
*In the first transcripts of these lectures, 
the 6th lecture of the first part is entitled 
Of The Royal Family and House of Lords. This 
Discourse consists of the former part of That 
corrected and enlarged. The Disquisition on 
The House 'of Lords continues nearly as before 
and forms a distinct lecture. 
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Part I, Lecture. VI: "Of The Royal Family (a), 
pp. 132-159. 
Kings 83' Lecture VIII: "Of. The Privy Council and Offices 
of State", pp. 2-44. 
Lecture IX: "Of Courts of Justice, and first of 
General Courts of Common Law and Equity", pp. 
45-76. 
Kings 84 Publick Law of England, Lectures 10th, 11th, 
and 12th. 
Lecture X: "Of Courts whose. ' Judgments are di- 
rected by the Civil, Canon and Maritime Law; 
and of Courts private. Jurisdiction",. pp. 31-85. 
Lecture 'XI: "Of The Civil Divisions of England 
and of Territorial Magistrates", pp. 31-85. 
Lecture XII: "Of Civil Rank, Order, and Prece- 
dence", pp. 86-118. 
Kings 85 "Part I Containing the Publick Law of England, 
Lectures 13th and 14th". 
Lecture XIII: "Of the Rights of Embassadors", 
pp. 2-39. 
Lecture XIV: "Of Aliens, and of the*incorpora- 
tion of England wlt Wales and its union with. 
Scotland", . pp. 40-79. 
Kings 86 Part I: "Containing The Publick Law of England". 
vol. VII Lectures 15th*and 16th. 
Lecture XV: "Of the Government of Ireland and 
the American Provinces", pp. 2-42. 
Lecture XVI: "Of corporations", pp. 42-72. 
Kings 87 Part II "Containing the Criminal Law of England". 
Lecture I: "Of Criminal Law and first of the 
general nature of Punishments", pp. 2-35. 
Lecture II: "Of the History of Punishments", 
pp. 36-87. 
Lecture III: "Of Exemption from Punishment" and 
first of incapacity to commit crimes", pp. 88-123. 
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Kings 88 Lecture IV: -"Of the Benefit of Clergy", pp. 
1-35. 
Lecture B: "Of offences against The Government 
and First of High Treason; particularly such 
as are committed against the Stat: of Edward 
the 3rd called The Statute of Treason", pp. 
36-84. 
Lecture VI: "Of Crimes made Treason since the 
statute of Edward the Third", pp. 85-116. 
Lecture VII: "Of Felonies and Interiour Off- 
ences immediately against the Government", pp. 
117-149. 
Rings 89 Lecture VIII: "Offences against The Subjects of 
Other States: and of Homicide, The first o- 
ence against a Fellow Subject"-, pp. 1-31. 
Lecture IX: "0f Violence To The Person not 
destructive of Life", pp. 32-54. 
Lecture X: "Of offences against Property and 
first of Arson, Burglary, 'Malicious Mischief and 
Forgery", pp. 55-82. 
Lecture XI: "Of Larceny or Theft", pp. 83-122. 
Kings 90 Lecture XII: "Of Offences against The Common- 
wealth and first of such as are committed 
against established Religion", pp. 1-19. 
Lecture XIII: "Of The Remaining offences 
against the Commonwealth", pp. 20-42. 
Lecture XIV: "Of The Different Imputation of 
Crimes to Agents and Accomplices", pp. 43-46. 
Kings 91 Part III Containing The Private Law of England 
Lecture I: "Of Personal Rights, and the injuries 
affecting them, considering Man merely as an 
individual", pp. 2-49. 
Lecture II: "O£ Economical Relations, and Pri- 
vate'Civil Relations", pp. 50-110. 
Lecture'III: "Of The Several Species of Real 
Estates and first of Estates in Fee Simple. ", 
pp. 111-148. 
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Kings 92 Lecture IV: "Of Estates in Fee Tail", pp. 1-37. 
Lecture V: "Of Mere Freeholds", pp.. 38.87. 
Lecture VI: "Of Chattels Real", pp. 88-133. 
Kings 93 Lecture VII: "Of Customary Estates", pp. 1-43. 
Lecture VIII: "Of The Conditions. annexed to 
Real Estates, and first of the Tenures by which 
They are holden and the Conditions Therein 
implied", pp. 44-88. 
Lecture IX: "Of Estates Upon Condition", pp. 
89-131. 
Kings 94 Part III 
Lecture X: "Of The Joint Possession of Estates". 
pp. 1-22. 
Lecture XI" "Of The means of Acquiring and 
losing Real Property", pp. 25-51. 
Lecture XII: "Of Alienation by Common Assurance 
The Remaining Method of Transferring Real Prop- 
erty", pp. 52-90. 
Kings 95 Lecture XIII: "Of Injuries Affecting Real Prop- 
erty and Their respective remedies, and first 
of such as do no amountto Dispossession", pp. 
1-31. 
Lecture'XV: "Of The Remaining injuries to Real 
Property", pp. 32-74. 
Lecture XV: "Of The Several Species of Personal 
Property and of the Original Means of Acquiring 
it". pp. 72-100. 
Kings 96 Lecture XVI. "Of The Several Methods of Acquir- 
ing and losing Personal Property without the 
consent of The former Owners", pp. 1-35. 
Lecture XVII: "Of The Several Methods of Trans- 
ferring Personal Property. with the Consent of 
the former Owners", pp. 36-66. 
Lecture XVIII: "Of The Injuries Affecting Per- 
sonal Property and Their Respective Remedies", 
pp. 67-90. 
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Kings 97 Lecture XIX: "Of Private Rights as Protected 
by Cour: b5 of Equity, and first of cases of 
Securities for Money Lent", pp. 1-20. 
Lecture XX" "Of The distribution of Justice in 
Courts of Equity with Respect to Contracts", 
pp. 29-52. 
Lecture XXI: "Of The Distribution of Justice 
in Courts of Equity with respect to Fiduciary 
Property", pp. 23-83. 
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